mm 



THE 



PKINCIPLES 



MORALITY, 



PRIVATE AND POLITICAL RIGHTS ANQ 
OBLIGATIONS OF MANKIND. 



JONATHAN DYMOND. 



ABRIDGED, AND PROVIDED WITH QUESTIONS, 

FOR THE 



USE OF SCHOOLS AND OF YOUNG PERSONS GENERALLS^ 
CAROLINE M. KIRKLAND. 




NEW YO] 
C. S. FRANCIS & CO., 252 BROADWAY. • 

BOSTON: 
J. H. FRANCIS, 128 WASHINGTON ST. 

1842. 



Entered according to Act of Congress^ in the year 1842, 

By C. S. Francis & Co., 

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the Southern District 
of New York. 



i"3 



PRINTED BY 
UUNROE AND FRANCS, BOSTON. 



TO THAT ^ I 



SMALL, BUT INCKEASING NTJMBER, 



(WHETHER IN THIS COUNTRY OR ELSEWHERE,) 



MAINTAIIM IJSI PRmCIPLE, AND ILLUSTRATE BY THEIR 
PRACTICE, 

THE GREAT DUTY 

OF CONFORMING TO THE 

LAWS OF CHRISTIAN MORALITY, 

WITHOUT REGARD TO 

DANGERS OR PRESENT ADVANTAGES, 

THIS WORK 

IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED 



PREFACE. 



The Essays which are here offered in an abridged 
form to the public, have been, not unjustly, ranked 
among the wonderful productions of our day. Their 
author, Jonathan Dymond, — a young man destitute 
alike of the gifts of fortune and of the advantages 
of scholastic leisure, — pursued his researches after 
moral truth within the narrow precincts of a linen- 
draper's shop, from which humble source he drew his 
subsistence. Throughout the tedious course of the 
lingering and painful disease, which brought him to 
the grave at the age of thirty-two, the unabated ener- 
gies of an acute and pious mind were devoted to the 
task of laying before his countrymen and the world a 
system of morality which should differ from all those 
which had hitherto obtained currency, in the great 
point of an exclusive gospel foundation. Rejecting 
every intermediate consideration — every device or 
indulgence of human, and, of course, short-sighted, 
expediency — every effort to accommodate the simple 
precepts of the Savior to the corruptions or the weak- 
ness of men, — this single-minded inquirer after 
heavenly truth allowed but one question as to any 
1* 



6 



PREFACE. 



practice or sentiment, however plausible or popular, — 
How does this agree with the spirit of the gospel? " 
Far from searching out isolated texts or ingenious in- 
terpretations, in order to obtain a seeming sanc- 
tion for this or the other darling dogma of the 
present day, or in order to conciliate the prejudices of 
the worldly or the learned, Dymond appears to have 
given his whole soul to the study of the entire Bible, 
with the pure hope of enabling himself to exhibit to 
his fellow-beings, in a condensed form, the system of 
morality which his pious mind discovered divinely set 
forth in its pages. 

To put such a work as this into a form which 
should render it accessible to all, seemed a worthy 
attempt ; and it has even been hoped that this little 
book might fall into the hands of some who would be 
led by its perusal to inquire for the original and far 
more interesting and instructive volume. To the use 
of schools, and of young people generally, this abridg- 
ment is especially commended, as presenting in a 
miniature form, and yet in identical language, the 
essence of the entire work. 

duestions have been appended, not only because 
they are usual in school books, but because they are 
believed to offer the best mode by which the young 
may incorporate with their own minds the wisdom of 
the wise. A nice observer and a kind counsellor of 
young people, the late Richard Sharp, remarks on 
this mode of instruction in these words: — 



PREFACE. 



7 



1 never did expect much from merely didactic 
lectures. Knowledge can never be truly ours till we 
have appropriated it by some operation of our own 
minds. The best writers on property in land attrib- 
ute that right to the first proprietor having blended 
his labor with the soil. Something like this is true 
of intellectual attainments. The best mode of teach- 
ing children moral philosophy would be by giving 
each pupil a set of questions, such as — 

* Why should truth be spoken 1 ' 

* Why should a promise be kept ? — a debt paid 1 ' 

* What is the meaning of the word ought 

In the selection of questions, it has been principally 
desired to arouse the student's whole mind into ac- 
tivity, rather than to test his memory only. Intelligent 
teachers, however, will doubtless find much occasion 
to vary the questions, according to the age or advance- 
ment of different pupils. It would be impossible to 
contrive a set of questions which should be equally 
suitable to all. 

In conclusion, it may be allowable to observe that, 
though these Essays were the production of a strictly- 
consistent member of the Society of Friends, yet very 
few pages exhibit any thing of a denominational bias, 
and not one a trace of sectarian spirit. The style, 
though Doric in its simplicity, has yet a majesty which 
is the natural result of the writer's profound convic- 
tion of the truths he was imparting. Firmness and 
modesty, energy and mildness, are the characteris- 



i 



8 



PREFACE. 



tics of the book, as they were those of the lament- 
ed author. And it may safely be said, that he who 
shall thoroughly imbibe its precepts, may hope to 
become one of the happiest, as well as the most hon- 
orable, dignified, and excellent, of human beings. 



CONTENTS. 



Pag«. 

Introductory Notices • •• 13 



ESSAY I. 

PART 1. — PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 

Chap. I. — Moral Obligation 15 

Chap. IL— Standard of Right and Wrong. — The WUl of 

God. — The Communication of the Will of God 16 

Chap. IIL — Subordinate Standards of Right and Wrong. 24 
Chap. IV. — Identical Authority of Moral and Religious 

Obligations. — The Divine Attributes. — Virtue 25 

Chap. V. — Scripture. — The Morality of the Patriarchal, 
Mosaic, and Christian Dispensations. — Mode of apply- 
ing the Precepts of Scripture to Questions of Duty. 

— Benevolence, as it is proposed in the Christian 
Scriptures 28 

Chap. VI. — The immediate Communication of the Will of 
God. Sect. I. Conscience, its Nature and Author- 
ity. — Review of Opinions respecting a Moral Sense. 

— Immediate Communication of the Will of God .... 36 

PART II. — SUBORDINATE MEANS OF DISCOVERING 
THE DIVINE WILL. 

Chap. I.— The Law of the Land 51 

Chap. II. — The Law of Nature 55 

Chap. III.— Utility 60 

Chap. IV. — The Law of Nations. — The Law of Honor, 

r Sect. I. The Law of Nations. Sect. II. The 

Law of Honor 63 



]0 



CONTENTS. 



ESSAY II. 

PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 

Page. 



Chap. 1. — Religious Obligations. — Sabbatical Institu- 
tions 69 

Chap. II. — Property 74 

Chap. 111. — Inequality of Property 84 

Chap. IV. — Litigation. — Arbitration 87 

Chap. V. — The Morality of Legal Practice 89 

Chap. VI. — Promises. — Lies 95 

Chap. VII. — Oaths. — Their Moral Character: their 
Efficacy as Securities for Veracity : their Effects. 
— Efficacy of Oaths as Securities for Veracity. — Ef- 
fects of Oaths 101 

Chap. VIII. — Immoral Agency 108 

Chap. IX. — Influence of Individuals upon Public Opin- 
ion . . 112 

Chap. X. — Intellectual Education 120 

Chap. XI. — Moral Education 127 

Chap. XII. — Education of the People 133 

Chap. XIII. — Amusements 136 

Chap. XIV. — Duelling 140 

Chap. XV. — Suicide 142 

Chap. XVI. — Rights of Self-defence 145 



ESSAY III. 

POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 

Chap. I. — Principles of Political Truth and Political 
Rectitude. — I. Pohtical Power is rightly possessed 
only when it is possessed by Consent of the Com- ^ 
munity. — II. Political Power is rightly exercised 



CONTENTS. 11 

Page. 

only when it subserves the Welfare of the Com- 
munity. — III. Political Power is rightly exercised 
only when it subserves the Welfare of the Communi- 
ty by Means which the Moral Law permits 151 

Chap. 11. — Civil Liberty 158 

Chap. 111.— -Political Liberty 159 

Chap. IV. — Religious Liberty 160 

Chap. V. — Civil Obedience 162 

Chap. VI. — Forms of Government 167 

Chap. Vll. — Political Influence. — Party 172 

Chap. Vlll. — Moral Legislation 174 

Chap. IX. — Administration of Justice 176 

Chap. X. — Of the popular Subjects of penal Animad- 
version , 179 

Chap. XI. — Of the proper Ends of Punishment 182 

Chap. XII. — Punishment of Death 184 

Chap. XIII. — Religious Establishments 189 

Chap. XIV. — Patriotism 192 

Chap. XV. — Slavery 195 

Chap. XVI. — War. — Causes of War. — Consequences 
of War. — Lawfulness of War. — Of the probable 
Effects of adhering to the Moral Law in Respect to 
War m 



Conclusion 222 



QUESTIONS 



225 



INTRODUCTORY NOTICES. 



1. Of the two causes of deviations from rectitude 
— want of knowledge and want of virtue — the latter 
is undoubtedly the more operative. Want of knowl- 
edge is, however, sometimes a cause ; nor can this be 
any subject of wonder, when it is recollected in what 
manner many of our notions of right and wrong are 
acquired. From infancy, every one is placed in a sort 
of moral school, in which those with whom he asso- 
ciates, or of whom he hears, are the teachers. That 
the learner in such a school will often be taught amiss, 
is plain ; so that we want information respecting our 
duties. To supply this information, is the object of 
moral philosophy, and is attempted in the present work. 

2. It is believed that the existing treatises on moral 
philosophy have not exhibited the principles and en- 
forced the obligations of morality in all their perfec- 
tion and purity. Perhaps the expression of this belief 
is not inconsistent with that deference which it be- 
comes every man to feel when he addresses the public ; 
because, not to have entertained such a belief, were 
to have possessed no reason for writing. 

3. In the First Essay, the writer has attempted to 
investigate the principles of morality ; in which term 
is here included, first, the ultimate standard of right 
and wrong ; and, secondly, those subordinate rules to 
which we are authorized to apply for the direction of 
our conduct in life. In these investigations, he has 
been solicitous to avoid any approach to curious or 
metaphysical inquiry. He has endeavored to act upon 

2 



14 



INTRODUCTORY NOTICES. 



the advice given by Tindal, the reformer, to his friend 
John Frith : Pronounce not, nor define of hid se- 
crets, or things that neither help nor hinder whether 
it be so or no ; but stick you stiffly and stubbornly in 
earnest and necessary things." 

4. In the Second Essay, these principles of moral- 
ity are applied in the determination of various ques- 
tions of personal and relative duty. In selecting from 
the unnumbered particulars to which this Essay might 
have been extended, form has been sacrificed to utility. 
Many great duties have been passed over, since no 
one questions their obligation. The subjects which 
have been chosen were selected as furnishing illus- 
trations of the general principles; as the compiler of 
a book of mathematics proposes a variety of examples, 
not merely to discover the solution of a particular 
problem, but to familiarize the application of his gen- 
eral rule. 

5. Of the Third Essay, in which some of the great 
questions of political rectitude have been examined, 
the subjects are in themselves sufficiently important. 
The application of sound and pure moral principles 
to questions of government, of legislation, of the ad- 
ministration of justice, or of religious establishments, 
is manifestly of great interest; the greater, because 
these subjects have usually been examined, as the wri- 
ter conceives, by other and very different standards. 

6. If the reader should find in each of these Essays 
some principles or some conclusions respecting human 
duties, to which he has not been accustomed, the au- 
thor hopes for his candid investigation of the truth. 
It is hoped that he will not find himself invited to alter 
his opinions or his conduct without being shown why; 
and that, if he is conclusively shown this, he will not 
reject truth because it is new or unwelcome. 



15 



ESSAY I. 
PART I. 

PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 



CHAPTER L 

MORAL OBLIGATION. 

7. To propose a precise definition of moral obliga- 
tion can be of little practical importance. Many who 
dispute about the definition coincide in their judgment 
of what we are obliged to do and to forbear ; and so 
long as the individual knows that he is actually the 
subject of moral obligation, and actually responsible 
to a superior power, it is not of much consequence 
whether he can critically explain in what moral obli- 
gation consists. 

8. No attempt, therefore, is made at strictness of 
definition. It is sufficient for our purpose that man 
is under an obligation to obey his Creator; and if any 
one curiously asks, "Why?" — we answer, that one 
reason at least is, that the Deity possesses the power, and 
evinces the intention, to call the human species to ac- 
count for their actions, and to punish or reward them. 

9. There may be, and T believe there are, higher 
grounds upon which a sense of moral obligation may 
be founded ; such as the love of goodness for its own 
sake, or love and gratitude to God for his beneficence: 
nor is it unreasonable to suppose that such grounds 
of obligation are especially approved by the universal 
Parent of mankind. 



1 



16 PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. ' 

i 

CHAPTER IL I 

i 

\ 

STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG. \ 

\ 

10. It is obvious that to him who seeks the knowl- j 
edge of his duty, the first inquiry is, " What is the rule j 
of duty? What is the standard of right and wrong? i 
Most men, or most of those with whom we are con- j 
cerned, agree that this standard consists in the will | 
of God. 

11. But here the coincidence of opinion stops, i 
Various and very dissimilar answers are given to | 
the question, How is the will of God to be disco v- J 
ered?'' These differences lead to differing conclu- | 
sions respecting human duty. All the proposed { 
modes of discovering his will cannot be the best | 
nor the right ; and those which are not right are | 
likely to lead to erroneous conclusions respecting | 
what his will is. 1 

12. It becomes, therefore, a question of very great 
interest, How is the will of God to be discovered? " 



the will of god. 

13. When we say that most men agree in referring j 
to the will of God as the standard of rectitude, we do 
not mean that all those who have framed systems of . 
moral philosophy have set out with this proposition as \ 
their fundamental rule; but we mean that the majority j 
of mankind do really believe (with whatever indis- , 
tinctness) that they ought to obey the will of God ; ^ 
and that, as it respects the systems of philosophical / 
men, they will commonly be found to involve, directly | 
or indirectly, the same belief. ' 

14. One"^ proposes the understanding as the means j 

* Dr. Price : Review of principal Questions in Morals. 



PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 



17 



of discovering our duty ; but every one perceives that 
the understandings of men are often contradictory in 
their decisions ; and the understanding itself, however 
we define it, is the offspring of the divine counsels 
and power. 

15. Adam Smith resolves moral obligation into 
propriety arising from feelings of sympathy but 
these feelings are manifestly the result of that consti- 
tution which God gave to man. 

16. Bishop Butler says, We ought to live according 
to nature^^ and make conscience the judge whether 
we do so live or not. Here a kindred observation 
arises; for the existence and nature of conscience 
must be referred ultimately to the divine will. 

17. The theories of Dr. Samuel Clarke, and of 
Wollaston, though differing in some points, refer us, 
with almost equal distinctness, to the will of God, as 
our ultimate guide. And it is the same with Dr. Pa- 
ley, in his far-famed doctrine of expediency. It is 
the utility of any action alone which constitutes the 
obligation of it ; " but this very obligation is deduced 
from the will of God. Every duty is a duty towards 
God, since it is his will that makes it a duty." 

18. Besides the important objections which apply 
to these systems separately, there is one which applies 
to them all — that they do not refer us directly to 
the will of God. They interpose a medium; and it 
is the inevitable tendency of all such mediums to ren- 
der the truth uncertain. They seek the will of God 
not from positive evidence, but by implication ; and 
we repeat the truth that every medium which is inter- 
posed between the divine will and our estimates of 
it, diminishes the probability that we shall estimate it 
rightly. 

19. These are considerations which, antecedently 
to all others, would prompt us to seek the will of God, 
directly and immediately; and it is evident that this 

2* 



18 



PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 



direct and immediate knowledo^e of the divine will 
can in no other manner be possessed than by his own 
communication of it. 



THE COMMUNICATION OF THE WILL OF GOD. 

20. That a direct communication of the will of the 
Deity respecting the conduct which mankind shall 
pursue, must be very useful to them, can need little 
proof It is sufficiently obvious that those who have 
had no access to his written revelations have com- 
monly entertained very imperfect views of right and 
wrong. We do not sufficiently consider for how much 
knowledge respecting the divine will we are indebted 
to his own communication of it. Of Lord Herbert's 
book De Veritate, which was designed to disprove the 
validity of revelation, it is observed by the editor of 
his '^Life," that it is a book so strongly imbued with 
the light of revelation relative to the moral virtues 
and a future life, that no man ignorant of the Scrip- 
tures, or of the knowledge derived from them, could 
have written it." 

21. But if, in fact, we obtain from the commumca- 
tion of the will of God, knowledge of wider extent 
and of a higher order than was otherwise attainable, 
is it not an argument that that communicated will 
should be our supreme law, and that, if any of the in- 
ferior means of acquiring moral knowledge lead to 
conclusions in opposition to that Vvill, they ought to 
give way to its higher authority? 

22. If we examine those sacred volumes in which 
the written expression of the divine will is contained, 
we find that they habitually proceed upon the sup- 
position that the will of God, being expressed, is for 
that reason our final law. They do not set about 
formal proofs that we ought to sacrifice inferior rules 
to it, but conclude, as of course, that, if the will of 



PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 



19 



God is made known, human duty is ascertained. 
We hear nothing of any other ultimate authority; 
nothing of '^sympathy;" nothing of the '^eternal 
fitness of things;" nothing of the production of the 
greatest sum of enjoyment ; " — but we hear repeat- 
edly, constantly, of the will of God; of the voice of 
God ; of the commands of God. The whole system 
of moral legislation, as it is exhibited in Scripture, is 
a system founded upon authority. Thus saith the 
Lord," is regarded as constituting a sufficient and a 
final law. So with the moral instructions of Christ. 

I say unto you," is proposed as the sole, and suf- 
ficient, and ultimate ground of obligation. The rea- 
S071 of a precept is not often assigned. This is not 
the ground upon which God expects the obedience of 
man. We can, undoubtedly, in general, perceive the 
wisdom of his laws ; and it is, doubtless, right to seek 
out that wisdom ; but whether we discover it or not, 
does not lessen their authority, nor alter our duties. 

23. We conclude, then, that the communicated will 
of God is the final standard of right and wrong; that 
wheresoever this will is made known, human duty is 
determined ; and that neither the conclusions of 
philosophers, nor advantages, nor dangers, nor pleas- 
ures, nor sufferings, ought to have any opposing 
influence in altering our conduct. Let it be remem- 
bered that in morals there can be no equilibrium of 
authority. If the expressed will of the Deity is not 
our supreme rule, some other is superior. This fatal 
consequence is inseparable from the adoption of any 
other ultimate rule of conduct. The divine law be- 
comes the decision of a certain tribunal ; the adopted 
rule, the decision of a superior tribunal ; for that 
must needs be the superior which can reverse the 
decisions of the other. It is a consideration, too, 
which may reasonably alarm the inquirer, that, if once 
we assume this power of dispensing with the divine 



20 



PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 



law, there is no limit to its exercise. If we may 
supersede one precept of the Deity upon one occasion, 
we may supersede every precept upon all occasions. 
Man becomes the greater authority, and God the less, 

24. To a considerate man, it will be no subject of 
wonder, that the supremacy of the expressed will of 
God is often not recognized in the waitings of moralists, 
or in the practice of life. The moralist acknowledges, 
perhaps, the authority of revelation ; but in his inves- 
tigations he passes away from the precepts of revela- 
tion, to some of those subordinate means by which 
human duties may be discovered — means which, 
however authorized by the Deity as subservient to his 
purpose of human instruction, are wholly unauthorized 
as ultimate standards of right and wrong. Again, an 
influential motive to pass by the divine precepts, 
operates both upon wTiters and upon the public ; 
the rein w^hich they hold upon the desires and passions 
of mankind, is more tight than they are willing to 
bear. Here is an obvious motive to the writer to 
endeavor to substitute some less rigid rule of conduct, 
and an obvious motive to the reader to acquiesce in it 
as true, without a very rigid scrutiny into its founda- 
tion. To adhere with fidelity to the expressed will 
of Heaven, requires greater confidence in God than 
most men are willing to repose, or than most moral- 
ists are willing to recommend. 

25. Of all those principles which have been pro- 
posed as the standard of rectitude, that which obtains 
the greatest share of approbation in the world, is the 
principle of directing every action so as to produce 
the greatest happiness and the least misery in our 
power." The particular forms of defining this doc- 
trine are various; but they may be conveniently inclu- 
ded in the one general term, expedicnry. 

26. The apparent beauty and excellence of this 
rule of action are so captivating, its actual acceptance 



PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 



21 



in the world is so great, and the reasonings by which 
it is supported are so acute, that if it can be shown 
that this rule is not the ultimate standard of right and 
wrong, we may safely conclude that none other which 
philosophy can propose can make pretensions to such 
authority. 

27. The only question is, whether the principle of 
expediency ought to be the paramount rule of human 
conduct. No one doubts whether it ought to influ- 
ence us, or whether it is of great importance in esti- 
mating the duties of morality. The sole question is 
this : When an expression of the will of God, and 
our calculations respecting human happiness, lead to 
different conclusions respecting the rectitude of an 
action, — whether of the two shall we prefer and obey ? 

28. Bearing in mind that the doctrine of expediency 
is objectionable only where it is made an ultimate 
rule, the reader is invited to attend to these short 
considerations. 

29. 1. In computing human happiness, the advo- 
cate of expediency does not sufficiently take into ac- 
count our happiness in futurity. Nor, indeed, does he 
always take it into account at all. Now, many things 
might be very expedient, if death were annihilation, 
which may be very inexpedient now ; and therefore 
it is not unreasonable to expect, nor an unreasonable 
exercise of humility to act upon the expectation, that 
the divine laws may sometimes impose obligations of 
which we do not perceive the expediency or the use. 
This sufficiently indicates that expediency is wholly 
inadmissible as an ultimate rule. 

30. 11. The doctrine is altoorether unconnected 
with the Christian revelation, or with any revelation 
from Heaven. The alleged supreme law of morality, 

Whatever is expedient is right," might have been 
taught by Epictetus as well as by a modern Christian. 
But are we, then, to be told that the revelations from 



22 



PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 



the Deity have conveyed no moral knowledge to raan ? 
that they make no act obligatory which was not obli- 
gatory before ? that he who had the fortune to discover | 
that whatever is expedient is right/' possessed a mor- 
al law just as perfect as that which God has ushered 
into the world, and much more comprehensive ? 

31. III. If some subordinate rule of conduct were 
proposed, I should not think it a valid objection to its \ 
correctness that no sanction of the principle was to j 
be found in the written revelation ; but if some rule 
of conduct were proposed as being of universal obli- 1 
gation, and I discovered that this principle was un- j 
sanctioned by the written revelation, I should think 
this want of sanction was conclusive evidence against \ 
it; because it is not credible that a revelation from J 
God would have been silent respecting a rule of con- | 
duct which was to be a universal guide to man. We 
apply these considerations to the doctrine of expedi- 
ency : Scripture contains not a ivord upon the subject. 

32. IV. The principle of expediency necessarily 
proceeds upon the supposition that we are to investi- 
gate the future ; and this investigation is, as every 
one knows, peculiarly without the limits of human 
sagacity — an objection which derives additional force i 
from the circumstance that an action, in order to be | 
expedient, must be expedient on the whole, at the \ 
long run, in all its effects, collateral and rem.ote." * I 
do not know whether, if a man should sit down ex- 
pressly to devise a moral principle which should be 
uncertain and difficult in its application, he could 
devise one which would be more difficult and un- 
certain than this. 

33. V. But whatever may be the propriety of in- 
vestigating all consequences, collateral and remote," 
it is certain that such an investigation is possible only 

i 

* Mor. and Pol. Phil., b. 2, c. 8. ' 



PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 



23 



in that class of moral questions which allows a man 
time to sit down, and deliberately to think and com- 
pute. As it respects that large class of cases in which 
a person must decide and act in a moment, it is whol- 
ly useless. 

34. VI. Lastly, the rule of expediency is deficient 
in one of the first requisites of a moral law — obvi- 
ousness and palpability of sanction. It is easy to 
perceive that the authority of a rule will not come 
home to that man's mind, who is told, respecting a 
given action, that its effect upon the universal interest 
is the only thing that makes it right or wrong. All 
the doubts that arise as to this effect are so many 
diminutions of the sanction. The principle, too, is 
liable to the most extravagant abuse ; or, rather, ex- 
travagant abuse is, in the present condition of man- 
kind, inseparable from its general adoption. What- 
ever is expedient is right,'' soliloquizes the moonlight 
adventurer into the poultry-yard ; it will tend more 
to the sum of human happiness that my wife and 1 
should dine on a capon than that the farmer should 
feel the satisfaction of possessing it ; " and so he 
mounts the hen-roost. I do not say that this hungry 
moralist would reason soundly ; but I say that he 
would not listen to the philosophy which replied, 
*^ O, your reasoning is incomplete : you must take 
into account all consequences, collateral and remote; 
and then you will find that it is more expedient, upon 
the whole, and at the long run, that you and your wife 
should be hungry, than that hen-roosts should be in- 
secure." 



35. An objection has probably presented itself to 
the reader, — The greater part of mankind having no 
access to a written law, how can that be the final 
standard of right and wrong for the human race, of 
which the majority of the race have never heard? 



PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 



36. We answer, first, that, supposing most men 
to be destitute of a communication of the divine will, 
this does not affect the obligations of those who do 
possess it. That communication is the final law to 
me, whether my African brother enjoys it or not. 

37. But our real reply to the objection is, that 
they who are destitute of Scripture are not destitute 
of a direct communication of the will of God. This 
direct communication may be limited, it may be in- 
complete; but some communication exists; enough 
to assure them that some things are acceptable to 
the Supreme Power, and that some are not ; enough 
to indicate a distinction between right and wrong ; 
enough to make them moral agents, and reasonably 
accountable to our common Judge. 

— —4- 

CHAPTER III. 

SUBORDINATE STANDARDS OF RIGHT AND WRONG. 

38. To a son who is obliged to regulate all his 
actions by his father's will, there are two ways in 
which he may practise obedience — one by receiving, 
upon each subject, his father's direct instructions, 
and the other by receiving instructions from those 
whom his father commissions to teach him. The 
parent may appoint a governor, and enjoin that, upon 
all questions of a certain kind, the son shall conform 
to his instructions; and if the son does this, he really 
and truly conforms to his father's will. But, if the 
father has laid down certain general rules for his son's 
observance, — as that he shall devote ten hours a day 
to studyj and not less, — although the governor should 
recommend, or even command, him to devote fewer 



PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 



25 



hours, he may not comply ; for, if he does, the gov- 
ernor, and not his father, is his supreme guide. The 
subordination is destroyed. 

39. This case illustrates, perhaps with sufficient 
precision, the situation of mankind with respect to 
moral rules. Our Creator has given direct laws, some 
general and some specific. These are of final au- 
thority. But he has also sanctioned, or permitted an 
application to, other rules; and, in conforming to 
these, so long as we hold them in subordination to 
his laws, we perform his will. 

40. Some of the subordinate rules of conduct it 
will be proper hereafter to notice, in order to discov- 
er, if we can, how far their authority extends, and 
where it ceases. The observations that we shall have 
to offer upon them will be under these heads : The 
Law of the Land; The Law of Nature; The Pro- 
motion of Human Happiness, (or Expediency;) The 
Law of Nations; and the Law of Honor. These 
observations will, however, necessarily be preceded 
by some preparatory inquiries. 

♦ 

CHAPTER IV. 

(Which is to be regarded as parenthetical.) 

IDENTICAL AUTHORITY OF MORAL AND RELIGIOUS 
OBLIGATIONS. 

4L This identity is a truth to which we do not 
sufficiently advert, either in our habitual sentiments 
or in our practice. There are many persons who 
speak religious duties as if there were something 
sacred in their obligation, that does not belong to the 
duties of morality, — many who would perhaps rather 
3 



26 



PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 



offer up their lives than profess a belief in a false re- 
ligious dogma, but who would scarcely sacrifice an 
hour's gratification to avoid violating the moral law 
of love. It is therefore important to remember that 
the authority which imposes moral obligations and re- 
ligious obligations, is one and the same — the will of 
God. Not, indeed, that every violation of the divine 
will involves equal guilt, but that each violation is 
equally a disregard of divine authority. 

42. I would earnestly solicit the reader to bear in 
mind this principle of the identity of the authority of 
moral and religious obligations, because he may oth- 
erwise imagine that, in some of the subsequent pages, 
the obligation of a moral law is too strenuously in- 
sisted on, and that fidelity to it is to be purchased 

at too great a sacrifice of ease and enjoyment." 



THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 

43. The purpose for which a reference is here 
made to these sacred subjects, is to remark upon the 
unfitness of attempting to deduce human duties from 
the attributes of God. The truth is, that we do not 
accurately know what the divine attributes are. We 
say that God is merciful ; but if we attempt to define 
with strictness what the term merciful means, and 
especially if we attempt to reconcile the appearances 
which present themselves in the world with our no- 
tions of mercy, we shall find a difficult, if not an 
impracticable task. It is plain, then, that we cannot 
deduce rules for our conduct from the divine attri- 
butes without being very liable to error. 

44. Yet this is a rock upon which the judgments 
of many have suffered wreck. One, because he can- 
not reconcile the command to exterminate a people 
with his notions of the attribute of mercy, questions 
the truth of the Mosaic writings. Another, on the 



PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 



27 



supposition of the unchangeableness of God, per* 
plexes himself because the dispensations and the laws 
of the Almighty have been changed. We have no 
business with these things ; and I will venture to affirm 
that he who will exercise no faith — who will believe 
in the divine authority of no rule which he is unable 
to reconcile with the divine attributes — must be 
consigned to hopeless skepticism. 

45. The lesson which such considerations teach is 
an important one — that our business is to discover 
the actual, present will of God, without seeking to 
deduce from our notions of his attributes, rules of 
conduct which are more safely and more certainly 
discovered by other means. 



VIRTUE. 

46. The definitions which have been proposed of 
virtue have been both numerous and various, because 
many and discordant standards of rectitude have been 
advanced. 

47. Our definition of virtue necessarily accords 
with the principles of morality which have been ad- 
vanced in the preceding chapter : Virtue is conformity/ 
with the standard of rectitude ; which standard con- 
sists primarily in the expressed will of God. 

48. Virtue, as it respects the meritoriousness of 
the agent, is another consideration. The quality of 
the action is one thing, the desert of the agent is 
another. 

49. Although the concern of a work like the pres- 
ent is evidently with the moral character of actions, 
without reference to the motives of the agent, yet the 
remark may be allowed, that there is frequently a 
sort of inaccuracy and unreasonableness in the judg- 
ments which we form of the deserts of other men. 

regard the act too much, and the intention too 



28 



PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 



little. We should endeavor to correct this inequality 
of judgment. It should habitually be borne in mind, 
with reference to our own conduct, that to have been 
unable to execute an ill intention deducts nothing 
from our guilt; and with regard to others, who desire 
to do good, but have not the power, that their virtue 
is not diminished by their want of ability. 



CHAPTER V. 
SCRIPTURE. 

THE MORALITY OF THE PATRIARCHAL, MOSAIC, AND 
CHRISTIAN DISPENSATIONS. 

50. In perusing the volume of Scripture, we per- 
ceive that there are three distinctly-defined periods, 
in which the moral government and laws of the Deity 
assume, in some respects, a different character. 

51. That the records of all these dispensations con- 
tain declarations of the will of God, is certain ; that 
their moral requisitions are not always coincident, is 
also certain ; and hence the conclusion becomes in- 
evitable, that to us one is of primary authority. That 
a coincidence does not always exist, may easily be 
shown. 

52. One example, referring to the Christian and 
Jewish dispensations, may be found in the extension 
of the law of love. Christianity requires us to abstain 
from that which the law of Moses permitted us to do. 
Thus, in the Sermon on the Mount, It hath been 
said hy them of old time, Thou shalt love thy neighbor 
and hate thine enemy ; but / say unto you, Love your 
enemies." 

53. But, though this change appears to be thus 



PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 



29 



clear with respect to the Jewish dispensation, there 
are some who regard the moral precepts delivered be- 
fore that dispensation, as imposing permanent obliga- 
tions. To this we might answer, " If the precepts 
of the patriarchal and Christian dispensations are co- 
incident, no question need be discussed ; if they are 
not, surely the Christian cannot doubt what election 
he should make." 

54. We, indeed, have, if it be possible, still stronger 
motives. The moral law of Christianity binds us, not 
merely because it is the present expression of the will 
of God, but because it is a portion of his last dispen- 
sation to man. 

55. There are motives of gratitude, too, and of af- 
fection, as well as of reason. The clearer exhibition 
which Christianity gives us of the attributes of God ; 
its distinct disclosure of our immortal destinies; and, 
above all, its wonderful discovery of the love of our 
universal Father, — may well give to the moral law 
with which they are connected, an authority which 
should supersede every other. 

56. These considerations are of practical impor- 
tance; for it may be observed of those who do not 
advert to them, that they sometimes refer indiscrim- 
inately to the Old Testament and the New, without 
any other guide than the apparent greater applicability 
of a precept, in the one or the other, to their present 
need. It is a fact which the reader should especially 
notice, that an appeal to the Hebrew Scriptures is 
frequently made when the precepts of Christianity 
would he too rigid for our purpose. 

57. It may be regarded as a general rule, that none 
of the injunctions or permissions which formed a part 
of the former dispensations, can be referred to as of 
authority to us, except so far as they are coincident 
with the Christian law. To our own Master we stand 
or fall ; and our Master is Christ. 

3* 



30 



PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 



58. Let not the reader suppose that we would speak 
or feel towards these superseded laws otherwise than 
as their origin demands. They were the laws of God ; 
and in all the dispensations there is a harmony, a one 
pervading principle, which sufficiently indicates their 
common origin. The Mosaic dispensation was a 
" schoolmaster to bring us to Christ. 



59. Respecting the variations of the moral law, 
some persons needlessly perplex themselves by indul- 
ging in such questions as this : If God be perfect, 
and all the dispensations communications of his will, 
how happens it that they are not uniform in their 
requisitions?" I answer, I cannot tell. And what 
then ? If inability to discover the reasons of the moral 
government of God be a good motive to doubt its au- 
thority, may involve ourselves in doubts without 
end. — Why does a Being who is infinitely pure, per- 
mit moral evil in the world ? Why does he who is 
perfectly benevolent, permit physical suffering? Why 
was the Messiah's appearance deferred for four thou- 
sand years? To these and a multitude of similar 
questions no answer can be given. But he who will 
not believe in a Deity unless he can reconcile all the 
facts before his eyes with his notions of the divine 
attributes, must deny that a Deity exists. 

60. It is instructive to observe into what absurdities 
those writers are led who attempt to reconcile some 
of the facts before us with the moral perfections" 
of the Deity. These things are beacons which should 
warn us. The speculations show that not only re- 
ligion, but reason, dictates the propriety of acquiescing 
in that degree of ignorance in which it has pleased 
God to leave us; because they show that attempts to 
acquire knowledge may conduct us to folly. These 
are subjects upon which he acts most rationally, who 
Bays to his reason, " Be still." 



PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 



31 



MODE OF APPLYING THE PRECEPTS OF SCRIPTURE 
TO QUESTIONS OF DUTY. 

61. It is manifest that considerable care is requi- 
site in the application of precepts delivered, — not sys- 
tematically, but occasionally, — distributed, without 
precision, through occasional discourses and letters, — 
to the conduct of life. To apply them in all cases 
literally, would be to act neither reasonably nor con- 
sistently with the design of the Lawgiver : to regard 
them, in all cases, as mere general directions, and to 
subject them to* the unauthorized revision of man, 
were to deprive them of their proper character and 
authority as divine laws. From the fact that the 
moral duties are to be gathered rather by implication 
or general tenor than from specific and formal rules, 
as well as from many other indications, we perceive 
that the dispensation of which these precepts form a 
part, stands not in icords, but in poioer. Neither the 
morals nor the religion of Christianity can be ade- 
quately estimated by the man who sits down to the 
New Testament, with no other preparation than that 
which is necessary in sitting down to Euclid or New- 
ton. There must be some preparation of heart, as 
well as of understanding; it is necessary that we 
should become, in some degree, the sheep" of Christ, 
before we can accurately " know his voice." 

62. There is one clear and distinct ground upon 
which we may limit the application of a precept that 
is couched in absolute language — the lawfulness, in 
any given conjuncture, of obeying it. Submit your- 
selves to every ordinance of man." This is an un- 
conditional command. But if we were to obey it 
unconditionally, we should sometimes comply with 
human, in opposition to divine, laws. In such cases, 
the obligation is clearly suspended. 

63. Of some precepts, it is evident they were de- 



32 



PRINCIFLES OF MORALITY. 



signed to be understood conditionally.* Others are 
figurative, and describe the spirit and temper that 
should govern us, rather than the particular actions 
we should perform.! In promulgating some precepts, 
a principal object appears to have been to supply sanc- 
tions. Thus, in the case of civil obedience, we are 
to obey, not from considerations of necessity only, 
but of duty; '^not only for wrath, but for conscience' 
sake.'' One precept, if we accepted it literally, would 
enjoin us to accumulate no property ; and I once saw 
a book that endeavored to prove that such w^as its 
meaning. The principle upon whic'h the wTiter pro- 
ceeded was correct — that it is necessary to conform 
unconditionally to the expressed will of God. The 
defect was in ascertaining w^hat that will did actually 
require. 

64. But, in applying these limitations to the abso- 
lute precepts of Scripture, it is to be remembered that 
we are not subjecting their authority to inferior prin- 
ciples. We are not violating the principle upon which 
these Essays proceed — that the expression of the di- 
vine will is our ultimate law. We are only ascer- 
taining w^hat that expression is. There are many 
precepts w^hich stand imperative in their absolute 
form; and, being such, we allow no considerations of 
convenience, nor of expediency, nor of any other kind, 
to dispense with their authority. 



65. There are two modes in which moral obliga- 
tions are imposed in Scripture — by particular pre- 
cepts, and by general rules. The applicability of 
general rules is nearly similar to that of what is usual- 
ly called the spirit of the gospel — the sjm^it of the 
moral law. In this manner, some particular precepts 



* Matt. vi. 6. 



t Matt. v. 41. 



PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 



33 



become, in fact, general rules ; and the duty that re- 
sults from these rules — from this spirit — is as ob- 
ligatory as that which is imposed by a specific injunc- 
tion. 

66. The wide practical applicability of some of the 
Christian precepts is an argument of great wisdom. 
No number of specific precepts would be sufficient 
for the purposes of moral instruction ; so that, if we 
were destitute of general rules, we should frequently 
be destitute, so far as external precepts are concerned, 
of any. In the Mussulman code, which proceeds upon 
the system of a precise rule for a precise question, there 
have been promulgated seventy-jive thousand precepts. 



67. Of these wddely-applicable precepts, none is 
cited and recommended oftener than this : All things 
whatsoever ye w^ould that men should do to you^ do 
ye even so to them.'' The difficulty of applying this 
precept has induced some to reject it as containing a 
maxim which is not sound; but perhaps it w^ll be 
found that the deficiency is not in the rule, but in the 
non-applicability of the cases to which it has been ap- 
plied. It is not applicable when the act which anoth- 
er would that we should do to him is in itself unlawful, 
or adverse to some other portion of the moral law. 
If I seize a thief in the ^ct of picking a pocket, he 
undoubtedly " would " that I should let him go ; and 
I, if our situations were exchanged, would W'ish it too. 
But I am not therefore to release him ; because^ since 
it is a Christian obligation upon the magistrate to 
punish offenders, the obligation descends to me to 
secure them for punishment. 

68. Again, an idle and profligate man asks me to 
give him money. It would be wrong to indulge such 
a man's desire, and therefore the precept does not 
apply. 



! 

\ 

34 PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. [ 

69. Of the rule, *'not to do evil that good may | 
come," Dr. Paley says, It is, for the most part, a | 
salutary caution." A person might as well say that j 
the rule not to commit murder was a salutary cau- A 
Hon, The evil," which is thus prohibited, is, any \ 
thing and all things discordant with the divine will ; i 
so that the unsophisticated meaning of the rule is, that ? 
nothing which is contrary to the Christian law, may 1 
be done for the sake of attaining a beneficial end. \ 
There is no caution in the matter, but an impera- \ 
tive law. But Paley proceeds : Strictly speaking, 
that cannot be evil from which good comes." The < 
reader will perceive the foundation of this reasoning. i 
It assumes that good and evil are not to be estimated \ 
by the expression of the will of God, but by the effects \ 
of actions. The rule of Christianity is, Evil may \ 
not be committed for the purpose of good ; " the rule 

of this philosophy, Evil may not be committed ex- 
cept for the purpose of good." Are these precepts 
identical ? 

70. There is one subject of satisfaction in consid- 
ering such theories as these. They prove, negatively, 
the truths which they assail ; for that against which 
nothing but sophistry can be urged, is undoubtedly 
true. I 



BENEVOLENCE, AS IT IS PROPOSED IN THE CHRISTIAN j 

SCRIPTURES. I 

71. We discover one remarkable characteristic, 

one pervading peculiarity, in that moral system ! 

which the Christian revelation institutes — the para- | 

mount emphasis which it lays upon the exercise of ! 

pure benevolence. It will be found that this prefer- j 

ence of love " is wise as it is unexampled ; and that \ 

no other general principle would effect, with any ap- j 
proach to the same completeness, the best and high- 



PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 



3^ 



est purposes of morality. How easy soever it be for 
us, to whom the character and obligations of this be- 
nevolence are comparatively familiar, to perceive the 
wisdom of placing it at the foundation of the moral 
law, we are indebted for the capacity, not to our own 
sagaciousness, but to light which has been communi- 
cated from Heaven. Neither Moses nor the philoso- 
phers ever taught that love was the fulfilment of the 
moral law. Eighteen hundred years ago, this doctrine 
was a new commandment. 

72. The inculcation of this benevolence is as 
frequent in the Christian Scriptures as its practical 
utility is great. It is the theme of all the apostolic 
exhortations, that with which their morality begins^ 
and ends, from which all their details and enumera- 
tions set out, and into which they return." He 
that dwelleth in love, dwelleth in God, and God ia 
him." More emphatic language cannot be employed. 
If, then, of faith, hope, and love, love be the greatest, 
— if it be by the test of love that our pretensions to 
Christianity are to be tried, — if all the relative duties 
of morality are embraced in one word, and that word 
is love, — it is obviously needful that, in a book like 
this, the requisitions of benevolence should be ha- 
bitually regarded in the prosecution of its inquiries. 
And, accordingly, the reader will sometimes be invi- 
ted to sacrifice inferior considerations to these requi- 
sitions, and to give to the law of love that paramount 
station in which it has been placed by the authority 
of God. 

73. It is certain that almost every offence against 
the relative duties has its origin, if not in the malevo- 
lent propensities, at least in those which are incon- 
gruous with love. The universal applicability of this - 
great Christian law may be illustrated by referring 
to the obligations justice. He who estimates these 
obligations by a reference to that benevolence which 



36 



PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 



Christianity prescribes, will form to himself a much 
more pure and perfect standard than he who refers to 
the law of the land, to the apprehension of exposure, 
or to the desire of reputation. There are many ways 
in which a man can be unjust without censure from 
the public, and without violating the laws; but there 
is no way in which he may be so without disregarding 
Christian benevolence. It is a universal and very 
sensitive test. That integrity which is founded upon 
love, when compared with that which has any other 
basis, is recommended by its honor and dignity, as 
w^ell as by its rectitude. 

74. It is obvious that the obligations of this be- 
nevolence are not merely prohibitory, — directing us 
to avoid '^working ill'' to another, — but mandatory, 
— requiring us to do him good. To abstain from in- 
justice, from violence, from slander, is compatible 
with an extreme deficiency of love. In illustrating 
the obligations of morality, whether private or politi- 
cal, it will sometimes become necessary to state what 
this benevolence requires, as well as what it forbids. 
The legislator whose laws are contrived only for the 
detection and punishment of offenders, fulfils but half 
his duty ; if he would conform to the Christian stand- 
ard, he must provide also for their reformation. 



CHAPTER VL 

THE IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATION OF THE WILL 
OF GOD. 

75. In endeavoring to investigate this very serious 
subject, it is especially necessary to distinguish the 
communication of the will of God from those mental 
phenomena with which it has very commonly been 



PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 



intermingled and confounded. The want of this dis- 
tinction has occasioned a ^confusion which has been 
greatly injurious to the cause of truth. When an 
intelligent person perceives that infallible truth, or 
divine authority, is described as belonging to the 
dictates of conscience," and when he perceives, as 
he sometimes must perceive, that these dictates are 
various, and sometimes contradictory, he is in dan- 
ger of concluding that no unerring, no divine gui- 
dance is accorded to man. 

76. The first section of the present chapter will be 
devoted to some brief observations respecting the 
conscience, its nature and its authority. 



SECTION I. 

CONSCIENCE, ITS NATURE AND AUTHORITY. 

77. Men possess notions of right and wrong : they 
possess a belief that, under given circumstances, they 
ought to do one thing, or to forbear another. This 
belief I would call a conscientious belief And when 
such a belief exists in a man's mind, in reference to a 
number of actions, I would call the sum or aggregate 
of his notions respecting what is right and wrong, his 
conscience. 

78. To possess notions of right and wrong in 
human conduct, — to be convinced that we ought to 
do or to forbear an action, — implies and supposes a 
sense of obligation existent in the mind. 

79. In most men, — perhaps in all, — this sense of 
obligation refers, with greater or less distinctness, to 
the will of a superior Being. 

80. It is manifest that, if the sense of obligation is 
sometimes connected with subjects that are proposed 
to us merely by the instruction of others, or if the 

4 



38 



PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY, 



connection results from the power of association and 
habit, or from the fallible investigations of our own 
minds, — that sense of obligation will be connected, in 
different individuals, with different subjects. 

81. Such considerations enable us to account for 
the diversity of the dictates of the conscience in indi- 
viduals respectively. When, therefore, a person says. 

My conscience dictates to me that I ought to perform 
such an action," he means — or in the use of such 
language he ought to mean — that the sense of obli- 
gation which subsists in his mind, is connected with 
that action ; that, so far as his judgment is enlightened, 
it is a requisition of the law of God. 

82. But not all our opinions respecting morality 
and religion are derived from education or reasoning. 
He who finds in Scripture the precept, Thou shalt 
love thy neighbor as thyself," derives an opinion, 
with respect to the duty of loving others, from the 
discovery of this expression of the will of God. His 
understanding has been informed by the moral law, 
and a new duty is added to those which are dictated 
by his conscience. Thus it is that Scripture, by in- 
forming the judgment, extends the jurisdiction of 
conscience ; and it is hence, in part, that, in those 
who seriously study the Scriptures, the conscience ap- 
pears so much more vigilant and operative, than in 
many who do not possess, or who do not regard, them. 
Yet Scripture does not decide every question respect- 
ing human duty ; and, in some instances, individuals 
judge differently of the decisions which Scripture 
gives. This, again, occasions some diversity in the 
dictates of the conscience. 

83. But another portion of men's judgments re- 
specting moral affairs, is derived from immediate in- 
timations of the divine will. It does not, however, 
follow, by any sort of necessity, that this higher in- 
struction must correct all the mistakes of the judg- 



PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 



39 



ment ; that, because it imparts some light, that light 
must tre perfect day ; that, because it communicates 
some moral or religious truth, it must communicate 
all the truths of religion and morality ; — so that we 
are to expect, what in fact we find, that, although the 
judgment receives light from a superhuman intel- 
ligence, the degree of that light varies in individuals; 
and that the sense of obligation is connected with fewer 
subjects, and attended with less accuracy, in the minds 
of some men than of others. 

84. With respect to the authority which properly 
belongs to conscience, it appears manifest, alike from 
reason and from Scripture, that it is great. When a 
man believes, upon due deliberation, that a certain 
action is right, that action is right to Mm, And this 
is true, whether the action be or be not required 
by the moral law. The individual is to be held guilty 
if he violates his conscience ; if he does one thing 
when his sense of obligation is directed to its con- 
trary. Nor, if his judgment should not be accu- 
rately informed, if his sense of obligation should not 
be connected with a proper subject, is the guilt of vio- 
lating his conscience taken aw^ay. Dr. Furneaux says. 

To secure the favor of God and the rew^ards of true 
religion, we must follow our own consciences and 
judgment according to the best light w^e can attain.'' * 
And 1 am especially disposed to add the testimony 
of Sir William Temple, because he recognizes the 
doctrine which has just been advanced, — that our 
judgments are enlightened by superhuman agency. 
" The way of our future happiness must be left, at 
last, to the impressions made upon every man's belief 
and conscience, either by natural or supernatural 
arguments and means." 

85. One observation remains — that, although a man 
ought to make his conduct conform to his conscience, 

* Essay on Toleration. 



40 



PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 



yet he may sometimes justly be held criminal for the 
errors of his opinion. Men often judge amiss in con- 
sequence of their own faults ; some take little pains 
to ascertain the truth; and most men would possess 
more accurate perceptions of the moral law, if they 
sufficiently endeavored to obtain them. And there- 
fore, although a man may not be punished for a given 
act which he ignorantly supposes to be law^ful, he may 
be punished for that ignorance in which the supposi- 
tion originates. 

86. There is a degree of wickedness, to the agents 
of which God at length sends strong delusion," that 
they may believe a lie." The principles which have 
been here delivered, would lead us to suppose that 
the punishment which awaits such men w^ill have re- 
spect rather to that intensity of wickedness of which 
delusion was the consequence, than to those particular 
acts which they might ignorantly commit, under the 
influence of the delusion itself This observation is 
offered because some WTiters have obscured the 
present subject, by speculating upon the moral deserts 
of those desperately bad men, w^ho occasionally have 
committed atrocious acts under the notion that they 
were doing right. 

REVIEW OF OPINIONS RESPECTING A MORAL SENSE. 

87. The purpose of this brief review is to inquire, 
by a reference to the written opinions of many per- 
sons, whether they do not agree in asserting that our 
Creator communicates some portions of his moral law 
immediately to the human mind. 

88. Blair says, Conscience is felt to act as the 
delegate of an invisible Ruler." The reader will 
perceive the fundamental truth, that man is in fact 
illuminated, and illuminated by an invisible Ruler. 
The same author says, in another place, Under the 



PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 



41 



tuition of God let us put ourselves." A heavenly 
Conductor vouchsafes his aid." Divine light de- 
scends to guide our steps." 

89. The following is not less worthy of notice 
because it is from the pen of Lord Shaftesbury : 

Sense of right and wrong being as natural to us as 
natural affection itself, and being a first principle in 
our constitution and make, there is no speculation, 
opinion, persuasion, or belief, which is capable, im- 
mediately or directly, to exclude or destroy it." Now, 
we do not say that these sentiments are absolutely 
just, or that a sense of right and wrong is strictly 

natural" to man; but we say that the sentiments 
involve the supposition of some mode of divine 
guidance — some mode in which the moral law of 
Ood, or some part of it, is communicated by him to 
mankind. 

90. " The first principles of morals are the im- 
mediate dictates of the moral faculty." By the 
moral faculty, or conscience solely, we have the 
original conception of right and wrong." The 
Supreme Being has given us this light within to 
direct our moral conduct." . " It is the candle of 
the Lord set up within us to guide our steps." * This 
is almost the language of Christianity : That was 
the true Light, which lighteth every man that cometh 
into the world." I do not mean to affirm that the 
author of the Essays speaks exclusively of the same 

I divine guidance as the apostle ; but surely, if con- 
i science operates as such a "light within" as the 
I candle of the Lord," it can require no reasoninor to 
convince us that it is illuminated from Heaven. The 
indistinctness of notions which such language ex- 
hibits appears to arise from inaccurate views of the 
nature of conscience. The writer does not dis- 

I 

^ Dr. Reid : Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind. 

4* 



42 



PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 



tinguish between the enlightened principle and the 
enlightening beam. The apostle speaks only of the 
last ; the uninspired inquirer speaks, without dis- 
crimination, of both ; and hence the ambiguity. 

91. Dr. Beattie appears to maintain the same 
essential truth, under other phraseology. Common 
sense, he says, is that power of the mind which 
perceives truth, or commands belief, by an instanta- 
neous, instinctive, and irresistible impulse, neither 
derived from education nor from habit, but from 
nature^ ^' Every man may find the evidence of 
moral science in his own breast.^' An instinctive 
perception of truth, derived from nature, must neces- 
sarily be tantamount to a power of perception im- 
parted by the Deity. Dr. Beattie himself explains his 
own meaning : The dictates of nature, that is, the 
voice of God." 

92. Price, Watts, and Cudworth, advance similar 
opinions under various modes of expression. Voltaire, 
in his Commentary on Beccaria, says, I call natural 
laws those which Nature dictates, in all ages, to all 
men, for the maintenance of that justice which she 
(say what they will of her) hath implanted in our 
hearts." 

93. These impressions," says Dr. Shepherd, 
operating on the mind of man, bespeak a law writ- 
ten on his heart. 

94. Locke : The divine law, that law which God 
has set to the actions of men, whether promulgated 
to them by the light of nature or the voice of revela- 
tion, is the measure of sin and duty." 

95. Adam Smith : Though man has been ren- 
dered the immediate judge of mankind, an appeal lies 
from his sentence to a much higher tribunal — to the 
tribunal of their own consciences, to -that of the man 
within the breast, the great judge and arbiter of their 
conduct." Some questions must be left altogether 



PRINCIPLES OF MOPvALITY. 



43 



to the decision of the man within the breast. If we 
listen with diligent and reverential attention to what 
he suggests to us, his voice will never deceive us. 
We shall stand in no need of casuistic rules to direct 
our conduct." How nearly does this approach the 
language of Scripture ! The anointing which ye 
have received of him abideth in you, and ye need not 
that any man teach you." 

96. Paley, though, in his Philosophy, he had dis- 
missed the question respecting the origin of a moral 
sense as entirely unimportant or irrelevant, yet, in 
another work, — - a work in which he did not bind him- 
self to the support of a philosophical system, — holds 
other language : " Conscience, our own conscience, 
is to be our guide in all things." " It is through 
the whisperings of conscience that the Spirit speaks. 
If men are wilfully deaf to their consciences, they 
cannot hear the Spirit. If, hearing, if, being com- 
pelled to hear, the remonstrances of conscience, they 
nevertheless decide, and resolve, and determine, to go 
against them, then they grieve, then they defy, then 
they do despite to, the Spirit of God." It being 
suggested that we cannot ordinarily distinguish, at 
the time, the suggestions of the Spirit from the 
operations of our own minds, it may be asked, 
''How are we to listen to them?' The answer is, 
* By attending, universally, to the admonitions vv^ithin 
us.' " * 

"And I will place within them, as a ofuide, 
My umpire, Conscience ; whom if they will hear, 
Light after light, well used, they shall attain." t 

97. This is the language of Milton, and thus in his 
Christian Doctrine more clearly : " They can lay 
claim to nothing more than human powers, assisted 
bj that spirituhl illumination loJiichis common to allJ^ 

98. Judge Hale : " Any man that sincerely and 



* Sermons. 



t Paradise Lost. 



44 



PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY, 



truly fears Almighty God, and calls and relies upon 
him for his direction, has it as really as a son has the 
counsel and direction of his father ; and though the 
voice be not audible, nor discernible by sense, yet it is 
equally as real as if a man heard a voice saying, ^ This 
is the way ; walk in it. ' " 

99. The sentiments of the ancient philosophers^ 
6oC., should not be forgotten, and the rather because 
their language is frequently much more distinct and 
satisfactory than that of the refined inquirers of the 
present day. 

100. Marcus Antoninus : ^' He who is well-dis- 
posed, will do every thing dictated by the divinity — 
aparticle or portion of liimselfy which God has given to 
each as a guide and a leader. Aristotle : " The mind 
of man hath a near affinity to God; there is a divine 
ruler in him.^' So Plutarch, Hieron, Epictetus, Sen- 
eca ; and such citations might, if necessary, be greatly 
multiplied. 

101. Now, respecting the various opinions which 
have been laid before the reader, there is one obser- 
vation that will generally apply — that they unite in 
assigning certain important attributes or operations to 
some principle or power existent in the human mind. 
They affirm that this principle or power possesses 
wisdom to direct us aright; that its directions are 
given instantaneously, as the individual needs them ; 
that it is inseparably attended with unquestionable 
authority to command. The great point for our 
attention is, not the designation, or the supposed origin 
of this guide, but its attributes ; and these attributes 
appear to be divine. 



IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATION OF THE WILL OF GOD. 

102. I. That every reasonable being is a moral 
agent, — that is, that every such human being is 



PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 



45 



responsible to God, — no one, perhaps, denies. There 
can be no responsibility where there is no knowl- 
edge. ^' Where there is no law, there is no trans- 
gression.'' So, then, every human being possesses, 
or is furnished with, moral knowledge and a moral 
law. If we admit that mankind, without an outward 
revelation, are, nevertheless, sinners, we must also 
admit that mankind, without such a revelation, are, 
nevertheless, in possession of the law of God." * 

103. Whence, then, do they obtain it ? — a question 
to which but one answer can be given, — From the 
Creator himself. It appears, therefore, to be almost 
demonstratively shown, that God does communicate 
his will immediately to the minds of those who have 
no access to the external expression of it. It is 
always to be remembered that, as the majority of 
mankind do not possess the written communication 
of the will of God, the question, as it respects them, 
is between an immediate communication and none ; 
between such a communication and the denial of their 
responsibility in a future state ; between such a com- 
munication and the reducing them to the condition of 
the beasts that perish. 

104. II. No one, perhaps, will imagine that this 
argument is confined to countries which the external 
light of Christianity has not reached. Even in Chris- 
tian countries, there exists some portion of that 
necessity for other guidance, which has been seen to 
exist in respect of pagans. The Scriptures do not 
contain a specific direction for every moral doubt that 
arises ; and, if they did, there are thousands, perhaps 
millions, in Christian and in Protestant countries, 
who, probably, do not possess the Scriptures, or, if 
they do, cannot read them. What they do know they 
learn from others; from others, who may be little 

* Gurney : Essays on Christianity. 



46 



PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 



solicitous to teach them, or to teach them aright. 
Such persons, therefore, are, to a considerable extent, 
practically in the same situation as those who have 
not heard of Christianity ; and there is, therefore, to 
them, a corresponding need of a direct communica- 
tion of knowledge from Heaven. 

105. These are offered as considerations involving 
an antecedent probability of the truth of our argument. 
Here is probability very strong ; here is usefulness 
very manifest and very great ; so that the mind may 
reasonably be open to evidence, whatever truth that 
evidence shall establish. 

106. Our argument does not respect the degrees 
of illumination which may be possessed respectively 
by individuals or in different ages of the world. 
There were motives, easily conceived, for imparting 
a greater degree of light and of power at the intro- 
duction of Christianity, than at the present day. 
Nevertheless, if the records of Christianity, in descri- 
bing these greater gifts," inform us that a gift similar 
in its nature, but without specification of its amount, 
is imparted to all men, it is sufficient. Although it is 
one thing for the Creator to impart a general capacity 
to distinguish right from wrong, and another to im- 
part miraculous power, — one thing to inform his 
accountable creature that lying is an evil, and another 
to enable him to cure a leprosy, — yet this affords 
no reason to deny that the nature of the gift is the 
same, or that both are divine. 

107. So early as Genesis vi., there is a distinct 
declaration of the moral operation of the Deity on the 
human mind : My Spirit shall not always strive with 
man." Upon this passage a good r»nd intelligent man 
writes thus : Surely, if his Spirit had striven with 
them until that time, until they were so desperately 
wicked and wholly corrupt, that not only some, but 
every imagination of their hearts was evil, yes, only 



PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 



47 



evil, and that continually, we may well believe the 
express assertion of Scripture, that ' a manifestation 
of the Spirit is given to every man to profit withal.' " 

108. And all thy children," says Isaiah, shall 
be taught of the Lord." Christ himself quotes this 
passage in illustrating the nature of his own religion : 

It is written in the prophets. And they shall be all 
taught of God." 

109. The Christian Scriptures, if they be not more 
explicit, are more abundant in their testimony. Paul 
addresses the '^foolish Galatians." The reader should 
observe their character ; for some Christians, who 
acknowledge the divine influence on the minds of 
eminently good men, are disposed to question it in 
reference to others. It is to these foolish Gala- 
tians," that Paul makes the solemn declaration, 
" God hath sent forth the spirit of his Son into your 
hearts," 

110. The solemn declarations which follow are 
addressed to large numbers of recent converts, whom 
the writer had been severely reproving for impro- 
prieties of conduct, for unchristian contentions, and 
even for greater faults: — Ye are the temple of the 
living God ; as God hath said, I will dwell in them 
and walk in them." What ! know ye not that your 
body is the temple of the Holy Ghost, which is in 
you ? " Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, 
and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you ? " 

111. And with respect to the moral operations of 
this sacred power : As touching brotherly love, ye 
need not that I write unto you, for ye yourselves are 
taught of God to love one another;" that is, taught 
a duty of morality. 

112. Again : " When the Gentiles, which have not 
the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, 
these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves ; 
which show the work of the law written in their 



48 



I»llINCIPLES OF MORALITY, 



hearts; " — written, it may be asked^ by whom, but by 
that Being who said, I will put my law in their in- 
ward parts, and write it in their hearts" ? 

1 13. To such evidence from the written revelation, 
I know of no other objection which can be urged, 
than the supposition that this divine instruction, 
though existing eighteen hundred years ago, does not 
exist now ; to which it appears sufficient to reply, 
that it existed, not only eighteen hundred years ago, 
but before the period of the deluge ; and that the 
terms in which the Scriptures speak of it, are incom- 
patible with the supposition of a temporary duration. 
Besides, there is not the most remote indication in 
the Christian Scriptures, that this instruction would 
not be perpetual ; and their silence on such a subject, 
■ — a subject involving the most sacred privileges of our 
race, — must surely be regarded as positive evidence 
that this instruction would be accorded to us forever. 

114. How clear soever appears to be the evidence 
of reason, that man, being universally a moral and 
acco^^ntable agent, must be possessed universally of a 
moral law, and how distinct soever the testimony of 
revelation that he does possess it, objections are still 
uro^ed aorainst its existence. 

115. Of these, perhaps the most popular are those 
which are founded upon the varying dictates of the 
conscience. If the view which we have taken of the 
nature and operations of the conscience be just, these 
objections can have little weight. 

116. I am, however, disposed here to notice the 
objections that may be founded upon national derelic- 
tions of portions of the moral law. There is," says 
Locke, ^' scarcely that principle of morality to be 
named, or rule of virtue to be thought on, which is 
not, somewhere or other, slighted and condemned 
by the general fashion of whole societies of men, 
governed by practical opinions and rules of living 



PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 



quite opposite to others." And Paley : " There is 
scarcely a single vice which, in some age or country 
of the 'world, has not been countenanced by publio 
opinion. In one country, it is esteemed an office of 
piety in children to sustain their aged parents; in 
another, to despatch them, out of the way : suicide, in 
one age of the world, has been heroism; in another, 
felony : theft, which is punished by most laws, v/as, 
by the laws of Sparta, not unfrequently rewarded: 
you shall hear duelling alternately reprobated and 
applauded according to the sex, age, or station, of the 
person you converse with : the forgiveness of injuries 
and insults is accounted by one sort of people mag- 
nanimity ; by another, meanness." 

117. Upon all which I observe, that, to whatever 
purpose these reasonings are directed, they are defec- 
tive in an essential point. They show us, indeed, 
what the external actions of men have been, but give 
no proof that these actions were conformable with the 
secret, internal judgment ; and this last is the only im- 
portant point. There is a great deal of difference 
between those sentiments which men seem to enter- 
tain respecting their duties when they give expression 
to public opinion," and when they rest their heads 
on their pillows in calm reflection. Forgiveness of 
injuries and insults is accounted by one sort of peo- 
ple magnanimity, by another, meanness;" and yet 
they who thus vulgarly employ the word meanness, do 
not imagine that forbearance and placability are 
really wrong. 

118. With respect to public opinions and general 
fashions, and thence descending to private life, we 
shall find that men very usually know the requisitions 
of the moral law better than they seem to know them, 
and that he who estimates the moral knowledge of 
societies or individuals by their common language, 

I refers to an uncertain and fallacious standard. 
I 5 ■ ■ 



50 



PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 



119. After all, the uniformity of human opinion 
respecting the great laws of morality is very remark- 
able. Sir James Mackintosh speaks of Grotius, who 
had cited poets, orators, historians, &/C., and says. 

He quotes them as witnesses, whose conspiring tes- 
timony, mightily strengthened and confirmed by their 
discordance on almost every other subject, is a con- 
clusive proof of the unanimity of the whole human 
race, on the great rules of duty and fundamental 
principles of morals." 

120. But reasonings such as these are, in reality, 
not necessary to the support of the truth of the im- 
mediate communication of the will of God ; because, 
if the variations in men's notions of rio;ht and wronor 
were greater than they are, they would not impeach 
the existence of that communication. In the first 
place, we never affirm that the Deity communicates 
all his law to every man ; and, in the second place, it 
is sufficiently certain that multitudes know his laws, 
and yet neglect to fulfil them. 

121. If, in conclusion, it should be asked, What 
assistance can be yielded in the investigation of pub- 
licly-authorized rules of virtue by the discussion of 
the present chapter?" we answer, ^' Very little." But 
when it is asked, ^' Of what importance are they as illus- 
trating the principles of morality? " we answer, Very 
much." If there be two sources from which it has 
pleased God to enable mankind to know liis will, — a 
law written externally, and a law written on the heart, 
— it is evident that both must be regarded as principles 
of morality, and that, in a work like the present, both 
should be illustrated as such. It is incidental to the 
latter mode of moral guidance, that it is little adapted 
to the formation of external rules ; but it is of high 
and solemn importance to our species for the secret 
direction of the individual man. 



61 



PART II. 

SUBORDINATE MEANS OF DISCOVERING 
THE DIVINE WILL. 



CHAPTER L 

THE LAW OF THE LAND. 

122. The authority of civil government, as a di* 
rector of individual conduct, is explicitly asserted iu 
the Christian Scriptures : Be subject to principali- 
ties and powers, — obey magistrates,'^ — "Submit 
yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's 
sake," &c. 

123. By this general sanction of civil government, 
a multitude of questions respecting human duty are 
at once decided. In ordinary cases, he upon whom 
the magistrate imposes a law, needs not to seek for 
knowledge of his duty upon the subject from a higher 
source. Obedience to the law is obedience to the 
expressed will of God. 

124. In thus founding the authority of civil gov- 
ernment upon the precepts of revelation, we refer to 
the ultimate, and therefore to the most proper, sanc- 
tion. Not, indeed, that, if revelation had been silent, 
the obligation of obedience might not have been de- 
duced from other considerations. The utility of 
government, its tendency to promote the order and 
happiness of society, powerfully recommend its au- 
thority, — so powerfully, indeed, that it is probable that 
the worst government which ever existed was incom- 
parably better than none ; and we shall hereafter have 
occasion to see that considerations of utility involve 
actual moral obligation. 



52 



SUBORDINATE MEANS OP 



125. The practical excellence of the motives to 
civil obedience which are proposed in the Christian 
Scriptures is especially worthy of regard. Be sub- 
ject not only for wrath, but for conscience' sake." 
The man who obeys the law for conscience' sake will 
obey always. The magistrate has a security for such 
a man's fidelity, which no other motive can supply. 

126. It is to be observed that the obligation to civil 
obedience is enforced, whether the particular com- 
mand of the law is in itself sanctioned by morality or 
not. The laws which prohibit smuggling supply il- 
lustrations on this point. Some persons assert that, 
unless the particular law is enforced by morality, it 
does not become obligatory by command of the state. 
But if this w^ere true, — if no law was obligatory that 
was not previously enjoined by morality, — no moral 
obligation would result from the law of the land. 
Such a question is surely set at rest by Submit your- 
selves to every ordinance of man. 

127. But the authority of civil government is a 
subordinate authority. If, from any cause, the magis- 
trate enjoins that which is prohibited by the moral 
law, the duty of obedience is withdrawn. When the 
magistrate enjoins what is criminal, he has exceeded 
his power. There is, in our day, no such thing as a 
moral plenipotentiary. 

128. Upon these principles the first teachers of 
Christianity acted, when the rulers ^' called them, and 
commanded them not to speak at all nor teach in the 
name of Jesus." — Whether," they replied, it be 
right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more 
than unto God, judge ye." They accordingly en- 
tered into the temple early in the morning, and 
taught;" and w^hen, subsequently, they were again 
brought before the council, and interrogated, they 
made a similar reply; and, notwithstanding the re- 
newed command of the council, daily in the temple, 



DISCOVERING THE DIVINE WILL. 



53 



and in every house, they ceased not to teach and to 
preach Jesus Christ.'^ 

129. To disobey the civil magistrate is, however, 
not a light thing. When the Christian conceives that 
the requisitions of government conflict with those of 
a higher law, he should exercise a strict scrutiny into 
the principles of his conduct. But if, upon such scru- 
tiny, the contrariety of requisitions appears real, he 
has then no concern with considerations of conse- 
quences. Be they what they may, his path is plain 
before him. 

130. It is sufficiently evident that these doctrines 
respect non-compliance only. It is one thing not to 
comply with laws, and another to resist those who 
make or enforce them. A man who should think the 
payment of certain taxes unchristian, ought to decline 
paying them ; but he would act upon strange princi- 
ples of morality, if, when an officer came to distrain 
upon his property, he should forcibly resist his au- 
thority. 

131. As there are cases in which the positive in- 
junctions of the law may be disobeyed, so it is mani- 
fest that the mere permission of the law to do a given 
action, conveys no sufficient authority to perform it. 
A man may be entitled by law to privileges which mo- 
rality forbids him to exercise, or to possessions which 
mprality forbids him to enjoy. 

132. As to property, for example. The general 
foundation of the right to property is the law of the 
land. But as the law of the land is itself subordinate, 
it is manifest that the right to property must be sub- 
ordinate also, and must be held in subjection to the 
moral law. 

133. A man who has a wife and two sons, and who 
is worth fifteen hundred pounds, dies without a will. 
The widow possesses no separate property, but the 
sons have received, from another quarter, ten thousand 

5* 



54 



SUBORDINATE MEANS OF 



pounds apiece. Now, of the fifteen hundred pounds 
which the intestate left, the law assigns five hundred 
to the mother, and five hundred to each son. Are 
these sons ???ora% permitted to take each five hundred 
pounds, and to leave their parent with only five hun- 
dred for her support ? Every man, I hope, will answer, 
No : and the reason is this — that the moral law, which 
is superior to the law of the land, forbids them to avail 
themselves of their legal rights. The moral law re- 
quires justice and benevolence, and a due considera- 
tion for the wants of others ; and if these would be 
violated by availing ourselves of legal permissions, 
those permissions are not sufficient authorities to di- 
rect our conduct. 

134. Paley has laid it down, that, so long as we 
keep within the design and intention of a law, that 
law would justify us, in foro conscienticB, as in foro 
humano, whatever be the equity or expediency of the 
law itself From the example which has been of- 
fered, I think it sufficiently appears that this maxim is 
utterly unsound : at any rate, this will appear from a 
brief historical fact. During the revolutionary war in 
America, the Virginia legislature passed a law, by 
which it was enacted that all merchants and planters 
in Virginia, who owed money to British merchants, 
should be exonerated from their debts, if they paid 
the money due into the public treasury, instead of 
sending it to Great Britain ; and all such as stood in- 
debted were invited to come forward and give their 
money, in this manner, towards the support of the 
contest in which America was then engaged." Now, 
it is quite clear that the design and intention" of 
this law was to allow a fraud ; the people were even 
invited to commit it : the conclusion is, therefore, dis- 
tinct — that legal decisions respecting property are 
not always a sufficient warrant for individual conduct. 
It is pleasant, for the sake of America, to add that, in 



DISCOVERING THE DIVINE WILL. 



55 



1796, after the Supreme Court of the United States 
had been erected, the British merchants brought the 
affair before it; and the judges directed that every 
one of these debts should again be paid to the rightful 
creditors. 

135. It miorht be almost imaorined that the moral 
philosopher designed to justify such conduct as that 
of tlie planters.* But his error is founded in the as- 
sumption that there is supreme authority" in the 
law. Make that authority, as it really is, subordinate, 
and the error, and the fallacious rule w^hich is founded 
upon it, will be alike corrected. 

136- In applying to the law of the land as a moral 
guide, it is of importance to distinguish its intention 
from its letter. The want of a sufficient attention to 
this simple rule, occasions many snares to private vir- 
tue, and the commission of much practical injustice. 
It is found that courts of law generally regard the let- 
ter of a statute rather than its general intention ; and 
hence it happens that many duties devolve upon indi- 
viduals in the application of the laws in their own 
affairs. Examples of this class of cases will be offered 
in the early part of the next essay. 



CHAPTER 11. 

THE LAW OF NATURE. 

137. We here use the term law of nature," as 
a convenient title under which to advert to the au- 
thority, in moral affairs, of what are called natural 
instincts and natural rights. 

138. " They who rank pity among the original 
impulses of our nature," says Paley, rightly contend 
that, when this principle prompts us to the relief of 



* Mor. and Pol. Phil. b. 3, p. 1, c. 4. 



56 



SUBORDINATE MEANS OF 



human misery, it indicates the divine intention, and 
our duty. Indeed, the same conclusion is deducible 
from the existence of the passion, whatever account 
be given of its origin. Whether it be an instinct or 
a habit, it is, in fact, a property of our nature which 
God appointed." 

139. I should reason similarly respecting natural 
rights, — the right to life, to personal liberty, to a 
share of the productions of the earth. TYiefact that 
life is given us by the Creator, that our personal 
powers and mental dispositions are adapted by him 
to personal liberty, and that he has constituted our 
bodies so as to need the productions of the earth, are 
satisfactory indications of the divine will, and of hu- 
man duty. 

140. So that we conclude the general proposition 
is true, that a regard to the law of nature, in estima- 
ting human duty, is accordant with the will of God, 
If the authority of this law were questioned, it might 
be said that the expression of the divine \yill tacitly 
sanctions it, because that expression is addressed to 
us under the supposition that our constitution is such 
as it is ; and because some of the divine precepts ap- 
pear to specify a point at which the authority of the 
law of nature stops. To say that a law is only in 
some cases wrong, is to say that in many it is right ; 
to which may be added the consideration, that the 
tendency of the law of nature is manifestly beneficial. 

141. But the authority of the law of nature, like 
every other authority, is subordinate to that of the 
moral law. This, indeed, is sufficiently indicated by 
those reasonings which show the universal supremacy 
of that law. Yet it may be of advantage to remember 
such expressions as these : Be not afraid of them 
that kill the body, and, after that, have no more that 
they can do; but fear Him which, after he hath killed, 
hath power to cast into hell." This appears distinct- 



DISCOVERING THE DIVINE WILL. 



57 



ly to place the natural instinct of self-preservation in 
subordination to the moral law. 

142. Parental affection has been classed among the 
instincts. The declaration, He that loveth son or 
daughter more than me, is not worthy of me," clearly 
subjects this instinct to the higher authority of the 
divine will, for the ^' love" of God is to be manifested 
by obedience to his law. And it is remarkable that 
this and other instincts are adduced yb?* the purpose 
of inculcating their subordination to the moral law. 

143. Even that morality which is not founded upon 
religion, recommends the propriety of holding the nat- 
ural impulses in subjection to a higher law. Godwin 
says that, if Fenelon were in his palace, and it took 
fire, and it so happened that either the life of himself 
or of his chambermaid must be sacrificed, it wowl'd 
be the duty of the woman to repress the instinct of 
self-preservation, and sacrifice hers, because Fenelon 
would do more good in the world> If the morality 
of skepticism inculcates this subjugation of our in- 
stincts to indeterminate views of advantage, much 
more does the morality of the New Testament teach 
us to subject them to the determinate will of God. 

144. Yet, obvious as is the propriety and the duty 
of preferring the divine law before all, the dictates 
or the rights of nature are continually urged as of 
paramount obligation. Many persons appear to think 
that, if a given action is dictated by the laio of nature, 
it is quite sufficient. Respecting the instinct of self- 
preservation, especially, they seem to conclude that, 
to whatever that instinct prompts, it is lawful to con- 
form to its voice. They do not surely reflect upoa the 
mofistroifsness of their opinions ; they do not consider 
that they are absolutely superseding the moral law 
of God, and that, too, upon considerations resulting 
merely from the animal part of our constitution. 
The divine laws respect the whole human economy, 



SUBORDINATE MEANS OF 



1 



— our prospects in another world, as well as our 
existence in the present. 

145. Some men, again, speak cf our rights in a 
state of nature, as if to be in a state of nature was to 
be without the jurisdiction of the moral law. But if 
man be a moral and responsible agent, that law ap- 
plies every where. 

146. Situations similar to those of a state of nature 
sometimes arise in society ; as where money is de- 
manded, or violence committed by one person on 
another, where no third person can be called in to 
assistance. The injured party, in such a case, cannot 
go every length in his own cause by virtue of the law 
of nature; he can only go so far as the moral law 
allows. These considerations will be found peculiar- 
ly applicable to the rights of self-defence. 

147. Yet the natural rights of man ought to pos- 
sess extensive application, both in private and political 
affairs. If it Vv^ere sufficiently remembered that these 
rights are abstractedly possessed in equality by all 
men, we should find many imperative claims upon us, 
with which we do not now comply. The artificial 
distinctions of society induce forgetfulness of the 
circumstance that we are all brethren. Not that I 
would countenance the speculations of those who 
think that all men should be now practically equal ; 
but that these distinctions are such, that the rights of 
nature are invaded in a degree which nothing can 
justify. There are natural claims of the poor upon 
the rich, of dependants upon their superiors, which 
are very commonly forgotten : there are numberless 
actsvof superciliousness, and unkindness, and oppres- 
sion, in private life, which the law of nature emphat- 
ically condemns. When, sometimes, I see a man of . 
fortune speaking in terms of supercilious command 
to his servant, I feel that he needs to go and learn 
some lessons of the law of nature. I feel that he has 



DISCOVERING THE DIVINE WILL. 59 

forgotten what he is, and what he is not, and what 
his brother is. He has forgotten that by nature he 
and his servant are, in strictness, equal ; and that al- 
though, by the permission of Providence, a various 
allotment is assigned to them now, he should regard 
every one with that consideration and respect which 
is due to a man and a brother. And when to these 
considerations are added those which result from the 
contemplation of our relationship to God, — that we 
are the common objects of his bounty and his good- 
ness, and that we are heirs to a common salvation, — 
we are presented with such motives to pay attention 
to the rights of nature, as constitute an imperative 
obligation. 

148. The political duties which result from the 
law of nature, it is not our present business to inves- 
tigate ; but it may be observed here, that a very 
limited appeal to facts is sufficient to evince that, by 
many political institutions, the rights of nature have 
been grievously sacrificed, and that, if these rights 
had been sufficiently regarded, many of these vicious 
institutions would never have been exhibited in the 
world. 



149. It appears worth while, at the conclusion of 
this chapter, to remark, that a person, when he speaks 
of nature," should know distinctly what he means. 
There are few senses in which the word is used, that 
do not refer, however obscurely, to God; and it is 
for that reason that the notion of authority is con- 
nected with the word. The very name of nature 
implies that it must owe its birth to some prior agent ; 
or, to speak properly, signifies in itself nothing." * 
Yet, unmeaning as the term is, it is one of which 



* Miltan : Christian Doctrine. 



60 



SUBORDINATE MEANS OF 



many persons are very fond ; whether it be that their 
notions are really indistinct, or that some purposes 
are answered by referring to the obscurity of nature 
rather than to God. Nature has decorated the 
earth with beauty and magnificence," — '^Nature has 
furnished us with joints and limbs," — are phrases 
sufficiently unmeaning. But when it is said that 
Nature teaches us to adhere to truth," — Men are 
taught by nature that they are responsible beings," 
— there is considerable da nger that we have both 
fallacious and injurious notions of the authority which 
thus teaches or condemns us. It is dangerous to in- 
duce confusion into our ideas respecting our relation- 
ship with God. 

CHAPTER III. 

UTILITY. 

150. That, in estimating our duties in life, we 
ought to pay regard to what is useful and beneficial, 
can need little argument to prove. Yet, if it were 
required, it may be easily shown that this regard to 
utility is recommended or enforced in the expression 
of the divine will. That will requires the exercise of 
pure and universal benevolence ; which benevolence 
is exercised in consulting the interests, the welfare, 
and the happiness, of mankind. 

151. Or, if we derive the obligations of utility 
from considerations connected with our reason, they 
do not appear much less distinct. The daily and 
hourly use of reason is to discover what is fit to be 
done; that is, what is useful and expedient; and, 
since it is manifest that the Creator, in endowing us 
with the faculty, designed that we should exercise it, 



DISCOVERING THE DIVINE WILL. 



61 



it is obvious that, in this view, also, a reference to 
expediency is consistent with the divine will. 

152. When (higher laws being silent) a man 
judges that, of two alternatives, one is dictated by 
greater utility, that dictate constitutes an obligation 
upon him to prefer it. I should not hold the person 
innocent J who opposed an improvement in ship-build- 
ing, or who obstructed the formation of a turnpike 
road that would benefit the public. These are ques- 
tions, not of prudence merely, but of morals also. 

153. Obligations resulting from utility possess great 
extent of application to political affairs. There are, 
indeed, some public concerns in which the moral law, 
antecedently, decides nothing. Whether a duty shall 
be imposed, or a charter granted, is a question which 
is, perhaps, to be determined by expediency alone ; 
but, when a public man is of the judgment that any 
given measure will tend to the general good, he com- 
mits an offence against morality if he opposes that 
measure. 

154. It is sufficiently evident, upon the principles 
which have hitherto been advanced, that considera- 
tions of utility are only so far obligatory as they are 
in accordance with the moral law. That habitual 
preference of futurity to the present time which 
Scripture exhibits, indicates that our interests here 
should be held in subordination to our interests here- 
after ; and, as these higher interests are to be con- 
sulted by the means which revelation prescribes, it is 
manifest that those means are to be pursued, whatever 
we may suppose to be their effects upon the present 
welfare of ourselves or of other men. Utility, as it 
respects mankind, cannot be properly consulted with- 
out taking into account our interests in futurity. 

Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die," is a 
maxim of which all would approve if w^e had no con- 
cern with another life. That which might be expe- 
6 



62 



SUBORDINATE MEANS OP 



dient if death were annihilation, may be very inexpe^ 
dient now. 

155. After all, the general experience is, that what 
is most expedient with respect to another world, is so 
with respect to the present. There may be cases, and 
there have been, in which the divine will may require 
an absolute renunciation of our present interests ; as 
the martyr who maintains his fidelity sacrifices all 
possibility of advantage now. But these are unusual 
cases ; and, perhaps, in nineteen cases out of twenty, 
he best consults his present welfare who endeavors to 
secure it in another world. Were it, however, other- 
wise, the truth of our principles would not be shaken. 
Men's happiness, and especially the happiness of good 
men, does not consist merely in external things. The 
promise of a hundred fold in this present life may be 
fulfilled in mental felicity ; and if it could not be, who 
is the man that would exclude from his computations 
the prospect, in the world to come, of life everlasting ? 

156. In the endeavor to produce the greatest sum 
of happiness, or, which is the same thing, in applying 
the dictates of utility to our conduct in life, there is 
one species of utility that is deplorably disregarded, 
both in public and private affairs, — that which re- 
spects the religious and moral welfare of mankind. 
A politician will tell how greatly a certain measure 
will promote the interests of commerce, or propitiate 
a party, or injure a nation whom he dreads; but you 
will hear not a word of inquiry whether it will cor- 
rupt the character of those who are to execute it, or 
whether it will present new temptations to the virtue 
of the public. And yet these considerations are, per- 
haps, by far the most important in the view even of 
enlightened expediency ; for it is a desperate game to 
endeavor to benefit a people by means which may 
diminish their virtue. — It is the same in private life. 
You hear a parent, who proposes to change his place 



DISCOVERING THE DIVINE WILL. 



63 



of residence, or to engage m a new profession or pur- 
suit, discussing the comparative convenience, profit, or 
pleasure, which may result from the contemplated 
change ; but perhaps not a word of inquiry as to 
whether it will def)rive his family of virtuous and ben- 
eficial society, which will not be replaced ; whether 
it will not tempt his own virtue, or diminish his use- 
fulness ; or whether his children will not be ex- 
posed to circumstances that will probably taint the 
purity of their minds. Such persons, surely, make 
very inaccurate computations of expediency. 

157. As to the actual conduct of political affairs, 
men frequently legislate as if there vt^as no such thing 
as religion or morality in the world. I believe that 
a sort of shame (a false and vulgar shame, no doubt) 
would be felt by many legislators in opposing religious 
or moral considerations to prospects of advantage. In 
our own country, those who are most willing to do 
this, receive, from vulgar persons, names of contempt 
for their absurdity ! How inveterate must be the im- 
purity of a system which teaches men to regard as 
ridiculous that system which only is sound ! 



CHAPTER IV. 

THE LAW OF NATIONS. THE LAW CF HONOR, 

SECTIOJN I. 
THE LAW OF NATIONS. 

158. The law of nations, so far as it is founded 
upon the principles of morality, partakes of that au- 
thority which tho^e principles possess : so far as it is 
founded merely upon the mutual conventions of states, 



•64 SUBORDINATE MEANS OP - 

it possesses that authority over the contracting parties 

which results from the rule that men ought to abide i 

by their engagements. The principal considerations ] 

which present themselves upon the subject appear to ; 
be these : — 

(1.) That the law of nations is binding upon those \ 
states who allow themselves to be regarded as parties 

to it ; I 

(2.) That it is wholly nugatory with respect to 

those states which are not parties to it ; : 

(3.) That it is of no force in opposition to the | 

moral law. ; 

159. I. The obligation of the law of nations upon i 
those who join in the convention is plain. A tacit j 
engagement, only, is, from the circumstances of the ; 
case, to be expected ; and if any state did not choose to ! 
conform to the law, it should publicly express its dis- j 
sent. The law of nations is not wont to tighten the j 
bonds of morality ; so that, probably, most of its posi- | 
tive requisitions are enforced by the moral law ; and t 
this consideration should operate as an inducement to j 
a conscientious fulfilment of these requisitions. j 

160. Attempts to deduce the maxims of interna- j 
tional law, as they now obtain, from principles of mo- | 
rality, will always be vain. Grotius seems as if he ' 
would countenance the attempt, when he says, Some 
writers have advanced a doctrine which can never be 
admitted, maintaining that the law of nations author- ^ 
izes one power to commence hostilities against anoth- 
er, whose increasing greatness awakens her alarms. 
Alas ! if principles of justice are to decide what the 
law of nations shall authorize, it will be needful to 
establish a new code to-morrow. A great part of the 
code arises out of the conduct of war ; and the usual 
practices of war are so foreign to principles of justice i 
and morality, that it is to no purpose to attempt to i 
found the code upon them. « 



DISCOVERING THE DIVINE WILL. 



65 



161. II. That the law of nations is wholly nugato- 
ry with respect to those states which are not parties 
to it, is a truth which, however sound, has been too 
little regarded in the conduct of civilized nations. 
The state whose subjects discover and take posses- 
sion of an uninhabited island, is entitled, by the law 
of nations, quietly to possess it. And this is right ; 
but, unhappily, our lav/ of nations goes much farther, 
and, by a monstrous abuse of power, has acted upon 
the same doctrine with respect to inliahited countries; 
for, when these have been discovered, the law of na- 
tions has talked, with perfect coolness, of erecting a 
standard, and thenceforth assigning the territory to 
the nation whose subjects set it up ; as if the previous 
inhabitants possessed no other claim or right than the 
bears and wolves. It has been asked, (and with great 
reason,) What would be said to a canoe full of In- 
dians who should discover England, and take posses- 
sion of it in the name of their chief? 

162. Civilized states appear to have acted upon the 
maxim, that no people possess political rights but those 
who are parties to the law of nations ; and, according- 
ly, the history of European settlements has been, so 
far as the aborigines were concerned, too much a his- 
tory of outrage, treachery, and blood. Penn acted 
upon sounder principles : he perfectly well knew that 
neither an established practice nor the law of nations 
could impart a right to a country which was justly 
possessed by former inhabitants ; and therefore, though 
Charles II. granted" him Pennsylvania, he did not 
imagine that the gift of a man in London could justi- 
fy him in taking possession of a distant country with- 
out the occupiers' consent. What was ^' granted," 
therefore, by his sovereign, he purchased of the own- 
ers ; and the sellers were satisfied with their bargain 
and with him. The experience of Pennsylvania has 
shown that integrity is politic as well as right. 

6* 



66 



SUBORDINATE MEANS OF 



163. III. Respecting the third consideration, that 
the iaw of nations is of no force in opposition to the 
moral law, little needs to be said here. It is evident 
that, upon whatever foundation the law" of nations rests, 
its authority is subordinate to that of the will of God. 
The mode of asserting even acknowledged rights is to 
be regulated in subordination to the moral law. Du- 
plicity, and fraud, and violence, and bloodshed, may, 
perhaps, be sometimes the only means of availing 
ourselves of the rights which the law of nations grants ; 
but it were a confused species of morality which 
should allow^ the commission of all this because it is 
consistent with the law of nations. 

164. A kindred remark applies to the obligation of 
treaties. Treaties do not oblige us to do what is 
morally wrong. The state which, in the pursuit of a 
temporary policy, has been weak enough to make a 
treaty of offensive alliance unconditional w^ith respect 
to time or objects, should not hesitate to refuse fulfil- 
ment when the act of fulfilment is incompatible with 
the moral law. Such a state should decline to per- 
form the treaty, and retire with shame ; with shame, 
not so much that it has been obliged to violate its 
engagements, as that it was ever so vicious as to make 
them. 



SECTION II. 
THE LAW OF HONOR. 

165. The law of honor consists of a set of maxims, 
WTitten or understood, by which persons of a certain 
class agree to regulate, or are expected to regulate, 
their conduct. It is evident that the obligation of the 
law of honor, as such, results exclusively from the 
agreement, tacit or expressed, of the parties concerned. 
It binds them because they have agreed to be bound, 
and for no other reason. 



DISCOVERING THE DIVINE WILL. 



166. It seems, therefore, very remarkable, that, at 
the commencement of his Moral Philosophy, Dr. Pa- 
ley says, The rules of lift are, the law of honor, the 
law of the land, and the Scriptures." It i^ so much 
the more remarkable, because, in the same work, the 
law of honor is described as unauthorized," as a 

capricious rule," and as affording countenance to 
some of the most heinous of human transgressions. 
Surely, then, it cannot, with any propriety of language, 
be called a rule of life. 

167. Placing, then, the obligation of the law of 
honor, as such, upon what appears to be a proper 
basis, — the duty to perform our lawful engagements, 
— it may be concluded that, when a man loses money 
by betting or playing, he is morally bound to pay ; the 
sin lying in staking the money, not in fulfilling the 
promise to pay. Nevertheless, there may be prior 
claims upon a man's property, — lawful debts, which 
real honor would induce him to "^dij first. It may be 
suspected that the motive to the prompt payment 
of gaming debts is usually no other than the desire to 
preserve a fair name with the world. Integrity of 
principle has often so little to do with it, that this 
principle is sacrificed in order to pay them. 

163. With respect to those maxims of the law of 
honor which require conduct that the moral law for- 
bids, it is quite manifest that they are utterly inde- 
fensible. .For instance, those respecting duelling. 
The man who acts upon these acts icickedly ; unless, 
indeed, he be so little informed of the obligations 
of morality, that he does not, upon this subject, per- 
ceive the distinction between right and wrong. 

169. Whatever advantages may result from the law 
of honor, it is, as a system, both contemptible and 
bad. Even its advantages are of an ambiguous kind ; 
for, although it may prompt to rectitude of conduct, 
that conduct is not founded upon rectitude of princi- 



68 MEANS OF DISCOVERING THE DIVINE WILL. 



pie. Its practical effects are probably greater and 
worse thaii we are accustomed to suppose. A set of 
rules which inculcates some actions that are right, 
and permits others that are wrong, practically ope- 
rates as a sanction to the wrong. 

170. What, then, is to be done, but to reprobate 
the system as a whole] And in this the man of sense 
may join with the man of virtue; for the system is 
contemptible in the view of intellect, as well as hate« 
ful in the view of purity. 



69 



ESSAY 11. 

PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



CHAPTER 1. 

RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS. 

171. Of the two classes of religious obligations, 
— that which respects the exercise of piety towards 
God, and that which respects visible testimonials of our 
reverence and devotion, — the business of a work like 
this is principally with the latter. Yet I would adven- 
ture a few paragraphs respecting devotion of mind. 

172. That the worship of our Father in heaven 
consists not in assembling with others at an appointed 
place and hour, not in joining in the rituals of a 
Christian church, all men will agree. Devotion, it is 
evident, is an operation of the mind — the sincere and 
grateful aspirations of a dependent and grateful being 
to Him who has all power both in heaven and earth. It 
may be maintained every where, without regard to 
time or place. Even under a less spiritual dispensa- 
tion, a good man worshipped leaning on the top of 
his staff.'^ 

173. It is to be feared that some persons impose 
upon themselves some feelings as devotional, which 
are wholly foreign to the worship of God. Devotion 
requires the purification of the affections, and the 
subjugation of the passions. This implies a sacrifice 
of inclination, a subjection of the will; and this men- 
tal operation many persons are not willing to under- 
go. It is not wonderful, therefore, that many are 



70 PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



willing to satisfy themselves with a semblance of devo- 
tion which shall be attained at less cost. 

174. There are some preachers with whom it ap- 
pears to be an object of much effort to excite the 
hearer to an impassioned state of feeling. The 
hearer, who desires, perhaps, to experience the ardors 
of religion, abandons his mind to the impulse of feel- 
ing, and goes home flattering himself with having 
felt the warmth of true devotion. 

175. Other causes — lofty aisles, venerable ruins, 
the starry heavens, the ocean, the tempest — are some- 
times the sources of kindred illusion. These suffuse 
the mind with a sort of reverence and awe which may 
easily be mistaken for devotional feeling. But it must 
not be forgotten that persons who have no pretension 
to habitual religion, are as capable of such devotion 
as those who are habitually pious ; and it is not to 
be imagined that v/e can thus suddenly adore our 
Creator, and then forget him again until some new 
excitement shall arouse new raptures, to be again for- 
gotten. 

176. To religious feelings, as to other things, the 
truth applies, By their fruits ye shall know them." 
He who rises from the sensibilities of seeming devo- 
tion, and finds that sensible and permanent effects are 
not produced in his mind, may rest assured that, in 
whatever he has been employed, it has not been in 
the pure worship of that God who is a spirit. To the 
real prostration of the soul in the divine presence, it 
is necessary that the mind should be still. Such 
devotion is sufficient for the whole mind. When the 
soul is humble in the presence of God, — when all its 
desires are involved in one desire of devotedness to 
him, — then is the hour of acceptable worship; then is 
the petition of the soul prayer ; then is its gratitude 
thanksgiving, its oblation praise. 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 71 



177. Without real and efficient piety, we are not 
to expect a consistent observance of the moral law. 
Religion alono can induce the sacrifices which that 
law requires. I recommend not enthusiasm nor 
fanaticism, but that sincere application of the soul to 
its Creator, which alone can give distinctness to our 
perceptions of his will, or efficiency to our motives to 
fulfil it. 



SABBATICAL INSTITUTIONS. 

178. Not forsaking the assembling of ourselves 
together, as the manner of some is." The divinely- 
authorized institution of Moses respecting a weekly 
Sabbath, and the practice of the first teachers of 
Christianity, constitute a sufficient recommendation to 
set apart certain times for the exercise of public wor- 
ship, even were there no injunctions such as that 
which is placed at the head of this paragraph. It 
is, besides, manifestly proper that beings who are de- 
pendent upon God for all things, should devote a por- 
tion of their time to the expression of their gratitude, 
submission, and reverence. 

179. From the duty of observing the Hebrew Sab- 
bath we are sufficiently exempted by the fact that it 
was not observed by the apostles of Christ. The early 
Christians met for public worship on the first day of 
the week ; and, whatever may be the diflfering views 
as to the sanctity of one day above another, as it is 
very plainly right to devote some portion of our time 
to religious exercises, and no objection exists to the 
day which is actually appropriated, the duty seems 
very obvious so to employ it. 

180. To attempt specific rules upon the subject of 
the employment of the day were vain. A tradesman 
ought, as a general rule, to refuse to buy or sell goods. 
If I sold clothing, I would sell a surtout to a man who 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



was suddenly summoned on a journey, but not to one 
who could call the next morninor. Were I a builder, 
I would prop a falling wall, but not proceed in the 
erection of a house. The medical profession, and 
those who sell medicine, are differently situated ; yet 
some physicians in extensive practice attend on pub- 
lic worship almost as regularly as any of their neigh- 
bors. Excursions of pleasure do not comport with the 
purposes to which the day is appropriated. Yet not 
every thing which partakes of relaxation is unallow- 
able. A walk in the country may be right, when a 
party to a watering-place would be decidedly wrong. 
There will be little difficulty in determining what is 
allowable, and what is not, if the inquiry be not, How 
much secularity does religion allow?" but, How 
much can I, without neglect of duty, avoid?" 

181. The habit which many persons have of travel- 
ling on this day, is peculiarly indefensible. The plea 
of saving time" is not remote from irreverence; for, 
if it has any meaning, it is this, — that our time is of 
more value when employed in business than when 
employed in the worship of God. 

182. Upon every kind and mode of negligence 
respecting these religious obligations, the question is 
not simply whether the individual himself sustains 
moral injury, but also whether those around him sus- 
tain injury ; so that many things, if they were not 
intrinsically unlawful, would be inexpedient on account 
of the mischievous example. Some things might be 
done without blame by the lone tenant of a wild, 
which involve positive guilt in a man in society. 



183. To those who may sometimes be brought into 
contact with persons who profess skepticism with re- 
gard to Christianity, and especially to those who are 
conscious of any tendency in their own minds to 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



73 



listen to the objections of these persons, it may be 
useful to observe, that the grounds upon which skep- 
tics build their disbelief of Christianity are com- 
monly very slight. The number is comparatively 
few whose opinions are the result of any tolerable 
degree of investigation. They embraced skeptical 
notions through the means which they now take of 
diffusing them among others, — not by arguments, but 
jests ; not by objections to the historical evidence of 
Christianity, but by conceits and witticisms ; not by 
examining the nature of the religion as delivered by its 
Founder, but by exposing the conduct of those who 
profess it. Perhaps the seeming paradox is true, that 
no men are so credulous, that no men accept im- 
portant propositions upon such slender evidence, as 
the majority of those who reject Christianity. What 
is the evidence upon which the unfledged witlings 
who essay their wanton efforts" against religion, 
usually found their notions ? Concerning unbe- 
lievers and doubters of every class, one observation 
may almost universally be made with truth, — that they 
are little acquainted with the nature of the Christian 
religion, and still less with the evidence by which it is 
supported." * Upon the testimony of Dr. Priestley, 
we may believe that the philosophers of France re- 
jected Christianity in contemptible and shameful 
ignorance of its nature and evidence : upon what 
grounds, then, are we to suppose the ordinary strip- 
lings of infidelity reject it ? 

184. Why, then, is it that those who affect skepti- 
cism are so ambitious to make their views known? 
Because it affords a cheap means of gratifying vanity. 
To rise above vulgar prejudices and superstitions" 
— "to entertain enlarged and liberal opinions" — are 
phrases of great attraction, especially to young men ; 

* Gisborne's Duties of Men. 
7 



74 PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



and how shall they show their superiority to these 
things so easily as by rejecting a system which all 
their neighbors agree to be true ? They are objects 
of curiosity to others, not on account of their own 
qualities, but on account of the greatness of that which 
they contemn. The peasant who vilifies a peasant 
mny revile him without an auditor, but a province 
will listen to him who vilifies a king. 

185. More contemptible motives to the profession 
of infidelity cannot, perhaps, exist; but there are 
some which are more detestable. Hartley siys that 
" the strictness and purity of the Christian religion, 
with regard to licentiousness, is probably the chief 
thing which makes vicious men first fear and hate, 
then vilify and oppose it." 

186. Whether, therefore, we regard the motives 
which lead to skepticism, or the reasonableness of the 
grounds upon which it is commonly founded, there is 
surely much reason for an ingenuous young person to 
hold in contempt the jests, pleasantries, and sophistries 
respecting revelation, with which he may be assailed. 

_ — » 

CHAPTER n. 

PROPERTY. 

187. Disquisitions respecting the origin of prop- 
erty appear to be of little use. In whatever manner 
an estate was acquiied two thousand years ago, it is 
of no consequence in inquiring who ought to possess 
it now. 

188. The foundation of the right to property is 
a more important point. Ordinarily, the foundation 
is the law of the land. Of civil government — an 
institution sanctioned by the divine will — one of the 



PRIVATE RIGHTS. AND OBLIGATIONS. 75 



great offices is the distribution of property ; to give 
it, if it has the power of giving ; or to decide, between 
opposing claimants, to whom it shall be assigned. 

189. This, however, is only a general rule. It has 
been sufficiently seen that some legal possessions are 
not permitted by the moral law. 

193. It is evident that, in the present state of legal 
institutions, the evils which result from the laws re- 
specting property must be prevented, if at all, by the 
exercise of virtue in individuals. 

191. Insolvency. — Why is a man obliged to pay 
his debts 1 It is to be hoped that but few persons 
will reply, Because the law compels him." Why, 
then? Because the moral law requires it. That this 
is the primary ground of the obligation, is evident; 
otherwise the payment of any debt which a corrupt 
legislature chose to cancel, would cease to be ob- 
ligatory upon the debtor. 

192. A man becomes insolvent, and is made a 
bankrupt; pays his creditors ten shillings, instead of 
twenty, and is discharged. The bankrupt receives 
a large legacy, or engages in business, and acquires 
property. Being then able to pay the remainder of 
his debts, does the legal discharge exempt him from 
the obligation to pay them? No ; and for this reason, 
— that the legal discharge was not a moral discharge. 
The duty to pay was not founded primarily on the 
law. 

193. It would be preposterous to say that creditors 
relinquish their claims voluntarily. It might as rea- 
sonably be said that a man parts with a limb volunta- 
rily, because, having incurably lacerated it, he sub- 
raits to an amputation. It should be remembered, 
too, that the relinquishment of half the demand is 
occasioned by the debtor himself; and it seems very 
manifest that when a man, by his own act, deprives 
another of his property, he cannot allege the conse- 



T6 PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 

quences of that act as a justification of withholding it, 
after restoration is in his power. 

194. In all cases, the reasoning that applies to the 
debt, applies, also, to the interest that accrues upon 
it ; although, with respect to the acceptance of both, 
the creditor should exercise a considerate discretion. 
A man who has failed of paying his debts ought 
always to live with frugality, and carefully to econo- 
mize such money as he gains. He should reflect 
that he is the trustee for his creditors, and that all 
the needless money that he expends, is not his, but 
theirs. 

195. The loss of property which the trading part 
of a commercial community sustains by insolvency, 
is great enough to constitute a considerable national 
evil. The fraud, too, that is practised under cover 
of insolvency, is, doubtless, the most extensive of 
all species of private robbery. The profligacy of 
some of these cases is well known to be ex- 
treme. He who is a bankrupt to-day riots in 
luxury to-morrow; bows to the creditors whose 
money he is spending, and exults in the impunity of 
his wickedness. Of such conduct we should not 
think or speak but with detestation. Happy would 
it be if public opinion supplied the deficiency of the 
law, and held this iniquity in rightful abhorrence ! 
If such conduct were held to be of the same charac- 
ter as theft, probably a more powerful motive to avoid 
insolvency would be established than any which now 
exists. If it be urged that such odium would be too 
severe upon the insolvent, I answer, that the evil 
would be much less extensive than is imagined. The 
calamity being foreseen, would prevent men from be- 
coming insolvent; and it is certain that the majority 
might have avoided insolvency by sufficient care. 

196. It is a cause of satisfaction, that, respecting 
this rectified state of opinion, and respecting integrity 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



77 



of private virtue, some examples are offered. There 
is one community of Christians which holds its mem- 
bers obliged to pay their debts whenever they possess 
the ability, without regard to the legal discharge.* 
By this means there is thrown over the character of 
every bankrupt, who possesses property, a shade which 
nothing but payment can dispel. 

197. I would briefly mention two honorable in- 
stances of the payment of debts by discharged insol- 
vents, which have fallen under my own observation. 
A man had become insolvent in early life; his cred- 
itors divided his property among them, and gave him 
a legal discharge. He labored faithfully, and lived 
frugally, for eighteen years, and, at the expiration of 
that time, paid the remainder to his creditors. Such 
a man, I think, might hope to derive, during the re- 
mainder of his life, more satisfaction from the con- 
sciousness of integrity than he could have derived 
from expending the money on himself Many of his 
creditors refused to receive the money, or presented 
it to him again. — The other instance may furnish 
hints of a useful kind. It was the case of a female 
who had endeavored to support herself by the profits 
of a shop. She became insolvent, again entered into 
business, and, in the course of years, had accumulated 
enough to pay the remainder of her debts. But the 
infirmities of age were now coming on, and the annu- 
al income from her savings was just sufficient for the 
wants of declining years. Being thus unable to dis- 
charge her obligations without making herself depend- 
ent upon others, she executed a will, directing that, 
at her death, the creditors should be paid the remain- 
der of their demands ; which was done accordingly. 

198. Wills, Legatees, and Heirs. — The right 
of a person to order the distribution of his property 

* The Society of Friends. 
7* 



78 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



after death is recommended by its utility ; and, were 
this less manifest, it would be sufficient that the right 
is established by civil government. 

199. It happens that persons sometimes distribute 
their property in a manner that is both unreasonable 
and unjust. This evil the law cannot easily remedy ; 
and, consequently, the duty of remedying it devolves 
upon those to whom the property is bequeathed. An- 
other cause for the exercise of this integrity consists 
in this circumstance: — ^The intention of the testator 
ought, in general, to be the standard of his successor's 
conduct ; and when, through accident or inadverten- 
cy, the testator does not comply with the precise 
forms of law, the law, adhering to its rules, will frus- 
trate the intention of the testator, unless the demands 
of equity be fulfilled by the virtuous integrity of heirs 
and legatees. 

200. A man, who possesses five thousand pounds, 
has two sons, of whom John is well provided for, and 
Thomas is not. With the knowledge of his sons, 
he makes a will, leaving four thousand pounds to 
Thomas, and one to John, explaining to both the rea- 
son of this division. A fire happens, by which the 
will is burnt, and the father dies before he has the 
opportunity of making another. The English law 
assigns a half of the money to .each brother. If John 
demands his half, is he a just man ? 

201. A person whose near relations do not need 
his money, adopts the children of distant relatives, 
with the declared intention, or manifest design, of 
providing for them at his death. If, under such cir- 
cumstances, he dies without a wdll, the heir at law 
cannot morally avail himself of his legal privilege, to 
the injury of these expectant parties. They need the 
money, which he does not; and this is one good rea- 
son for not seizing it; but the intention of the de- 
ceased invested them with a right; and, so that in- 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 79 



tention is known, it matters little to the moral obli- 
gation whether it is expressed on paper or not. 

292. It may be worth a paragraph, to remark that 
it is to be feared some persons think too complacently 
of their charitable bequests, or, what is worse, hope 
that this is a species of good works, which will coun- 
terbalance the offence of some present irregularities 
of conduct. Such bequests ought not to be dis- 
couraged ; yet it should be remembered that he who 
gives money after his deuh, parts with nothing of his 
own. He gives it only when he cannot retain it. A 
man who has more than he needs, should dispense it 
while it is his own. 

293. Minors' Debts. — A young man, under twen- 
ty-one years of age, purchases articles of a tradesman, 
of which some are necessary and some are not. Pay- 
ment for unnecessary articles cannot be enforced by 
law. Bat is the youth, who purchises unnecessary 
articles, with the promise to pay, exempted from the 
obligation? The circumstance that the law does not 
assi -t the creditor to recover the m^oney, does not dis- 
pense with it ; and, although those tradesmen who 
take advantage of the inexperience of a youth to ca- 
jole him into improper debts, ought undoubtedly to be 
punished, and the existing laws have been contrived 
for this purpose, yet the youth is the last person who 
ought to profit by the punishment of the trader. 

204. Distraints. — It is well known that, in dis- 
traints for rent, the law allows the landlord to seize 
whatever goods he finds upon the premises, without 
inquiring to whom they belong. And this rule, like 
many others, is as good as a general rule can be; 
since an unprincipled tenant might easily contrive to 
make it appear that none of the property was his 
own, and thus the landlord be irremediably defraud- 
ed. Yet the landlord cannot always virtuously act 
upon this rule of law. A tenant, who expects a dis- 



80 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



traint to-morrow, and of whose profligacy a lodger 
has no suspicion, secretly removes his own goods in 
the night, and leaves the lodger's, perhaps, to be seized 
by the bailiff. The landlord ought not, as a matter 
of course, to take these goods. The law, indeed, 
allows it, but benevolence and probity do not. 

205. Unjust Defendants. — It does not present a 
very favorable view of the state of private principle, 
that there are so many who refuse justice, unless 
compelled to be just by the law. It is indisputable 
that a multitude of suits are undertaken in order to 
obtain property or rights which the defendant knows 
he ought voluntarily to give up. Such a person is 
certainly a dishonest man. For what is the difference 
between him Vv^ho takes what is another's and him 
who withholds it? This severity of censure applies 
to some who are sued for damages. A man who, 
whether by design or inadvertency, has injured anoth- 
er, and will not compensate him unless he is legally 
compelled to do it, is certainly unjust. The law does 
not create this duty ; it only compels us to fulfil it. 
If the minds of such persons were under the influence 
of integrity, they would pay such debts without com- 
pulsion. 

206. Extortion. — It is a very common thing for 
a creditor who cannot obtain payment from a person 
who owes him money, to threaten to imprison him, 
in order to induce his friends to pay, rather than allow 
him to be immured in a jail. It will be said that 
the debtor's friends pay voluntarily ; but it is only 
with that sort of willingness with which a traveller 
gives his purse to a footpad, rather than be violently 
assaulted or perhaps killed. Both the footpad and 
the creditor are extortioners. One obtains money by 
threatening mischief to the body, the other by threat- 
ening pain to the mind. We do not say that the 
guilt is equal; but we say that both are criminal. It 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 81 



is said that, when a number of men of rank were 
assembled to attend Sheridan's funeral, a person 
elegantly dressed entered the chamber of death, and, 
stating himself to be a relation of the deceased, ur- 
gently entreated to be allowed to view the face of his 
departed friend. When the coffin-lid was unscrewed, 
the stranger pulled a warrant out of his pocket, and 
arrested the body. The extortioner was successful. 
The men of rank and fortune, who were present, 
could not suffer the remains of their friend to be 
consigned to the police; and it is said that Lord Sid- 
mouth and another gentleman paid the money — 
five hundred pounds. Was this creditor an honest 
man ? 

207. Slaves. — If a person left me an estate in 
Virginia, or the West Indies, with a hundred slaves, 
the law of the land allows me to keep possession of 
both; the moral law does not. I should, therefore, 
hold myself imperatively obliged to give those persons 
their liberty. Some persons, who perceive the flagi- 
tiousness of slavery, retain slaves. Much forbearance 
of thought and language should be exercised towards 
those in whose mind, perhaps, there is a strong conflict 
between conscience and the difficulty or loss which 
might attend a regard to its dictates. To endeavor 
to extricate one's self from the difficulty by selling 
the slaves, would be self-imposition. A narrative has 
appeared in print, of the conduct of a gentleman to 
whom a number of slaves had been bequeathed, and 
who acted upon principles of rectitude. He con- 
veyed the slaves to some other country, educated 
some, procured employment for others, and acted as 
a Christian towards all. 

208. Upon similar grounds, an upright man should 
not accept a present of a hundred pounds from a 
person who had not paid his debts; neither should he 
become his legatee. If the money were not rightfully 



82 PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



his, he cannot give it; if it be rightfully his creditors^, 
it cannot be mine. 

209. Privateers. — Although familiarity with war 
occasions many obliquities in the moral notions of a 
people, yet the silent verdict of public opinion is, I 
think, against the rectitude of privateering. It is not 
regarded as creditable and virtuous, and public dis- 
approbation appears to be on the increase. To the 
private plunderer himself I do not talk of the obliga- 
tions of morality ; he has many lessons of virtue to 
learn, before he will listen to such virtue as it is the 
object of these pages to recommend ; but to him who 
perceives the flagitiousness of the practice, I would 
urge the consideration that he ought not to receive 
the plunder of a privateer, even at second hand. Yet 
it is to be feared that many who would not fit out a 
privateer, would accept the money which the owners 
had stolen. 

210. Insurance. — It is very possible for a man to 
act dishonestly every day, and yet never defraud 
another of a shilling. A merchant who conducts his 
business partly or wholly with borrowed capital, is 
not honest if he endangers the loss of an amount of 
property which, if lost, would disable him from pay- 
ing his debts. He who possesses a thousand pounds 
of his own, and borrows a thousand of some one else, 
cannot virtuously speculate in such a way as to risk 
the loss of twelve hundred. Under similar circum- 
stances, it is unjust not to insure. Perhaps the ma- 
jority of uninsured traders, if their houses and goods 
were burnt, would be unable to pay their creditors. 

211. Settlements. — It not unfrequently occurs, 
when a person becomes insolvent, that the creditors 
unexpectedly find the estate is chargeable with a set- 
tlement on the wife. 

212. There is a consideration connected with this, 
which in a greater degree involves integrity of charac- 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 83 



ter than, perhaps, is often supposed. Men in business 
obtain credit from others in consequence of the opin- 
ions which others form of their character and prop- 
erty. To make a false appearance, then, is to act an 
untruth ; and the deception is as real, though not as 
palpable, as if the creditor had been deluded by a 
verbal falsehood. 

213. Rewards. — A person loses his pocket-book, 
containing fifty pounds, and offers ten pounds to the 
finder, if he will restore it. The finder ought not to 
demand the reward. To be paid for giving up the 
property, is to be paid for not committing fraud. It 
will be said that the reward is offered voluntarily. 
This, properly speaking, is not true. Two evils are 
presented to the loser, of which he is compelled to 
choose one. The offered ten pounds is a tax which 
is imposed upon him by the want of uprightness in 
mankind. As a reward, the man of integrity would 
receive nothing. If the loser requested it, he might, 
if he needed it, accept a donation ; but he would let 
it be understood that he accepted it as a present, not 
that he received it as a debt. 

214. Perhaps examples enough have been gath- 
ered to illustrate this class of obligations. Many 
appeared needful, because it is a class which is de- 
plorably neglected in practice. So strong is the 
temptation to think that we may rightfully possess 
whatever the law assigns to us, — so insinuating is 
the notion, upon subjects of property, that whatever 
the law does not punish we may rightfully do, — that 
there is little danger of supplying too many motives 
to habitual discrimination of our duties, and to ha- 
bitual purity of conduct. 



84 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



CHAPTER IIL 

INEQUALITY OF PROPERTY. 

215. That many and great evils result from that 
inequality of property which exists in civilized coun- 
tries, is indicated by the many propositions which 
have been made to diminish or destroy it. We join 
not with those who declaim against all inequality of 
property : the real evil is, not that it is unequal, but 
that it is greatly unequal ; not that one man is richer 
than another, but that one man is so rich as to be 
luxurious, or profligate, or imperious, and that another 
is so poor as to be abject and depraved, as well as 
destitute of the proper comforts of life. 

216. There are two means by which the pernicious 
inequality of property may be diminished — by po- 
litical institutions, and by the exertions of private 
men. Our present business is with the latter. 

217. To a person who possesses and expends more 
than he needs, there are two reasonable inducements 
to diminish its amount: 1st, To benefit others — a 
duty so often urged upon the public, that it need not 
be insisted on here; and, 2d, To benefit his family 
and himself — which may seem to some men to pre- 
sent new or paradoxical ideas. 

218. Large possessions are, in a great majority of 
instances, injurious to the possessor ; that is to say, 
those who hold them are generally less excellent, 
both as citizens and as men, than those who do not. 
This truth appears to be established by the concur- ; 
rent judgment of mankind. Lord Bacon says, As \ 
baggage is to an army, so are riches to virtue." 
Hannah More: It is to be feared that the general 
tendency of rank, and especially of riches^ is to with- 
draw the heart from spiritual exercises." Wilberforce : 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



85 



A much looser system of morals commonly prevails 
in the higher, than in the middling and lower orders 
of society." And Johnson, in his poem on the Van- 
ity of Human Wishes, has these lines : — 

" Wealth heaped on wealth nor truth nor safety buys ; 
The dangers gather as the treasures rise." 

219. It was an observation of Voltaire's, that the 
English people were like their butts of beer ; froth at 
top, dregs at bottom, in the middle excellent. The 
most rational, the wisest, the best portion of mankind 
belong to that class who possess ^' neither poverty 
nor riches." Who, then, would make his son a rich 
man ? 

220. If a man knows that wealth will, in all prob- 
ability, be injurious to himself and to his children, 

— injurious, too, in the most important points, — the 
religious and moral character, — it is manifestly a 
point of the soundest wisdom and truest kindness to 
decline to accumulate it. The Christian Scriptures 
give us repeated warnings of the evil tendency of 
wealth; not that riches necessarily lead to such conse- 
quences, but that such is their usual effect. Now, this 
language of Scripture does not merely state facts, — 
it imposes duties; and one point seems perfectly clear, 

— that he who sets no other limits to his possessions 
than inability to obtain more, does not conform to 
the will of God. 

221. It will be said that a man should provide for 
his family, and make them, if he can, independent. 
That he should provide for his family, is true ; but 
that he should give them an affluent independence, 
forms no part of his duty. Ordinarily, he will best 
approve himself a wise and kind parent, who leaves 
to his sons so much only as may enable them, by the 
aid of moderate engagements, to enjoy the comforts 

8 



86 PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



of life ; and to his daughters a sufficiency to possess 
similar comforts, but not what will enable them to 
mingle with the votaries of expensive dissipation. 

222. It w^ere idle to specify any amount of property 
which a person ought not to exceed. Yet somewhat of 
a general rule may be suggested. He who is accu- 
mulating should consider ivliy he desires more. If he 
really believes an addition will increase the welfare, 
and usefulness, and virtue, of his family, it is probable 
that further accumulation may be right. But he who 
already possesses affluence, should consider its actual 
existing effects. If he employs a competent portion 
of it in increasing the happiness of others, — if it 
does not diminish or impair the virtues of his chil- 
dren, — if he is conscious of no evil effect, — he may 
remain as he is. But if he perceives an opposite 
tendency, he certainly has tbo much. 

223. Perhaps it is remarkable, that the obligation 
not to accumulate great property for ourselves or our 
children is so little enforced by the writers on mo- 
rality. None will dispute that such accumulation is 
both unwise and unkind. Every one acknowledges, 
too, that the general evils of the existing inequality 
of property are enormously great; yet how few insist 
upon those means by which these evils might be di- 
minished ! If all men declined to retain, or refrained 
from acquiring, more than is likely to be beneficial to 
their families or themselves, the pernicious inequality 
of property would quickly be diminished or destroyed. 
It might be said there is a claim of justice, too. A 
man who has acquired a reasonable >-ifficiency, and 
who, nevertheless, retains his business to ncquire more, 
practises a sort of injustice towards another, who 
needs his means of gain. There are always many 
who cannot enjoy the comforts of life, because others 
are improperly occupying the means by which those 
comforts are to be obtained. Is it the part of a 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 87 



Christian to do this, — even abating the consideration 
that he is injuring himself by withholding comforts 
from another ? 



CHAPTER IV. 

LITIGATION. ARBITRATION. 

224. The question for an individual, when he has 
some cause of dispute with another respecting prop- 
erty or rights, is, " By what means ought I to endeavor 
to adjust it ? " Three modes of adjustment may be 
supposed to be offered — private arrangement with 
the other party, reference to impartial men, and law. 
Private adjustment is the best mode ; arbitration is 
good; law is good only when it is the sole alternative. 

225. The litigiousness of the early Christians at 
Corinth gave occasion to the energetic expostulation 
in I. Corinthians, 6th verse — ''Dare any of you, 
having a matter against another, go to law befcre 
the unjust, and not before the saints? Do you not 
know that the saints shall judge the world? * * * * 
Now, therefore, there is utterly a fault among you, 
because you go to law one with another. Why do 
ye not rather take wrong? Why do ye not rather 
suffer yourselves to be defrauded?" 

226. Although the sipostle^s prohibition of going to 
law appears to have been founded upon the paganism 
of the courts, his language evidently conveys disap- 
probation, generally, of appeals to the law. He insists 
upon the propriety of adjusting disputes by arbitration. 
It will perhaps be acknowledged that, when Chris- 
tianity shall possess its proper influence over us, there 
will be little reason to recur to fixed rules of law. 

227. There are, however, cases in which the 
Christian may properly appeal to the law. He may 



88 PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



have an antagonist who can in no other manner be 
induced to act justly. There are, too, in the present 
condition of jurisprudence, some cases in which the 
rule of justice depends upon the rule of law ; so that 
a thing is just or not just according as the law deter- 
mines. In such cases, neither party may be able dis- 
tinctly to tell what justice requires, until the law 
informs them. Yet suits are not always necessary. 
The parties may obtain opinions.'^ 

228. There are evils of litigation from which arbi- 
tration is, in a great degree, exempt. 

229. Expense is an important item. The great 
cost of obtaining justice in courts of law, is a power- 
ful reason for preferring arbitration. 

230. Legal Injustice. He who desires that justice 
should be dispensed between himself and another, 
should bear in mind how much injustice is inflicted 
by the law. The technicalities of the law and the 
artifices of lawyers are almost innumerable. Some- 
times, when a party thinks he is on the eve of obtain- 
ing a just verdict, he is suddenly disappointed, and his 
cause is lost, by some technical defect — the omission 
of a word, or the misspelling of a name ; matters which 
in no degree affect the validity of his claims. 

231. There is no reason to doubt that justice 
would generally be administered by a reference to 
two or three upright and disinterested men. When 
facts are laid before such persons, they are seldom at 
a loss to decide what justice requires. 

232. Inquietude. The expense, the injustice, the 
delays and vexations, attendant upon lawsuits, bring 
altogether a degree of inquietude upon the mind, 
which greatly deducts from the enjoyment of life ; 
and, if to this we add the heart-burnings and ill-will 
which suits frequently occasion, a sum of evil is pre- 
sented to us, from which arbitration is, in a great 
degree, exempt. 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



89 



CHAPTER V. 

THE MORALITY OF LEGAL PRACTICE. 

^33. That public opinion pronounces that there is, 
in the ordinary character of legal practice, much that 
is not reconcilable with rectitude, can need no proof. 
It may reasonably be concluded that, when the profes- 
sional conduct of a particular set of men is character- 
ized peculiarly with sacrifices of rectitude, there must 
be some general and peculiar cause. There appears 
nothing in the profession, as such, to produce this 
effect ; nothing in taking part in the administration 
of justice, which necessarily leads men away from 
justice. Doubtless the original fault is in the law 
itself. 

234. The fault is of two kinds ; one is necessary, 
and one accidental. First : wherever there are fixed 
rules of deciding controversies between man and man_, 
or of administering punishment to public offenders, it 
is inevitable that equity will sometimes be sacrificed 
to rules. 

235. The second cause of the evil, as it results 
from the law itself, is its extreme complication, — in 
the needless multiplicity of its forms, in the inextrica- 
ble intricacy of its whole structure. This, which is 
probably by far the most efficient cause of the want 
of morality in legal practice, T call gratuitous. But, 
whether needed or not, the tempt ition which it casts 
in the way of professional virtue is excessively great. 
There can be no efficient reform among lawyers, with- 
out a reform of the law. 

236. It is to be expected, of course, in the present 
state of human virtue, that lawyers, familiarized to 
the notion thu whatever is legally right is right, 
should themselves be chargeable with adding greatly 

8* 



90 PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS, 



to the evils arising from legal institutions. They will 
go onward from insisting upon legal technicalities, to 
an endeavor to pervert the law ; then to giving a false 
coloring to facts ; then onward, and still onward, 
until witnesses are abashed and confounded, juries 
are misled by impassioned appeals to their feelings; 
until deliberate untruths are solemnly averred ; until, 
in a word, all the pitiable and degrading spectacles 
are exhibited w^hich are now exhibited in legal 
practice. 

237. But when we say that the original cause of 
this unhappy system is found in the law itself, do \ve 
justify the system ? Far from it. We affirm that a 
lawyer cannot morally enforce the application of legal 
rules without regard to the claims of equity in the 
particular case. For to w^hat does the alternative lead 
us? Is a man, when he undertakes a client's busi- 
ness, at liberty to advance his interests by every 
method, good or bad, which the law wdll not punish ? 
If not, something must limit and restrict him ; and 
that something is the moral law. 

238. Dr. Paley's attempts to defend that item in 
legal practice, which consists in uttering untruths in 
order to serve a client, are singularly unfortunate. 
^' There are falsehoods,'' says he, which are not 
criminal'; as where no one is deceived, — which is the 
case with an advocate in asserting the justice, or his 
belief in the justice, of his client's cause." No con- 
fidence is destroyed, because none was reposed." A 
defence not very creditable, if it were valid. It de- 
fends men from the imputation of falsehood, because 
their falsehoods are so habitual that no one gives them 
credit 1 

239. But the defence is not valid. Advocates 
would not persist in uttering untruths without attain- 
ing an object. If no one ever, in fact, believed them, 
they would cease to asseverate. But the real practice 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



91 



is, to mix falsehood and truth together, and so to in- 
volve the one with the other that the jury cannot 
easily separate them. And that the pleader's design 
is to persuade them of the truth of all he affirms, 
is manifest. Suppose an advocate, when he arose, 
should say, Gentlemen, I am now going to speak 
the truth ; " and, after narrating the facts of the case, 
should say, Gentlemen, I am now going to ad- 
dress you with fictions." Why would he not do this? 
The deduction should not be concealed, that he who 
employs untruths in his pleadings does, really and 
most strictly, lie, 

249. Gisborne defends legal practice on the ground 
that the standard to which the advocate refers the 
cause of his client, is not the law of reason, nor the 
law of God, but the law of the land. His peculiar 
and proper object is not to prove the side of the 
question which he advocates morally right, but legally 
right." There is something specious in this ; but 
what is its amount ? That if the laws of a country 
proceed upon such and such maxims, they exempt us 
from the authority of the law of God. Either the acts 
of a legislature may suspend the obligations of moral- 
ity, or they may not. If they may, there is an end of 
that morality which is founded upon the divine will; 
if not, the argument of Gisborne is a fallacy. 

241. Dr. Johnson's course is this: ''You do not 
know a cause to be good or bad till the judge de- 
termines it. An argument that does not convince 
you, may convince the judge to whom you urge 
it. If it does, then he is right, and you are wrong." 
This is satisfactory ^ for it is always satisfactory to 
perceive that a powerful intellect can find nothing 
but idle sophistry to urge against the obligations of 
virtue. 

242. One other argument is this : Eminent bar- 
risters, it is said, should not be too scrupulous, because 



92 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



clients might fear their causes would be rejected by 
virtuous pleaders, and would, therefore, go to needy 
and unprincipled chicaners. If their causes are bad^ 
the sooner they are discountenanced the better : be- 
sides, it is a very loose morality which recommends 
good men to do improper things, lest they should be 
done by the bad. Let us consider, for a moment, the 
practical results of the ordinary legal practice. 

243. A civil action is brought into court, and the 
evidence satisfies every man that the plaintiff is en- 
titled, in justice, to a verdict. Suddenly, the pleader 
discovers some technical irregularity in the proceed- 
ings, and the plaintiff loses his cause. The unhappy 
sufferer retires injured and wronged, without re- 
dress or hope of redress. Can it be sufficient to jus- 
tify a man in such conduct, to say that such things 
are his business, — the means by which he obtains his 
living 1 The same excuse would justify a troop of 
Arabian banditti which plunders the caravan. Yet 
this is the every-day practice of the profession ; and the 
amount of injustice which is inflicted by this practice 
is enormous. There is no excuse for thus inflicting- 
injustice. It is an act of pure, gratuitous mischief; 
an act not required by law, but condemned by moral- 
ity, and possessing no apology but the lawyer's love 
of gain. 

244. In criminal courts, the same conduct is prac- 
tised, and with the same effect of preventing the 
execution of justice. Is, then, the circumstance of 
belonging to the legal profession a good reason for 
disregarding those duties which are obligatory upon 
every other man? He who wards off punishment 
from swindlers and robbers, and turns them loose 
to the work of fraud and plunder again, surely de- 
serves worse of his country than many a hungry man 
who filches a loaf or a trinket. 

245. It really is a dreadful consideration that a body 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



93 



of men respectable in the various relationships of life, 
should make, in consequence of the vicious maxims 
of a profession, these deplorable sacrifices cf rectitude. 
To a writer upon such a subject, it is difficult to speak 
with that plainness which morality requires, without 
seeming to speak illiberally of men. But it is not a 
question of liberality, but of morals. When we see a 
barrister willing to take the brief of any client ; ready 
to exert all his abilities to prove that any given cause 
is good or bad; to urge before a jury the side on 
which he happens to have been employed, with all 
the earnestness of seeming integrity and truth; — 
when we see all this, and remember that it was the toss 
of a die whether he should have done exactly the con- 
trary, I think that no expression characterizes the 
procedure but intellectual and moral 'prostitution. In 
any other place than a court of justice, every one 
would say that it was prostitution ; a court of justice 
cannot make it less. 

246. It may probably be asked, What is a legal 
man to do? How shall he discriminate his duties?'* 
I confess that the answer is difficult , and wdiy is it dif- 
ficult? Because the whole system is unsound. The 
conscientious lawyer is surrounded with temptations 
and difficulties resulting from the general system of 
the law ; difficulties and temptations so great, that it 
may almost appear to be the part of a wise man to fly 
rather than encounter them. There is, however, 
nothing necessarily incidental to the profession which 
makes it incompatible with morality. He who has 
the firmness to maintain his allegiance to virtue, may 
doubtless maintain it. Such a man would consider 
that, law being in general the practical standard of 
equity, the pleader may properly illustrate and enforce 
it. He may assiduously examine statutes and prece- 
dents, and honorably adduce them on the part of his 
client. In examining his witnesses, he may educe the 



94 PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



whole truth; in examining the other party's, he may 
endeavor to detect collusions, and to elicit facts which 
they may endeavor to conceal. But he may not quote 
statutes and adjudged cases which he does not think 
apply to the subject. He may not endeavor to mis- 
lead the jury by appealing to their feelings, by em- 
ploying ridicule, and especially by unfounded insin- 
uations or misrepresentation of facts. He may not 
endeavor to conceal or discredit the truth, by attempt- 
ing to confuse the opposite witnesses, or by entrap- 
ping them into contradictions. Such as these appear 
to be the rules which rectitude imposes in ordinary 
cases. 

247. Murray, the grammarian, had been a barrister 
in America. ^* I do not recollect," says he, that I 
ever encouraged a client to proceed at law when I 
thought his cause was unjust or indefensible ,• but, 
in such cases, I believe it was my invariable practice 
to discourage litigation, and to recommend a peaceful 
settlement of differences. In the retrospect of this 
mode of practice I have always had great satisfac- 
tion; and I am persuaded that a different procedure 
would have been the source of many painful recol- 
lections." 

248. One serious consideration remains — the effect 
of the immorality of legal practice upon the personal 
character of the profession. The lawyer who is 
frequently engaged in resisting what he strongly sus- 
pects to be just; in maintenance of what he deems to 
be, in strictness, untenable ; in advancing inconclusive 
reasoning, — can be preserved by nothing short of seri- 
ous and invariable solicitude, from the risk of having 
the distinction between riorht and wronor almost erased 
from his mind." * Is it indeed so ? Then the cus- 
tom which entails this fearful risk must infiillibly be 



* Gisborne. 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 95 

bad. Assuredly no virtuous conduct tends to erase 
from the mind the distinctions of right and wrong. 



249. It is by no means certain that, if a lawyer 
were to enter upon life with a steady determination to 
act upon the principles of strict integrity, his expe- 
rience would occasion any exception to the general 
rule that the path of virtue is the path of interest. 
When such a man appeared before a jury, they would 
attend to his statements and his reasonings with that 
confidence which integrity only can inspire. They 
would not, as at present, be ever upon the watch to 
protect themselves from illusion, and casuistry, and 
misrepresentation. Such a man, I say, would have a 
weight of advocacy which no other qualification can 
supply; and upright clients, knowing this, would find 
it their interest to employ him. It might become 
almost equivalent to the loss of a cause to intrust it 
to a bad man. If none but upright men could be 
efficient advocates, and if upright men would not ad- 
vocate vicious causes, vicious causes would not be 
prosecuted. If such be even the possible results 
of sterling integrity, the obligation to practise it is 
proportionately great ; the amount of depending good 
involves a corresponding amount of responsibility 
upon him who contributes to perpetuate the evil. 



CHAPTER VI. 

PROMISES. LIES. 

250. A PROMISE is a contract, differing from such 
contracts as a lawyer would draw up, in the circum- 
stance that ordinarily it is not written. The general 



96 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



obligation of promises needs little illustration, because 
it is not disputed. Men are not left without the con- 
sciousness that what they promise they ought to per- 
form; and thus thousands who can give no philosoph- 
ical account of the matter, know that if they violate 
their engagements they violate the law of God. 

251. Some philosophers deduce the obligation of 
promises from the expediency of fulfilling them. There 
is a shorter and safer road to truth. To promise and 
not to perform, is to deceive ; and deceit is peculiarly 
and especially condemned by Christianity. 

252. Persons sometimes deceive others by making 
a promise in a sense different from that in which they 
know it will be understood. They hope this species 
of deceit is less criminal than breaking their word, 
and wish to gain the advantage of deceiving without 
its guilt. They dislike the shame, but perform the 
act. The sense in which a promise binds a person 
is the sense in which he knoivs it is accepted by the 
other party. 

253. It is very possible to promise without speak- 
ing. A person who brings up his own children or 
others in the known and encouraged expectation 
that he will provide for them, promises to provide for 
tliem. A shipmaster promises to deliver a pipe of 
wine at the accustomed port, ^Jtbough he may have 
made neither written nor verbal engagement respect- 

254. Parole, such as is taken of military men, is 
of imperative obligation. The prisoner who escapes 
by breach of parole, ought to be regarded as the per- 
petrator of an aggravated crime ; aggravated, because 
he knows peculiar reliance was placed upon his word, 
and since he adds to the ordinary guilt of breach of 
promise that of casting suspicion and entailing suffer- 
ing upon other men. An upright man never broke ' 
parole. 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



97 



255. Promises are not binding if performance is 
unlawful. Cranmer, whose religious firmness was- 
overcome in the prospect of the stake, recanted ; 
that is, he promised to abandon the Protestant faith. 
His promise was not binding. To have regarded it 
would have been a crime. 

258. Many promises are conditional, though the con- 
ditions are not expressed. Such are engagements for 
ordinary visits, &;c., which are made and accepted as 
subject to contingencies. Yet even to seem to disre- 
gard an engagement is an evil. To an ingenuous 
and Christian mind there is always something pain- 
ful in not performing it. Of this evil the principal 
source is that of using unconditional terms for con- 
ditional engagements. It is better, and more becom- 
ing the condition of humanity, to say, I intend" to do 
a thing, than, I will " do a thing. " Ye ought to say, 
If the Lord will, we shall live, and do this or that." 
Not, indeed, that the most sacred name is to be intro- 
duced to express the conditions of our little engage- 
ments, but the principle should never be forgotten, 
that we know not what we shall be on the morrow. 

257. Respecting the oft-discussed question whether 
extorted promises are binding, there has been, I sus- 
pect, a general want of advertence to one important 
point. What is an extorted promise ? If by an 
extorted promise is meant a promise that is made 
involuntarily, — if it is the effect of ungovernable im- 
pulse, and made without the consciousness of the 
party, — then it is not a promise. Such promises do 
not bind any more than those of a man in a fit of in- 
sanity. This may happen. Fear or agitation may be 
so great, that a person really does not know what he 
says or does. But if by an extorted promise, it is only 
meant that very powerful inducements were held out 
to making it, — inducements, however, which did not 
take away the power of choice, — then these promises 
9 



98 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



are, in strictness, voluntary, and, like all other volun- 
tary engagements, they ought to be fulfilled. But, 
perhaps, the fulfilment is unlawful. Then you may 
not fulfil it. The offence consists in making such 
engagements. Perhaps a robber threatens to take 
my life, unless I promise to reveal the place where my 
neighbor's money is deposited. Ought I not to make 
the promise, in order to save my life ? No. Here, 
in reality, is the origin of the difficulties and the 
doubts. To rob your neighbor, is criminal; to enable 
another man to rob him, is criminal too. We are 
commanded to hold subservient to our Christian 
fidelity our own life also." If, however, giving way 
to the weakness of nature, a person makes the prom- 
ise, he should regulate his fulfilment of it by the 
ordinary principles. Fulfil the promise, unless the 
performance involves moral wrong ; and, if any diffi- 
culty arises in settling this point, ascribe it to that 
entanglement which ensues from having begun to go 
astray. 

258. The history of that good man John Fletcher 
(La Flechere) affords an example to our purpose. 
His nephew, a noted profligate, came to him one day 
vv'ith an order for five hundred crowns, which order 
he had obtained by threatening the life of another 
uncle. Fletcher suspected some fraud, and put the 
order in his pocket. The young man instantly pre- 
sented his pistol, declaring that he would fire if he 
did not deliver it up. Fletcher refused, told him 
that he felt his life to be secure under the protection 
of God, and severely remonstrated with his nephew 
on his profligacy. The young man was softened and 
restrained, and, before he left his uncle, gave him 
many assurances that he would amend his life. The 
first uncle, who yielded to intimidation, might have 
doubts as to the obligation of his extorted" promise ; 
Fletcher could have no doubts to solve. 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 99 



LIES. 

259. The guilt of lying, like that of many other 
offences, has been needlessly founded upon its ill ef- 
fects. These effects constitute a good reason for 
adhering to truth ; but they are not the greatest, nor 
the best. Scripture abounds with peremptory prohibi- 
tions of this vice; and it is instructive to observe with 
what crimes lying is there associated, — with perjury, 
with murder, and with parricide. We find nothing to 
countenance the notion that lying is not always^ and 
for whatever purpose, prohibited by the divine will. 

260. A lie is uttering what is not true, when the 
speaker professes to utter truth, or when he knows it 
is expected by the hearer. 

261. Milton says, Falsehood is incurred when 
any one, from a dishonest motive, either perverts the 
truth or utters what is false to one to whom it is his 
duty to speak the truth.'' To whom is it not our 
duty to speak the truth? But another condition is 
proposed : in order to constitute a lie, the Jnotive to it 
must be dishonest. Is not all deceit dishonesty ? and 
can any one utter a lie without deceit? Milton, in 
this case, as in others where he advances doctrines 
of such questionable character, makes many references 
for authority to the Hebrew Scriptures, but not one 
to the Christian. 

262. Paley's philosophy is yet more lax: he says 
we may tell a. falsehood to a person "who has no 
right to know the truth." What constitutes a right 
to know the truth, it were not easy to determine. 
But if a man has no right to know the truth, with- 
hold it, but do not utter a lie. To say that, when a 
man is tempted to tell a falsehood, he is to consider 
the degree of " inconveniency which results from the 
want of confidence in such cases," * and to employ 



Paley. 



100 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



the falsehood or not, as this degree shall prescribe, 
is surely to trifle with morality. What is the hope 
that a man will decide aright, who sets about such a 
calculation at such a time ? 

263. It has been said that we may tell a falsehood 
to a madman for his own advantao^e," and this because 
it is beneficial. But the united testimony of those 
who have succeeded best in care of the insane, shows 
that experience enforces the dictates of principle, and 
that it is only by the strictest adherence to truth that 
the confidence of the insane is to be secured. 

264. Persons frequently employ falsehoods to a sick 
man who cannot recover, lest the truth should dis- 
compose his mind ; yet these very persons, perhaps, 
will discompose him without scruple, if he has not 
made his will. Is a bequest, then, of more importance 
than an earnest preparation for death ? 

265. Hyperboles, jests, tales, and fictions, are of 
course not considered as lies, although affirmative 
language is used. The parables of Scripture are 
instances of this. A man who thinks he can best 
inculcate virtue through a fable, may write one; he 
who desires to discountenance an absurdity, may 
employ irony. Yet it should not be forgotten that 
language professedly fictitious is not always under- 
stood by those to whom it is addressed. This applies 
especially to children. The boy who hears his father 
using hyperboles and irony with a grave countenance, 
may probably think he has his father's example for 
telling lies among his schoolfellows. 

266. Among the untruths which often are not lies, 
are those which factitious politeness enjoins. Such 
are compliments and complimentary subscriptions, 
and many other untruths of expression and of action, 
which pass currently in the world. These are, no 
doubt, often estimated at their value : the receiver 
knows that they are base coin, though they shine like 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 101 



the good. Now, although it is not to be pretenKled 
that such expressions so estimated are lies, yet I will 
venture to affirm, that the reader cannot set up for 
them any tolerable defence ; and, if he cannot show 
that they are right, he may be quite sure they are 
wrong. 

267. The childish and senseless practice of re- 
quiring servants to deny " their masters has had 
many apologists, — I suppose because many perceive 
that it is wrong. It is not always certain that such 
a servant does not in strictness lie; for, how well soever 
the folly may be understood in the gay world, some 
who knock at their doors have no other idea than 
that they may depend upon the servant's word. An 
uninitiated servant suffers a shock to his moral prin- 
ciples when he is first required to tell these falsehoods. 
It diminishes his previous abhorrence of lying, and 
otherwise deteriorates his moral character. 



CHAPTER m 
OATHS. 

THEIR MORAL CHARACTER : THEIR EFFICACY AS 
SECURITIES FOR VERACITY : THEIR EFFECTS. 

268. " An oath is that whereby we call God to 
witness the truth of what we say, with a curse upon 
ourselves, either implied or expressed, should it prove 
false." 

269. A Curse. — Now, supposing the Christian 
Scriptures to contain no information respecting the 
moral character of oaths, how far is it reasonable, or 

9* 



102 PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 

prudent, or reverent, for a man to stake his salvation 
upon the truth of what he says? This consideration 
applies, even if a man is sure that he speaks the truth : 
but who is, beforehand, sure of this? Who, at any 
rate, is so sure of this, that it is justifiable specifically 
to stake his salvation upon his accuracy ? Few men's 
minds are so sternly upright, that they can answer a 
variety of questions on subjects in which their feel- 
ings and interests are involved, without some little 
deduction from unfavorable truths, or some little over- 
coloring of facts in their own favor. 

270. To take an oath, is to assume that the Deity 
will become a party in the case, — that we can call 
upon him whenever we please, to follow up, by the 
exercise of his almighty power, the insignificant con- 
tracts which men make with men. 

271. Upon every subject of questionable rectitude 
that is sanctioned by habit and the usages of society, 
a person should place himself in the independent 
situation of an inquirer. He should not seek for 
arguments to defend an existing practice, but simply 
inquire what our practice ought to be. We therefore 
invite the reader, in considering the citation which 
follows, to suppose himself one of the listeners at the 
Mount, — to know nothing of the customs of the 
present day, and to have no desire to justify them. 

272. *^Ye have heard that it hath been said by 
them of old time, Thou shalt not forswear thyself, but 
shalt perform unto the Lord thine oaths. But I say unto 

you, Swear not at all Let your communication be 

Yea, yea. Nay, nay; for whatsoever is more than these, 
Cometh of evil." * The words are absolute and ex- 
clusive. As to the enumeration neither by heaven, 
nor by the earth," &c., it is said that it prohibits 
swearing by certain objects, but not by all objects. 



* Matt. V. 33—37. 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 103 



To which a sufficient answer is found in a parallel 
passage in James: "Swear not," he says, "neither 
by heaven, neither by the earth, neither by any other 
oath." 

273. " Whatsoever is more than these cometh of 
evil." This is, indeed, most accurately true. Evil 
is the foundation of oaths : it is because men are bad, 
that it is supposed oaths are needed : take away the 
wickedness of mankind, and we shall still have occa- 
sion for No and Yes, but for no stronger expressions. 

274. "Many of the Christian fathers," says Gro- 
tius, " condemned all oaths, without exception." " I 
say nothing of perjury," says Tertullian, " because 
SIC earing it self \^ \iYi\?L\vi\i\ to Christians." Chrysos- 
tom says, " Do not say to me, ' I swear for a just 
purpose ; ' it is no longer lawful for thee to swear, 
either justly or unjustly." " He who," says Gregory 
of Nysse, "has precluded murder by taking away 
anger, and udio has driven away the pollution of adul- 
tery by subduing desire, has expelled from our life 
the curse of perjury bv forbidding us to swear ; for 
where there is no oath, there can be no infringement 
of it." Such is the conviction which the language 
of Christ conveyed to the early converts ; and such is 
the conviction which I think it would convey to us, 
if custom had not familiarized us with the evil, and 
if v/e did not read the New Testament rather to find 
justifications of our practice, than to discover the 
truth, and to apply it to our conduct. 



EFFICACY OF OATHS AS SECURITIES FOR VERACITY. 

275. Men naturally speak the truth, unless they 
have some inducements to falsehood. When they 
have such inducements, what is it that overcomes 
them, and still prompts them to speak the truth ? 



104 PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



Considerations of duty founded upon religion ; 
The apprehension of the ill opinion of other men; 
The fear of legal penalties. 

276. I. It is obvious that the intervention of an 
oath is designed to strengthen only the first of these 
motives. The advantage of an oath — if advantage 
there be — is in the increased power which it gives to 
sentiments of duty, founded upon religion. It will 
be our endeavor to show that this increased power is 
small ; that, in fact, the oath, as such, adds very little 
to the motives to veracity. What class of men will 
the reader select, in order to show its greatest power 1 

277. Good men ? They will speak the truth, wheth- 
er with or without an oath. 

278. Bad men? Men who care nothing for reli- 
gion? They will care nothing for it, although they 
take an oath. 

279. Men of ambiguous character, who sometimes 
care for religion, and sometimes not? Perhaps it will 
be said, that to these the solemnity of an oath is ne- 
cessary, to rouse their latent apprehensions, and to 
bind them to veracity. It may be supposed by the 
reader, that the solemnity of a specific imprecation 
would frequently add stronger motives to adhere to 
truth. But what is the evidence of experience ? Po- 
thier says, In forty years of practice, I have only 
met two instances where the parties, in the case of an 
oath offered after evidence, have been prevented, by a 
sense of religion, from persisting in their testimony. 

2S0. II. The second inducement mentioned will 
be found to be incomparably more powerful than that 
religious inducement which is applied by an oath, as 
such. Not so much because religious sanctions are 
less operative than public opinion, as because public 
opinion applies, or detaches, the religious sanction. 
Upon this subject a serious mistake has been made ; 
for it has been contended that the influence of reli- 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



105 



gious motives is comparatively nothing ; that, unless 
men are impelled to speak the truth by fear of dis- 
grace, or of legal penalties, they care very little for 
the sanctions of religion. But the truth is, that the 
sanctions of religion are, in a great degree, either 
brought into operation, or prevented from operating, 
by these secondary motives. The power of public 
opinion in binding to veracity, is twofold. It has its 
dn-ect influence, arising from the fear which all men 
feel of the disapprobation of others, and the indirect 
inflaence, arising from the fact that public opinion 
applies the sanctions of religion. 

2S1. III. Of the influence of legal penalties in 
binding to veracity, little needs be said. But it may 
be remarked that the legal penalty tends to give 
vigor and efficiency to public opinion. He whom the 
law punishes as a criminal, is generally regarded 
as a criminal by the world. 

282. Now, that which we affirm is this — that, un- 
less public opinion or legal penalties enforce veracity, 
very little motive would be added by an oath, more 
than would subsist in the case of simple affirmation. 

2S3. The oaths of jurymen afford an instance. 
Jurymen swear that they will give a verdict according 
to the evidence ; yet it is perfectly well known that 
they often assent to a verdict which they believe to 
be contrary to that evidence. This perjury is com- 
mitted by multitudes ; yet what juryman cares for it, 
or refuses, in consequence of his oath, to deliver a 
verdict which he believes to be improper ? The rea- 
son that they do not care is, that the oath, as such, 
does not bind their consciences. The public do not 
often reprobate the violation of such oaths; the law 
does not punish it ; jurymen learn to think that it is 
no harm to violate them; and the resulting conclusion 
is, that the form of an oath cannot, and does not, sup- 
ply the deficiency. 



106 PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



284. Step a few yards from the jury-box, to the wit- 
ness-box, and you see the difference. There public 
opinion interposes its power; there the punishment of 
perjury impends ; there the religious sanction is ap- 
plied ; and there, consequently, men regard the truth. 
If the simple intervention of an oath was that which 
bound men to veracity, they would be bound in the 
jury-box as much as at ten feet off ; but it is not. 

285. A custom-house oath is nugatory, even to a 
proverb. Yet it is an oath, and the swearer does 
stake his salvation upon his veracity ; and still his 
veracity is not secured. Why? Because an oath, as 
such, applies to the minds of most men. little or no 
motive to veracity. 

286. We return, then, to our proposition. ■ — Unless 
public opinion or legal penalties enforce veracity, very 
little is added by an oath to the motives to veracity, 
more than would subsist in the case of simple affir- 
mation. 

287. It is obvious that the legislature might, if it 
pleased, attach the same penalties to falsehood as it 
now attaches to perjury ; and this is, in fact, done in 
the case of the Society of Friends. Public opinion 
might be applied to affirmation much more strongly 
than it is now. Take away oaths, and the public 
reprobation of falsehood will immediately increase in 
power, and will bring with its increase an increasing 
efficiency in the religious sanction. 

288. Our reasoning, then, proceeds by these steps : 
Oaths are designed to apply a strong religious sanc- 
tion : they, however, do not apply it, unless they are 
seconded by the apprehension of penalties or dis- 
grace. The apprehension of penalties and disgrace 
may be attached to falsehood, and with this apprehen- 
sion the religious sanction will also be attached to it. 
Therefore, all those motives which bind men to ve- 
racity, may be applied to falsehood as well as to oaths. 
In other words, oaths are needless. 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 107 



EFFECTS OF OATHS. 

289. There is a power and efficacy in our religion 
which elevate those who heartily accept it above that 
low moral state in which alone an oath can even be 
supposed to be of advantage. The man who takes an 
oath virtually declares that his word would not bind 
him. This degradation, this descent from the proper 
ground on which a man of integrity should stand, il- 
lustrates the proposition, that whatever exceeds affir- 
mation ^' Cometh of evil." It is related of Solon that 
he said, A good man ought to be in that estimation 
that he needs not an oath ; because it is to be reputed 
a lessening of his honor if he be forced to swear." If 
to take an oath lessened a pagan's honor, what must 
be its effect on a Christian's purity? 

290. Oaths tend powerfully to deprave the moral 
character. We have seen that they are continually 
violated ; that men are continually referring to the 
most tremendous sanctions of religion, with the ha- 
bitual belief that those sanctions impose no practical 
obligation. Can this have any other tendency than 
to diminish the effect of religious sanctions upon other 
things ? 

291. Oaths encourage falsehood. The law says, 
You must speak the truth when upon oath ; " which 

is the same as to say, that it is less harm to violate truth 
when you are not on oath. Common language bears 
testimony to the effect. The vulgar phrase, I will 
take my oath of it," clearly evinces the prevalent no- 
tion that a man may lie with less guilt when he does 
not take his oath. Godwin says, There is no cause 
of insincerity, prevarication, and falsehood, more pow- 
erful than the practice of administering oaths in a 
court of justice." 

292. A few serious words remain. The investi- 
gations of this chapter are not matters to employ 



108 PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 

speculation, but to influence our practice. If it be 
indeed true that Jesus Christ has imperatively for- 
bidden us to employ an oath, an imperative duty is 
imposed upon us. It is worse than merely vain to 
hear his laws and not obey them. Of him, therefore, 
who is assured of the prohibition, it is indispensably 
required that he should refuse an oath. How, then, 
does it happen that, although persons frequently ac- 
knowledge they think oaths are forbidden, so few 
decline swearing? By what means do the persons 
of whom we speak suppose the will of God respecting 
oaths is to be effected? This offers one instance, 
among the many, of the want of uncompromising 
moral principle in the world — of such principle as 
would prompt us, and enable us, to sacrifice every 
thing to Christian fidelity. 

^ 

CHAPTER VIII. 

IMMORAL AGENCY. 

293. A GREAT portion of the moral evil in the 
world is the result, not so much of the intensity of 
individual wickedness, as of a general incompleteness 
in the practical virtue of all classes of men. If it 
were possible to take away misconduct from one half 
of the community, and to add its amount to the re- 
mainder, it is probable that the moral character of 
our species would soon be benefited by the change. 
Now, the ill dispositions of the bad are powerfully 
encouraged by the want of upright example in those 
who are better. A man may deviate considerably 
from rectitude, and yet be as. good as his neighbors. 
From such a man the motive to excellence, which the 
constant presence of virtuous example supplies, is 
taken away. 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 109 



294. One of the modes in which the efficacy of 
example in reputable persons is miserably diminished, 
is, by what we have called immoral agency, — by 
their being wflling to encourage, at second hand, evils 
which they would not commit as principals. Linked 
together as men are in society, it is frequently diffi- 
cult to perform an unwarrantable action, without 
some sort of cooperation from creditable men. This 
cooperation is not often, except in flagrant cases, 
refused ; and thus not only is the commission of sach 
actions facilitated, but a general relaxation is induced 
in the practical estimates which men form of the 
standard of rectitude. 

295. Since, then, so much evil attends this agency 
in unwarrantable conduct, it manifestly becomes a 
good man to look around upon the nature of his in- 
tercourse with others, and to consider whether he is 
not virtually promoting evils which his judgment dep- 
recates, or reducincp the standard of moral iudo-ment 
in the world. The reader would have no difficulty in 
perceiving that, if a strenuous opponent of the slave 
trade should establish a manufactory of manacles and 
iron collars for the slave merchants, he would act with 
gross inconsistency. The reader would perceive, too, 
that his labors in the cause of abolition would be 
almost nullified by the viciousness of his example. 
Now, that which we desire the reader to do is, to ap- 
ply the principles which this illustration exhibits, to 
other and less flagrant cases. — I have read, in the life 
of a man of great purity of character, * that he refused 
to draw up a will, or some such document, because it 
contained a transfer of some slaves. He thought that 
slavery was absolutely wrong, and, therefore, would not, 
even by the remotest implication, sanction the system 
by his example. I think he exercised a sound Chris- 
tian judgment ; and if all who prepare such documents 

10 

* John Woolman. 



110 PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS, 

acted upon the same principles, I do not know wheth- 
er they would not so influence public opinion, as 
greatly to hasten the abolition of slavery. Yet where 
is the man who would thus refuse, or even decline, 
doing things far more reprehensible ? 

296. Publication and Circulation of Books. 
— It is a very common thing to hear of the evils of 
pernicious reading, — of how it enervates the mind 
and depraves the principles. The complaints are 
doubtless just. Yet, loudly as we complain of the 
evil, and carefully as we warn our children to avoid 
it, how seldom do we hear public reprobation of the 
writers! As to printers, and booksellers, and library- 
keepers, we scarcely hear their offences mentioned at 
all. The writer of a pernicious book is, of course, 
primarily censurable for whatever injury may be oc- 
casioned to the hundreds or thousands who* may read 
it ; but a printer or a bookseller should reflect that 
not to be so bad as another, is a very different thing 
from being innocent. If it were right for my neigh- 
bor to furnish me with the means of moral injury, it 
would not be wrong for me to accept and to employ 
them. It cannot be needful again to advance the 
consideration that, although your refusal might not 
prevent vicious books from being published, you are 
not therefore exempted from the obligation to refuse. 
A man must do his duty, whether the effects of his 
fidelity be such as he would desire, or not. Such pu- 
rity of conduct might, no doubt, circumscribe a man's 
business, — and so does purity of conduct in some 
other professions ; but if profit be a sufficient excuse 
for contributing to demoralize the world, it will be 
easy to defend the business of a pickpocket. 

297. He who is more studious to justify his conduct 
than to act aright, may say that, if a person may sell 
no book that can injure another, he can scarcely sell 
any book. The answer is, that, although a bookseller 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. Ill 



cannot always inform himself what the precise ten- 
dency of a book is, yet there can be no difficulty in 
judging, respecting numberless books, that their 
tendency is bad. If we cannot define the precise 
distinction between the good and the evil, we can, 
nevertheless, perceive the evil when it has attained 
to a certain extent. 

298. Inns. — When, on passing the door of an inn, 
I hear or see a company of intoxicated men in the 

excess of riot," I cannot persuade myself that he 
who sells the liquor, and profits by the viciousness, is 
a moral man. — A man was lately found drowned in a 
stream. He had just left a public house where he had 
been intoxicated for sixty hours. Does any reader 
need to be convinced that this innkeeper had acted 
criminally ? His crime, however, was neither greater 
nor less because it had resulted in loss of life ; no 
such accident might have happened, — yet his guilt 
would have been the same. 

299. Prosecutions. — M any persons are reluctant, 
and some refuse, to prosecute offenders, when they 
think the penalty of the law is unwarrantably severe. 
This motive operates in England to a great extent, 
and it ought to operate. I should not think it right 
to give evidence against a man who had robbed my 
house, if I knew that my evidence would occasion him 
to be hanged. Whether the reader may think simi- 
larly, is of no consequence to the principle. The 
principle is, that, if you think the end vicious and 
wrong, you are guilty of immoral agency " in con- 
tributing to effect that end. 

300. Undoubtedly, in the present state of society, 
it is no easy task, upon such subjects, — and many more 
which might be brought forward if necessary, to illus- 
trate the principle, — to wash our hands in innocency. 
But, if we cannot avoid all agency, direct or indirect, 
in evil things, we can yet avoid much ; and it will be 



112 PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 

sufficiently early to complain of the difficulty of doing 
all, when we have done all that we can. 



CHAPTER IX. 

INFLUENCE OF INDIVIDUALS UPON PUBLIC OPINION. 

301. That the influence of public opinion upon 
the practice of virtue is very great, needs no proof. 
There is, indeed, almost no action, and no institution, 
which public opinion does not affect. In moral affairs, 
it makes men call one mode of human destruction 
murderous, and another honorable ; it makes the same 
action abominable in one individual, and venial in 

. another ; in public institutions, it is powerful alike for 
evil or for good. 

302. In proportion to the greatness of its power is 
the necessity of rectifying public opinion itself To 
contribute to its rectitude, is to exercise exalted phi- 
lanthropy ; and to contribute to its incorrectness, is to 
spread wickedness and misery in the world. The 
purpose of the present chapter is to remark upon 
some of those subjects on which public opinion ap- 
pears to be inaccurate, and upon the consequent obli- 
gation upon individuals not to perpetuate that inac- 
curacy, and its attendant evils, by their conduct or 
their language. 

303. It might have been presumed of a people 
who assent to the authority of the moral law, that 
their notions of the merit or turpitude of actions 
would have been conformable with the docrines which 
that law delivers. Far other is the fact. The es- 
timates of the moral law and of public opinion are 
discordant to excess. 

304. How do these strange incongruities arise? 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 113 

First, men practise a sort of voluntary deception 
on themselves ; they persuade themselves to think an 
offence which they desire to commit, is not so vicious 
as the moral law indicates, or as others to which they 
have little temptation. Then they persuade them- 
selves, too, that a virtue which is easily practised is of 
great worth, because they thus flatter themselves with 
complacent notions of their excellences at a cheap 
rate. Virtues which are difficult, they for the same 
reason depreciate. This is the dictate of interest. 
It is manifestly good policy to think lightly of the 
value of a quality which we do not choose to be at 
the cost of possessing ; and who would willingly think 
there was much evil in a vice which he practised 
every day ? 

305. If, sometimes, the mind of an individual re- 
curs to the purer standard, a multitude of obstacles 
present themselves to its practical adoption. He 
hopes that, under the present circumstances of society, 
an exact obedience to the moral law is not required ; 
he tries to think that the notions of a kingdom or a 
continent cannot be so erroneous ; and, at any rate, 
trusts that, as he deviates with millions, millions will 
hardly be held guilty at the bar of God. The mis- 
direction of public opinion is an obstacle to the vir- 
tue even of good men. What, then, must be the 
effect of such misdirection upon those to whom 
acceptance in the world is the principal concern, and 
who, if others applaud or smile, seem to be indiffer- 
ent whether their own hearts condemn them ? 

306. Now, with a participation in the evils which 
the misdirection of public opinion occasions, every 
one is chargeable who speaks of moral actions accord- 
ing to a standard which varies from that which Chris- 

I tianity has exhibited. If moral offences are to be 
I estimated by their consequences, few will be found 
so deep as that of habitually giving good names to bad 
10* 



114 PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



things. It is well, indeed, for the responsibility of 
individuals, that their contribution to the aggregate 
mischief is commonly small ; yet every man should 
remember that it is by the contribution of individuals 
that the aggregate is formed. 

307. Duelling. — If two boys, who disagreed about 
a game of marbles or a penny tart, should therefore 
walk out by the river side, quietly take off their 
clothes, and, when they had got into the water, each 
try to keep the other's head down until one of them 
was drowned, we should doubtless think these two 
boys insane. If, when the survivor returned to his 
school-fellows, they patted him on the shoulder, told 
him he was a spirited fellow, and that, if he had done 
otherwise, they never would have played with him 
again, we should think these boys infected with a 
most revolting depravity and ferociousness. Yet we 
both tolerate and encourage such depravity and fero- 
ciousness every day. Change the penny tart for some 
other trifle, instead of boys put men, instead of a river 

a pistol, and we encourage it all. We virtually pat j 
the survivor's shoulder, tell him he is a man of honor, ' 
and that, if he had not shot at his acquaintance, we i 
would never have dined with him again. We are the ) 
school-boys grown up ; and by the absurdity, and more ( 
than absurdity, of our phrases and actions, shooting 
or drowning (it matters not which) becomes the 
practice of the national school. i 

308. It is not a trifling question that a man puts to f 
himself when he asks, ^' What is the amount of my con- [ 
tribution to this detestable practice ? " Men do not fire i 
at one another because they are fond of risking their f 
own lives or other men's, but because public notions 
are such as they are. When some offence has given , 
probability to a duel, every man acts immorally who 
evinces any disposition to coolness with either party 
until he has resolved to fight. And when a victim 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



115 



has fallen, I pity his family, but they have the con- 
solation of.knowing that he vindicated his honor," is 
equivalent to urging another and another to fight. 
Every heedless gossip, who says, Have you heard of 
this affair of honor ? and every reporter of news, who 
relates it as a proper and necessary procedure, par- 
ticipates in the general crime, 

309. To contribute to the suppression of this cus- 
tom, is, therefore, easy ; and let no man or woman who 
does not, as occasion offers, express reprobation of the 
custom, think that their hands are clear of blood. 

310. Glory: Military Virtues. — To prove that 
war is an evil, were much the same as to prove that 
the light of the sun is a good. Yet the practice is 
encircled with so many glittering fictions, that most 
men are content with but a vague and inadequate idea 
•of the calamities, moral, physical, and political, which 
it inflicts upon our species. Yet most men see 
enough to agree in the conclusion, that the less fre- 
quently it happens, the better for the common in- 
terests of man. Public opinion is favorable, not so 
much to war in the abstract, as to the profession 
of arms; and the inevitable consequence of this 
is, that war itself is greatly promoted, without refer- 
ence to the causes for which it is undertaken. To 
talk of "splendors," "glories," "honors," is, in fact, 
contributing, as far as the speaker's power goes, to 
desolate provinces, and set villages in flam.es. The 
listening soldier wants to signalize himself like the 
heroes who are departed. How shall he do this with- 
out a war? The consequence is inevitable. Multi- 
tudes desire war, and it requires no sagacity to 
discover that to desire it makes it likely to happen-. 
Thus a perpetual motive to human destruction is 
created. The present state of public opinion mani- 
festly promotes the recurrence of wars of all kinds. 
To minister to the popular notions of glory, is to en- 



116 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATTOXS- 



courage wars of the most unmingled wickedness. Of 
the writers of some books, it is not too much to sup- 
pose that they have occasioned more murders than all 
the clubs and pistols of assassins for ages have ef- 
fected. Is there no responsibility for this ] 

311. Perhaps it will afford to some men new ideas^ 
if we inquire what the real nature of the military vir- 
tues is. They receive more of applause than any other. 
Why? They receive much applause because they 
merit little. Of every species of real excellence it is 
the general characteristic that it is not anxious for 
applause. The more elevated the virtue, the less the 
desire, and the less is the public voice a motive to 
action. But the military virtues live upon applause ; 
it is their vital element and their food, their great 
pervading motive and reward. 

312. It is, again, a characteristic of exalted virtue, 
that it tends to produce exalted virtues of other 
kinds. Is this the case with military virtues? Is the 
brave man peculiarly pious ? Is he who pants for 
glory, and acquires it, distinguished by unusual chas- 
tity, placability, and temperance? 

313. The simple truth is this — that the military 
virtues will not bear examination. It would not serve 
the purposes of war to represent these qualities as 
being what they are ; we therefore dress them with 
factitious and alluring ornaments. Let us take sound 
rules for our guides of judgment, and it is not pos- 
sible that we should regard any quality as possessing 
much virtue which lives only or chiefly upon praise. 

314. Unchastity. — No portion of these pages is 
devoted to the enforcement of moral obligations upon 
this subject, partly because these obligations are 
commonly acknowledged, how little soever they may 
be regarded, and partly because, as the reader will 
have seen, the object of these Essays is to recom- 
mend those applications of the moral law which are 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 117 

frequently neglected in the practice even of respect- 
able men. But some of the popular notions on the 
present subject are extravagantly inconsistent with 
the moral law. The want of chastity in a woman is 
visited by public opinion with the severest reproba- 
tion ; in men, with very little, or with none. Now, 
morality makes no such distinction. If it be in the 
i Scriptures that wq are to seek for the principles of 
the moral law, how shall we defend this state of popu- 
lar opinion ? This departure from the moral law, 
like all others, produces pernicious effects. The sex 
in whom popular opinion reprobates the offences, 
comparatively seldom commits them ; the sex in whom 
it tolerates them, commits them to an enormous 
extent. It is obvious, therefore, that to promote the 
present state of popular opinion, is to promote the 
want of chastity in men. 

315. That some very beneficial consequences result 
from this severity of public opinion, is certain. The 
abandonment to which the loss of personal integrity 
consigns a w^oman, is a perpetual and fearful warning 
to the sex. But the fact that public opinion is thus 
powerful in restraining one sex, is a sufficient evi- 
dence that it would also be powerful in restraining 
the other. Waiving, for the present, the question 
whether the popular disapprobation of the crime in a 
woman is not too severe, — if the man who was guilty 
w^as forthwith consigned to infamy, how quickly 
would the frequency of the crime be diminished 1 

316. But, instead of this direction of public opin- 
ion, what is the ordinary language respecting the man 
who thus violates the moral law ? We are told that 

he is rather unsteady ; " that he is not free from 
indiscretions ; " and what is he likely to think of all 
1 this? To employ such language is, we say, to en- 
I courage a crime which brings more wretchedness into 
the world than almost any other, and for which, if 



118 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



Christianity is to be believed, the universal Judge will 
call to a strict and severe account. 

317. In connection with this subject, an observation 
suggests itself respecting the power of character in 
affecting the whole moral principles of the mind. If 
loss of character does not follow a breach of morality, 
that breach may be single and alone. If loss of char- 
acter does follow one offence, one of the great barriers 
which exclude the flood of evil is thrown down. If 
you take away a person's reputation, you take away 
one of the principal motives to propriety of conduct. 
As popular notions have agreed that she who loses her 
chastity shall retain no reputation, a principal motive 
to the practice of other virtues is taken away : she, 
therefore, disregards them, and thus, by degrees, her 
moral principle is utterly depraved. If public opinion 
were so modified that the world did not abandon a 
woman who has been robbed of chastity, it is probable 
that a much larger number of these unhappy persons 
would return to virtue. 

318. It becomes a serious question how we shall 
fix upon the degree in which diminution of character 
ought to be consequent upon offences against morality. 
It is not, I think, too much to say, that no single 
crime, once committed, under the influence, perhaps, 
of strong temptation, ought to occasion such a loss of 
character as to make the individual regard himself 
as abandoned. Certainly the avenues to amendment 
ought not to be closed against the female who is per- 
haps the victim — strictly the victim — of seduction. 
Yet if the public do not express, and strongly express, 
their disapprobation, we have seen that they practically 
encourage offences. In this difficulty, I know of no 
other guide than that system which the tenor of Chris- 
tianity prescribes — abhorrence of the evil, and com- 
miseration for him who commits it. The union of 
these dispositions will be likely to produce, with re» 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 119 

spect to offences of all kinds, that conduct which most 
effectually tends to discountenance them, while it as 
effectually tends to reform the offenders. 

319. Fa3ie. — The observations which were offered 
respecting contributing to the passion for glory, in- 
volve kindred doctrines respecting contributions gen^ 
erally to individual fame. The profligacy of men 
of talent and genius is regarded with much less of 
aversion than that of less gifted men. To be great, 
whether intellectually or otherwise, is often like a 
passport to impunity; and men talk as if we ought to 
speak leniently of the faults of a man who delights us 
by his genius or his talent. This, precisely, is the man 
whose faults we should be most prompt to mark, be- 
cause he is the man whose faults are most seducing to 
the world. Intellectual superiority brings, no doubt, 
its congenial temptations. Let these affect our judg- 
ments of the man, but let them not diminish our repro- 
bation of his offences. So to extenuate the individual 
as to apologize for his faults, is to injure the cause of 
virtue in one of its most vulnerable parts. 

3'20. After all, posterity exercises some justice in 
its award. When the first glitter and the first applauses 
are past, it makes a deduction, though not a due de- 
duction, for the shaded portions of the great man's 
character. It is not forgotten that Marlborough was 
avaricious, — that Bacon was mean; and there are 
great names of the present day, of whom it will not be 
forgotten that they had deep and dark shades in their 
reputation. 

321. The Press. — It is manifest that, if the obliga- 
tions w^hich have been urged apply to those who speak, 
they apply w^ith tenfold responsibility to those who 
write. The man who, in talking to half a dozen of his 
acquaintance, contributes to pervert their moral no- 
tions, is accountable for the mischief which he may do 
to six persons. He who writes a book containing 



120 PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



similar language is answerable for afar greater amount 
of mischief In this country, the periodical press is a 
powerful engine for evil or for good. Of some daily 
papers, the number of readers is so great, that, in the 
course of twelve months, they may influence the opin- 
ions and the conduct of six or eight millions of men. 
Considering the carelessness, wdth respect to morals, 
of a large portion of newspaper articles, it may safely 
be concluded that some creditable editors do harm in 
the world to an extent in comparison with which 
robberies and treasons are as nothing. 

' ♦ 

CHAPTER X. 

INTELLECTUAL EDUCATIONo 

322. Knowledge does not consist in being able 
to read books, but in understanding one's business 
and duty in life." ^^Most writers have considered the 
subject of education as relative to that portion of it 
only which applies to learning ; but the first object of 
all, in every nation, is to make a man a good member 
of society." Education consists in learning what 
makes a man useful, respectable, and happy, in the 
line for which he is destined." * 

323. If these propositions are true, it is evident 
that the systems of education which obtain need great 
reformation. By far too large a portion of time and 
attention has usually been bestowed on the ancient 
languages. Even a good knowledge of these can 
contribute but little towards a man's capability for 
legislating wisely upon questions of political economy, 
of taxation, or of jurisprudence ; or towards enabling 



* Play fair : Causes of Decline of Nations. 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIOxVS. 121 

Other classes of men to serve their families, their 
country, or mankind. Select what class you please^ 
and ask how much its members are indebted to ancient 
learning for their capability to discharge their duties 
as parents, as men, or as citizens, — the answer is 
literally, Almost nothing." 

324. That no advantages result from the study of 
ancient classics, it would be idle to maintain. But 
this is not the question. The question is, whether SQ 
many advantages result from this study as from others 
that might be substituted. With respect to the sum 
of knowledge which the works of antiquity convey, as 
compared with that which is conveyed by modern 
literature, the disproportion is great in the extreme. 
To say that the modern is a hundred times greater 
than the ancient, is to keep far from the language of 
exaggeration. And, to say the truth, a majority of 
those who are educated at college, leave it with but an 
imperfect acquaintance with those languages which 
they have spent ye^rs in professing to acquire. There 
are some men skilled in the languages; but the very 
circumstance that skill procures celebrity, is an evi- 
dence that it is rare. 

325. We may fairly ask, What can be the utility 
of the ^ learned ' languages to the ordinary business and 
professions to which most boys are destined ? " What 
conceivable relationship do Greek and Latin bear to 
discounting bills, or shipping cargoes, or selling cloth, 
or making steam-engines? None. But it will be 
said, What relationship does any mere literary pur- 
suit bear ? " Or, Why should a merchant's son read 
Paradise Lost ? " Such questions conduct us to the 
just view of the case. Let these young persons attend 
to literature, but let it be literature of the most expe- 
dient kind. Let them read Paradise Lost. Why? 
Because it is delightful; and because they can do it 

11 



122 PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. ' 

without learning a language in order to acquire the 
power. If Paradise Lost existed only in Arabic, I 
should think it preposterous to teach young persons 
Arabic that they might read it. To those who are to 
fill the active stations of life, literature must always be 
a subordinate concern; and it would be vain to deny 
that our own language possesses a sufficient store for 
them, without learning others to increase it. 

326. It is said that the act of studying the ancient 
languages exercises the memory, cultivates the habit 
of attention, and teaches, too, the art of reasoning. 
Grant all this. Cannot, then, the memory be exercised, 
and the other objects attained, as well by acquiring 
valuable knowledge, as by acquiring a mere knowl- 
edge of words, which is all that most boys attain in 
the ancient languages ? We do not question the 
utility of this exercise; we only say, that, while the 
mind is exercised, it should also be fed. 

327. Since human knowledge is so much more 
extensive than the opportunity of individuals for ac- 
quiring it, it becomes of the greatest importance so 
to economize the opportunity, as to make it subser- 
vient to the acquisition of as large and as valuable 
a portion as we can. It is not enough to show that a 
given branch of education is useful ; you must show 
that it is the most useful that can be selected. 

328. In general, science is preferable to literature 
— the knowledge of things to the knowledge of words. 
It is not by literature, nor by merely literary men, that 
the business of human society is now carried on. 
" We have risen to the station which we occupy, not 
by literature, not by the knowledge of extinct lan- 
guages, but by the sciences of politics, of law, of 
public economy, of commerce, of mathematics; by 
astronomy, by chemistry, by mechanics, by natural 
history. It is by these that we are destined to rise 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 123 



yet higher. These constitute the business of society, 
and in these we ought to seek for the objects of 
education." 

329. There is, according to my views, no study 
that is more adapted to please and improve young 
persons, than that of natural philosophy. When I 
was a schoolboy, I attended a few lectures on the 
air-pump, galvanism, &c, ; and I value the knowledge 
which I gained in three evenings more highly than 
any other that I gained at school in as many months. 
While our children are poring over lessons which 
disgust them, we allow that magazine of wonders 
which Heaven has stored up, to lie unexplored and 
unnoticed. There are multitudes of young men and 
women who are considered respectably educated, who 
are yet wonderfully ignorant of the first principles of 
natural science. Many a boy, who has spent years 
upon Latin, cannot tell hov/ it comes to pass that 
water rises in a pump, and would stare if he w^ere 
told that the decanters on the table w^ere not colder 
than the baize they stand on. 

330. Respecting the propriety of attempting to 
convey any knowledge of political science, many read- 
ers w^ill probably doubt. Yet why ? Is it not upon 
the goodness or badness of political institutions that 
much of the happiness or misery of mankind depends ? 
And what means are so likely to amend the bad, or 
secure the continuance of the good, as the intelligent 
opinion of a people ? We know that, in all free states, 
public opinion is powerful. What, then, can be more 
obviously true, than that it should be made as just as 
we can? The elements of political knowledge are 
not very abstruse or remote. Having once established 
the maxim, that the proper purpose of government is 
to secure the happiness of the community, very little 
is wanted, in applying the principle to particular ques- 
tions, but honest, conscientious thought. The diffi- 



124 PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 

culties are occasioned not so much by the nature 
of the case as by the interests and prejudices which 
habit and existing institutions introduce; and how 
shall these interests and prejudices be so effectually 
prevented from influencing the mind, as by the incul- 
cation of simple truths before young persons mix in 
the business of the world ? 

331. These are general suggestions; details are 
foreign to our purpose; but from these suggestions, 
the intelligent parent will perceive the kind of educa- 
tion that is proposed. If such an education would 
convey to young persons some tolerable portion of 
" the knowledge and the spirit of their age and coun- 
try,'' if it would tend to make them useful, respecta- 
ble, and happy,'' in the various relationships of life, the 
objects of intelligent education would be, in the same 
degree, attained. 

332. There are indications of a revolution in the 
system of education, which will probably lead both 
to great and beneficial results. Science is evidently 
gaining ground upon the judgments and affections of 
the public. Elementary books of science are, indeed, 
the familiar companions of young persons after they 
have left school. They lay aside tenses and parsing 
for Conversations on Chemistry." This revolution 
is also indicated by the topics which are introduced 
into mechanics' institutes. These associations seem 
almost instinctively to prefer science to literature, 
simply as such. They prefer science because it is 
preferable — preferable not merely for mechanics, but 
for men. It is of less consequence to man to know 
what Horace wrote, than to know by what laws the 
Deity regulates the operations of nature, and by what 
means those operations are made subservient to the 
purposes of life. 

333. A consideration of the kind of knowledge 
which education should impart, is, however, but one 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 125 

division of the general subject. The consideration of 
the best mode of imparting it is another. The latter 
is not so immediately connected with the general pur- 
pose of the work. Yet it may safely be observed, that, 
if two systems are proposed, each with apparently 
nearly equal claims, the one which will be more 
pleasurable to the learner is undoubtedly the best. 
That which a boy delights in he will learn ; and if the 
subjects of instruction were as delightful as they ought 
to be, and the mode of conveying were pleasurable, 
too, there would be an immense addition to the stock 
of knowledge which a schoolboy acquires. Knowl- 
edge is delightful to the human mind ; but we may 
select such kinds of knowledge, and adopt such modes 
of imparting it, as shall make the whole system, not 
delightful, but repulsive. 



334. There does not appear any reason why the 
education of women should differ in its essentials from 
that of men. The education which is good for human 
nature is good for them. They are a part — and 
they ought to be in a much greater degree than they 
are, a part — of the effective contributors to the wel- 
fare and intelligence of the human family. In intel- 
lectual as well as in other affairs, they ought to be fit 
helps to man. The preposterous absurdities of chiv- 
alrous times still exert a wretched influence over the 
character and the allotment of women. Men are not 
polite^ but gallant ; they do not act towards women as 
to beings of kindred habits and character, — as to 
beings who, like the other portion of mankind, reason, 
reflect, and judge, — but as beings who please, and 
whom men are bound to please. Essentially, there is 
no kindness, no politeness in this, but selfishness and 
insolence. He is the man of politeness who evinces 
his respect for the female mind. He is the man of 
11* 



126 PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



' insolence who tacitly says that, when he enters the 
society of women, he need not bring his intellects 
with him. I do not mean to affirm that these persons 
intend insolence; they think they are attentive and 
polite ; and habit has become so inveterate, that they 
are really not pleased if a woman, by the vigor of her 
conversation, interrupts the pleasant trifling to which 
they are accustomed. Unhappily, a great number of 
women themselves prefer this varnished and gilded 
contempt to solid respect. They would rather think 
themselves fascinating than respectable. 

335. For this unhappy state of intellectual inter- 
course, female education is in too great a degree 
adapted. A large class are taught less to think than 
to shine. To be accomplished is of greater interest 
than to be sensible. It is of more consequence to 
this class to charm by the tones of a piano, than to de- 
light by intellectual conversation. The effect is re- 
ciprocally bad. An absurd education disqualifies 
them for intellectual exertion, and that very disquali- 
fication perpetuates the degradation. I say the 
degradation, for the word is descriptive of the fact. 
A captive is not the less truly bound because his 
chains are made of silver, and studded with rubies. 

336. If we were wise enough to regard women, and 
if women were wise enough to regard themselves, with 
that real, practical respect to which they are entitled, 
and if the education they received were such as that 
respect would dictate, we might hereafter have occa- 
sion to say, not as is now said, that *^ in England and 
America women are queens," but something higher 
and greater ; we might say that in every thing, social, 
intellectual, and religious, they were fit to cooperate 
with man, and to cheer and assist him in his endeav- 
ors to promote his own happiness, and the happiness 
of his family, his country, and the world. 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 127 



CHAPTER XI. 

MORAL EDUCATION. 

337. To a good moral education two things are 
necessary — that the young should receive informa- 
tion respecting what is right and what is wrong, and 
that they should be furnished w^ith motives to adhere 
to what is right. We should communicate moral 
knowledge and moral dispositions. 

338. I. It is evident that moral education is ac- 
quired, to a great extent, by habit, — from the actions, 
opinions, and general example, of those by whom the 
individual is surrounded. It is manifest that, in the 
present low state of human morality, the learner in 
such a school must often be taught amiss. Yet how 
can we prevent him from being so taught ? It is of 
little purpose formally to teach him moral and religious 
truths, if he lives in circumstances where these truths 
are not recommended by any example. 

339. One of the first and greatest requisites, there- 
fore, in moral education, is a situation in which the 
knowledge and the practice of morality are inculcated 
by the habitually virtuous conduct of others. The 
boy who is placed in such a situation is in an efficient 
moral school, though he may never hear delivered 
formal rules of conduct; so that, if parents should ask 
how they may best give their child a moral education, 
I answer, " Be virtuous yourselves." 

340. The young, however, are unavoidably sub- 
jected to bad examples. Many who see consistent 
practical lessons of virtue in their parents' parlors, 
must see much that is contrary elsewhere ; and we 
must, if we; can, so rectify the moral perceptions, 
and invigorate the moral dispositions, that the mind 
ghall effectually resist the insinuations of evil. 

341. Religion is the basis of morality. lie that 



128 PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



would impart moral knowledge, must begin by im- 
parting a knowledge of God. 

342. A judicious parent will often find that the 
moral culture of his child may be promoted without 
seeming to have the object in view. There are many 
opportunities which present themselves for associating 
virtue with his affections — for throwing in among 
the accumulating mass of mental habits principles 
of rectitude which shall pervade and meliorate the 
whole. 

343. As the mind acquires an increased capacity 
for judging, I would offer to the young person a 
sound exhibition, if such can be found, of the prin- 
ciples of morality. He should know, with as great 
distinctness as possible, not only his duty, but the 
reasons of it. 

344. There is negative, as well as positive edu- 
cation — some things to avoid, as well as some to do. 
Of the things to be avoided, one of the most obvious 
is unfit society for the young. If a boy mixes, with- 
out restraint, in whatever society he pleases, his edu- 
cation will, in general, be practically bad, because 
the world in general is bad ; its moral condition is 
below the medium between perfect purity and utter 
depravation. Nevertheless, he must, at some period, 
mix with almost all sorts of men, and, therefore, he 
must be prepared for it. Very young children should 
be excluded, if possible, from all unfit association, 
because they acquire habits before they possess a 
sufficiency of counteracting principles. But, if a 
parent has, within his own house, sufficiently endeav- 
ored to confirm and invigorate the moral character 
of his child, it were worse than fruitless to endeavor 
to retain him in the seclusion of a monk. He should 
feel the necessity, and acquire the power, of resisting 
temptation, by hemg gradually subjected to that temp- 
tation which must one day be presented to him. 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 129 

345. In ruminating upon moral education, we 
cannot, in this age of reading, disregard the influence 
of books. That a young person should not read every 
book, is plain. No discrimination can be attempted 
here ; but it may be observed that the best species 
of discrimination is that which is supplied by a rec- 
tified condition of the mind. The best species of 
prohibition is not that w^hich a parent pronounces, 
but that which is pronounced by purified tastes and 
inclinations in the mind of the young. There are 
many whom a contemptible or vicious book disgusts, 
notwithstanding the fascinations which it may contain. 
This disgust is the result of education in a large 
sense ; and some portion of this disgust, and of the 
discrimination which results from it, may be induced 
into the mind of a boy by having made him familiar 
with superior productions. 

346. The mode in which intellectual education 
is acquired, may be made either an auxiliary of moral 
education, or the contrary. A young person may 
store his mind with literature and science, and, 
together with the acquisition, either corrupt his prin- 
ciples, or amend and invigorate them. The world 

, is so abundantly supplied with the means of knowl- 
edge, — there are so many paths to the desired temple, 
— that we may choose our own, and yet arrive at it. 
W e cannot, indeed, know every thing, without study- 
ing what is bad ; which, however, is no more to be 
recommended in literature than in life. 

347. II. But, in reality, the second division of 

I moral education is the more important of the two — 
the supply of motives to adhere to what is right. Our 
great deficiency is not in knowledge, but in obedience. 

I Of the offences which an individual commits against 

{ morality, the great majority are committed in the con- 
sciousness that he is doing wrong. Moral education, 

' therefore, should be directed, not so much to informing 



130 PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



the young what they ought to do, as to inducing those 
moral dispositions and principles which will make 
them adhere to what they know to be right. 

348. The human mind, of itself, is in a state 
something like that of men in a state of nature, 
where separate and conflicting desires and motives 
are not restrained by any acknowledged head. Gov- 
ernment, as it is necessary to society, is necessary to 
the individual mind. To the internal community 
of the heart the great questions are, Who shall be 
the leo^islator ? Who shall reo^ulate and restrain the 
passions and affections?" To these questions the 
breast of every man supplies him with an answer. 
He knows, because he feels, that there is a rightful 
legislator in his own heart. 

349. The great point, then, is to induce him, when 
inclination and this law are at variance, to sacrifice 
the inclination to the law; and for this purpose it 
appears proper, first, to impress him with a high, 
that is, with an accurate, estimate of the authority 
of the law itself. It is to the conscientious internal 
apprehension of rectitude that we should conform our 
conduct. Such appears to be the will of God. 

350. It should, therefore, be especially inculcated, 
that the dictate of conscience is never to be sacrificed; 
that, whatever may be the consequences of conform- 
ing to it, they are to be ventured. Obedience is to 
be unconditional ; — no questions about the utility 
of the law; — no computations of the consequences 
of obedience; — no presuming upon the lenity of the 
divine government. It is important so to regulate 
the understanding and imagination of the young, that 
they may be prepared to obey, even where they do not 
see the reasons of the commands of God. We should 
certainly endeavor, where we can, to show them the 
reasons of the divine commands, and this more and 
more as their understandings gain strength ; but let 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



131 



it be obvious to them that we do ourselves consider 
it as quite sufficient, if God has commanded us to do 
or avoid any thing." * 

351. Obedience to this internal legislator is not, 
like obedience to civil government, enforced. The 
law is promulgated, but the passions and inclinations 
can refuse obedience if they will. Obedience, there- 
fore, must be voluntary ; and hence the paramount 
importance, in moral education, of habitually subject- 
ing the will. Parents," says Hartley, should labor, 
from the earliest davvnings of understanding and 
desire, to check the growing obstinacy of the ivillJ^ 
" Religious persons, in all periods, who have possessed 
the light of revelation, have, in a particular manner, 
been sensible that the habit of self-control lies at 
the foundation of moral worth." t There is nothing 
mean-spirited in this. It is magnanimous in phi- 
losophy as it is right in morals. It is the subjugation 
of the lower qualities of our nature to wisdom and 
goodness. 

352. The internal law carries with it the voucher 
of its own reasonableness. A person does not need 
to be told that it is right to obey that law. Let 
the parent, then, very frequently refer his son or 
daughter to their own minds; let him teach them 
to seek for instruction there. The parent must refer 
them, if it be possible, not merely to conscience, but 
to enlightened conscience. He must unite the two 
branches of moral education, and" communicate the 
knowledge, while he endeavors to induce the practice, 
of morality. Without this, his children may obey 
their consciences, and yet be in error, and perhaps in 
fanaticism. With it, he may hope that their conduct 
will be both conscientious, and pure, and right. 

353. There is one consequence attendant upon 



* Carpenter : Principles of Education. t Carpenter. 



132 PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



this habitual reference to the internal law, which is 
highly beneficial to the moral character. It leads us 
to fulfil the wise instruction of antiquity, Know 
thyself" It makes us look within ourselves : it brings 
us acquainted with the busy world that is within us. 
This is valuable knowledge. A man's enemies are 
those of his own household ; and if he does not know 
their insidiousness or their strength, if he does not 
know upon what to depend for assistance, it is not 
likely that he will efficiently resist. 

354. It is to be regretted that, in the moral educa- 
tion which commonly obtains, whether formal or inci- 
dental, there is little that is calculated to produce this 
acquaintance with our own minds; little that refers us 
to ourselves, and much, very much, that calls or sends 
us away. The mind is kept from habits of introver- 
sion, even in the offices of religion, by habitually 
directing its attention to the tongue. ''Many, it is to 
be feared, imagine that they are giving their children 
religious principles, when they are only teaching them 
religious truths." * 

355. So little are the course of education and the 
subsequent engagements of life calculated to foster this 
great auxiliary of moral character, that nothing but 
wakeful solicitude on the part of the parent can be 
expected to direct the attention within^ while the 
general tendency of our associations and habits is to 
keep it without. Let him, however, do what he can. 
The habitual reference to the dictates of conscience 
may be promoted in the very young mind. This habit, 
like others, becomes strong by exercise. He that is 
faithful in little is intrusted with more; and this is 
true in respect of knowledge as of other departments 
of the Christian life. Fidelity of obedience is com- 
monly succeeded by increase of light ; and every act 

* Paley. 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 133 

of obedience and every addition to knowledge furnishes 
new and still stronger inducements to persevere in the 
same course. Acquaintance with ourselves is the in- 
separable attendant of this course ; and if this fidelity 
to the internal law, and consequent knowledge of the 
internal world, be acquired in early life, the parent 
may reasonably hope that it will never wholly lose its 
efficiency amid the bustles and anxieties of the world. 

^ . 

CHAPTER XII. 

EDUCATION OF THE PEOPLE. 

356. It is not long since it was a question whether 
the poor should be educated or not. That time is 
past; and it may be hoped the time will soon arrive 
when it will be agreed that no limit needs to be assigned 
to the education of the poor, but that which is assigned 
by their own necessities, or which ought to be assigned 
to the education of all men. 

357. The objections which are urged against ex- 
tended education, are of the same kind as those which 
were urged against any education. They insist upon 
the probability of abuse. It is said that, if you give 
an extended education to the poor, you will elevate 
them above their stations ; that a critic would not drive 
a wheelbarrow, and that a philosopher would not shoe 
horses or weave cloth. But these consequences are 
without the limits of possibility ; because the question 
for a poor man is, whether he shall perform such offices 
or starve ; and surely it will not be pretended that 
hungry men will rather criticize than eat. Science 
and literature would not solicit a poor man from his 
labor more irresistibly than ease and pleasure do now ; 
yet, in spite of these solicitations, what is the fact? 

12 



134 PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS* 

That the poor man works for his bread. This is the 
inevitable result. 

358. There are some .collateral advantages of an 
extended education of the people, which are of much 
importance. It has been observed, that if the French 
had been an educated people, many of the atrocities 
of their revolution never would have happened; and 
I believe it. Furious mobs are composed, not of 
enlightened, but of unenlightened men, — of men in 
whom the passions are dominant over the judgment, 
because the judgment has not been exercised and in- 
formed, and habituated to direct the conduct. And 
as the education of a people prevents political evil, it 
effects political good. Despotic rulers well know that 
knowledge is inimical to their power. This simple 
fact is a sufficient reason to a good and wise man to 
approve knowledge and extend it. The attention to 
public institutions and to public measures, which is in- 
separable from an educated population, is a great good. 
It is acknowledged that a check upon the natural 
advances of power is needed, and none is either 
so efficient or so safe as that of a watchful and intelli- 
gent public mind. Unhappily, the ordinary way in 
which a people have endeavored to amend their insti- 
tutions, has been by some mode of violence. If you 
ask when a nation acquired a greater degree of free- 
dom, you are referred to some era of violence, per- 
haps of blood. These are not proper — certainly not 
Christian — remedies for the disease. That reforma- 
tion of public institutions which results from public 
opinion is the best in kind, and likely to be the best 
in mode; — in its kind, because public opinion is the 
proper measure of the needed alteration ; and in its 
mode, because alterations which result from such a 
cause are likely to be temperately made. 

359. It may be feared that some persons object to 
an extended education of the people on these very 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



135 



grounds which we propose as recommendations ; that 
they regard the tendency of education to produce 
examination, and, if need be, alteration, of established 
institutions, as a reason for withholding it from the 
poor. To these it is a sufficient answer that, if in- 
crease of knowledge and habits of investigation tend 
to alter any established institution, it is fit that it 
should be altered. 

360. Generally, that intellectual education is good 
for a poor man which is good for his richer neighbors ; 
in other words, that is good for the poor which is good 
for man. The children of persons of property can 
undoubtedly learn much more than those of a laborer ; 
and the laborer must select, from the rich man's sys- 
tem, a part only for his own child. But the parts 
which he ought to select are precisely those parts 
which are most necessary and beneficial to the rich. 

361. It is not to be expected, that, in the time which 
is devoted professedly to education by the children of 
the poor, much extent of knowledge can be acquired ; 
but something may be acquired which is of much more 
consequence than mere school learning — the love 
and the habits of inquiry. Here is the great advan- 
tage of early intellectual culture. The busiest have 
some leisure, — leisure which they may employ ill or 
well ; and that they will employ it well, may reasonably 
be expected, when knowledge is rendered attractive 
for its own sake, as it is to a very great degree by the 
improved modes of instruction, and the higher intel- 
lectual character of the books for young people at the 
present day. A journeyman in our days can under- 
stand and relish a book which would have been like 
Arabic to his grandfather. 

362. Of moral education we say nothing here, 
except that the principles which are applicable to 
other classes of mankind, are obviously applicable to 
the poor. 



136 PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



CHAPTER XIII. 

AMUSEMENTS. 

363. It is a remarkable circumstance that, in 
almost all Christian countries, many of the public and 
popular amusements have been regarded as objection- 
able by the more sober and conscientious part of the 
community. This opinion could scarcely have been 
general unless it had been just. Yet lohy should a 
people prefer amusements of which good men feel 
themselves compelled to disapprove ? Is it because no 
public recreation can be devised of which the evil is 
not greater than the good? or because the inclina- 
tions of most men are such that, if it were devised, they 
would not enjoy it? It may be feared that the desires 
which are seeking for gratification are not themselves 
pure ; and pure pleasures are not congenial to impure 
minds. The real cause of the objectionable nature 
of many popular diversions is to be sought in the 
want of virtue in the people. 

364. Amusement is confessedly a subordinate con- 
cern in life. No reasonable man sacrifices the more 
important thing to the less ; and that a man's religious 
and moral condition is of incomparably greater im- 
portance than his diversion, is sufficiently plain. In 
estimating the propriety, or rather the lawfulness, of a 
given amusement, it may safely be laid down, that 
none is lawful of which the aggregate consequences 
are injurious to morals ; nor if its effects upon the 
immediate agents are, in general, morally bad ; nor, 
lastly, if it occupies much time, or is attended with 
much expense. Respecting all amusements, the ques- 
tion is not whether, in their simple or theoretical 
character, they are defensible, but whether they are 
defensible in their actually-existing state. 



t»RlVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 137 



365. The Drama. — So that, if a person, by way 
of showing the propriety of theatrical exhibitions, 
should ask whether there was any harm in a man's 
repeating a composition before others, and accom- 
panying it with appropriate gestures, he would ask a 
very foolish question, — because a question that pos- 
sesses little or no relevancy to the subject. What are 
the ordinary effects of the stage upon those who act 
on it ? One and one only answer can be given, — 
that, whatever happy exceptions there may be, the 
effect is bad; that the moral and religious character 
of actors is lower than that of persons in other pro- 
fessions. Therefore, if I take my seat in the theatre, 
I have paid my money as an inducement to a number 
of persons to subject their principles to extreme dan- 
ger ; and the defence which I make is, that I am 
amused by it, — a defence which reason pronounces 
to be absurd, and morality to be vicious. 

366. But this, which is sufficient to decide the 
morality of the question, is not the only nor the chief 
part of the evil. The evil which is suffered by per- 
formers may be more intense, but upon spectators and 
others it is more extended. The night of a play is 
the harvest time of iniquity. It is to no purpose to say 
that a man may go to a theatre, or parade a saloon, 
without taking part in the surrounding licentious- 
ness. All who are there promote the licentiousness; 
for if none were there, there would be no licentious- 
ness. The whole question is resolved into a very 
simple thing : After the doors, on any given night, 
are closed, have the virtuous or the vicious dispositions 
of the attenders been in the greater degree promoted ? 
Every one knows that the balance is on the side of 
vice, and this conclusively decides the question, *'Is 
it lawful to attend?" 

367. The same question is to be asked, and the 

12* 



138 PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 

same answer given, respecting various other asseffl" 
blies for purposes of amusement They do more harm 
than good. They please, but they injure us; and 
what makes the case still stronger is, that the pleasure 
is frequently such as ought not to be enjoyed. Dis- 
positions are gratified which it would be wiser to 
thwart; and, to speak the truth, if the dispositions of 
the mind were such as they ought to be, many of these 
modes of diversion would neither be relished nor re- 
sorted to. 

368. The Field. — If we proceed with the calcu- 
lation of the benefits and mischiefs of field-sports after 
the manner of debtor and creditor, the balance is 
presently found to be greatly against them. The 
value of the pleasure cannot easily be computed ; and 
as to healthy it may pass for nothing; for, if a man is 
so little concerned for his health that he will not take 
exercise without dogs and guns, he has no reason to 
expect other men will concern themselves with it in 
remarking upon his actions. — And then for the other 
side of the calculation. It is not necessary to show 
that every one who hunts is a worse man in the even- 
ing than he was in the morning : the influence of 
those things is to be sought among those with whom 
they are habitual. Is the character of the sportsman, 
then, distinguished by religious sensibility ? No. By 
activity of benevolence? No. By intellectual exer- 
tion? No. By purity of manners ? No. Sportsmen 
are not the persons who difi'use the light of Christian- 
ity, or endeavor to rectify the public morals, or to 
extend the empire of knowledge. 

369. As to the expenditure of time and money, I 
dare say we shall be told that a man has a right to 
employ both as he chooses. But no folly is more ab- 
surd than that of supposing we have a right to do 
whatever the law does not punish. Such is the state 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



139 



of mankind, so great is the amount of misery and deg- 
radation, and so great are the effects of money and 
active philanthropy in meliorating this condition of 
our species, that it is no light thing for a man to em- 
ploy his time and money upon vain and needless 
gratifications. 

370. Then, as to the torture inflicted upon animals, 
it is wonderful to observe our inconsistencies. He 
who has, during the day, inflicted upon half a dozen 
animals almost as much torture as they are capable 
of sustaining, and v/ounded, perhaps, half a dozen 
more, and left them to die of pain or starvation, gives, 
in the evening, a grave reproof to a child whom he 
sees picking off the wings of flies ! The infliction of 
pain is not that which pleases the sportsman; — this 
were ferocious depravity ; — = but he voluntarily inflicts 
the pain in order to please himself 

371. The Turf is still worse, because it is a strong- 
hold of gambling, and therefore an efficient cause of 
misery and wickedness. It is an amusement of almost 
unmingled evil, and in this every man participates 
who attends the course. 

372. It is the same with respect to the gross and 
vulgar amusements of boxing and wrestling, and feats 
of running and riding. There is the same pure and 
unmingled evil, — the same popularity resulting from 
the concourses who attend, and by consequence the 
participation and responsibility in those who do at- 
tend. The drunkenness, the profaneness, the de- 
bauchery, lie in part at the doors of those who are 
mere lookers-on ; and if these lookers-on make pre- 
tensions to purity of character, their example is the 
more influential, and their responsibility tenfold in- 
creased. 

373. These grossnesses will pass away, as the 
deadly conflicts of men with beasts are passed al- 
ffeadj. Our posterity will wonder at the barbarism 



140 PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 

of US their fathers, as we wonder at the barbarism of 
Rome. 



374. These criticisms might be extended to many 
other species of amusement ; and it is humiliating to 
discover that the conclusion will frequently be the 
same — that the evil outbalances the good. In thus 
concluding, it is possible that the reader may imagine 
that we would exclude enjoyment from the world, and 
substitute a system of irreproachable austerity. He 
who thinks this, is unacquainted with the nature and 
sources of our better enjoyments. It is an ordinary 
mistake to imagine that pleasure is great only when it 
is vivid or intemperate, as a child fancies it were more 
delightful to devour a pound of sugar at once, than to 
eat an ounce daily in his food. It is happily and 
kindly provided that the greatest sum of enjoyment is 
that which is quietly and constantly induced. No 
men understand the nature of pleasure so well^ or 
possess it so much, as those who find it within their 
own doors. If it were not that moral education is so 
bad, multitudes would seek enjoyment and find it 
here, who now fancy that they never partalie of pleas* 
are except in scenes of diversion. 



CHAPTER XIY. 

DUELLING. 

375. To advocate duelling is not to defend one 
species of offence, but to assert the general right to 
violate the laws of God. If, as Dr. Johnson reasoned,, 
the notions which prevail" make fighting rights they 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 141 



can make any thing right. Nothing is wanting but 
to alter the notions which prevail," and there is not 
a crime mentioned in the statute-book which may not 
be lawful and honorable to-morrow. 

376. It is usual with those who do foolish or vicious 
things, to invent some fiction by which to veil the evil 
or folly, and to give it, if possible, a creditable appear- 
ance. This has been done in the case of duelling. 
We hear a great deal about honor, and spirit, and 
courage, and other qualities equally pleasant, and, as 
it respects the duellist, equally fictitious. The ivant 
of sufficient honor, and spirit, and courage, is precise- 
ly the very reason why men fight. Pitt fought with 
Tierney; upon which Pitt's biographer writes ^ — A 
mind like his, cast in no common mould, should have 
risen superior to a low and unworthy prejudice, the 
folly of which it must have perceived, and the wick- 
edness of which it must have acknowledged. Could 
Mr. Pitt be led away by that false shame which sub- 
jects the decisions of reason to the control of fear, and 
renders the admonitions of conscience subservient to 
the powers of ridicule]"* Low prejudice, folly, 
wickedness, false shame, and fear, are the motives 
which the complacent duellist dignifies with the titles 
of honor, spirit, courage. 

377. Put Christianity out of the question, — would 
not even the philosophy of paganism have despised 
that littleness of principle which would not bear a man 
up in adhering to conduct which he knew to be right 
— that littleness of principle which sacrifices the dic- 
tates of understanding to an unworthy fear? When 
a good man, rather than conform to some vicious in- 
stitution of the papacy, stood firm against the frowns 
and persecutions of the world, against obloquy and 
infamy, we say that his principles were great as well 



* Gifford's Life. 



142 PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 

as good. If they were, the principles of the duellist 
are mean as well as vicious. He is afraid to be good 
and great. If you would show us a man of courage, 
bring forward him who will say, " I will not fight." 

378. One consideration connected with duelling 
is of unusual interest. " In the judgment of that 
religion which requires purity of heart, and of that 
Beinor to whom thoucrht is action, lie cannot be 
esteemed innocent of this crime, who lives in a 
settled, habitual determination to commit it, when 
circumstances shall call upon him so to do."* 

379. It is the intention," says Seneca, and not 
the effect, which makes the wickedness;" and that 
Greater than Seneca, who laid the axe to the root of 
our vices, who laid upon the mental disposition the 
guilt which had been laid upon the act, may be ex- 
pected to regard this habitual intention and willing- 
ness to violate his laws, as an actual and great offence. 
The felon who plans and resolves to break into a 
house, is not the less a felon because a watchman 
happens to prevent him ; nor is the offence of him 
who happens never to be challenged, necessarily at 
all less than that of him who takes the life of his 
friend. 



CHAPTER XV. 

SUICIDE. 

380. There is no subject upon which it is more 
difficult either to write or to legislate with effect, than 
that of suicide. It is difficult to a writer, because 
a man does not resolve upon the act until he has 



* Wilberforce : Practical View. 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 143 

first become steeled to some of the most powerful 
motives that can be urged upon the human mind; 
and to the legislator, because he can inflict no 
penalty upon the oifending party. 

381. It is to be feared that there is little proba- 
bility of diminishing the frequency of this miserable 
offence, by urging the considerations which philosophy 
sufforests. The voice of nature is louder and stronger 
than the voice of philosophy ; and as nature speaks 
to the suicide in vain, what is the hope that philoso- 
phy will be regarded ? There appears to be but one 
efficient means by which the mind can be armed 
against the temptations to suicide, because there is but 
one that can support it against every evil of life — prac- 
tical religion, belief in the providence of God, con- 
fidence in his wisdom, hope in his goodness. The 
only anchor that can hold us in safety, is that which 
is fixed within the vail." To him w^ho is enabled, 
by the power of religious faith, to regard even misery 
not as an evil, but as a good, — not as the unrestrained 
assault of chance or malice, but as the beneficent 
discipline of a Father ; to him who remember^ that 
the time is approaching in which he will be able 
most feelingly to say, For all I bless Thee — most 
for the severe," — every affliction is accompanied with 
its proper alleviation ; the present hour may distress, 
but it does not overwhelm him ; he sees the darkness 
and feels the storm, but he knows that light will 
again arise, and that the storm will eventually be 
hushed with a " Peace, be still," so that there shall 
be a great calm. 

382. To him who believes in either revealed or 
natural religion, there is a certain folly in the com- 
mission of suicide ; for from what does he fly ? From 
his present sufferings ; while death, for aught that he 
knows, may only be the portal to sufferings more 
intense. Natural religion, I think, gives no counte- 



144 PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 

nance to the supposition that suicide can be approved 
by the Deity, because it proceeds upon the belief that, 
in another state of existence, he will compensate good 
men for the sulferings of the present. At the best, 
and under either religion, it is a desperate stake. He 
that commits murder, may repent ; but he that destroys 
himself, while he incurs a load of guilt, cuts off, by 
the act, the power of repentance. 

383. Not every act of suicide is to be attributed 
to an excess of misery. Some shoot themselves, or 
throw themselves into a river, in rage or revenge, 
in order to inflict pain and remorse upon those who 
have ill-used them. Such, it is to be suspected, is 
sometimes a motive to self-destruction in disappointed 
love. Perhaps such persons hope that the world 
will sigh over their early fate, tell of the fidelity of 
their loves, and throw a romantic melancholy over 
their story. This need not be a subject of wonder. 
We hear continually of the fidelity of those who die 
for the sake of glory; and it is just as reasonable to 
die that the world may admire our true love, as that 
it may admire our bravery; and the lover's hope 
is the better founded. There are too many aspirants 
after glory for each to get even his " peppercorn of 
praise;" — but the lover may hope for higher honors ; 
a paragraph may record his fate ; he may be talked 
of through half a county ; and some kindred spirit 
may inscribe a tributary sonnet in a lady's album. 



384. To legislate efficiently upon the crime of 
suicide, is difficult, if not impossible. The great 
object is to associate wdth the act ideas of guilt and 
horror in the public mind. This association would be 
likely to preclude, in individuals, that^rsf complacent 
contemplation of the act which probably precedes, by 
a long interval, the act itself. The anxiety which the 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 145 

surviving friends manifest for a verdict of insanity/' 
is a proof how great is the power of imagination^ 
and how much they are in dread of public opinion. 
They are anxious that the disgrace and reproach of 
conscious self-murder should not cling to their family. 
This is precisely the anxiety of which the legislator 
should avail himself, by enactments that would require 
satisfactory proo/' of insanity, and which, in default of 
such proof, would leave to its full force the stigma 
and the pain, and excite a sense of horror of the act 
and a perception of its wickedness in the public mind. 
The point for the exercise of legislative wisdom is, to 
devise such an ultimate procedure as shall call forth 
these feelings, but as shall not become nugatory by 
being more dreadful than the public will endure. 



CHAPTER XVL 

RIGHTS OF SELF-DEFENCE. 

385. The right of defending ourselves against vio- 
lence is easily deducible from the law of nature. There 
is, however, little need to deduce it, because mankind 
are at least sufficiently persuaded of its lawfulness. 
The great question which the opinions and principles 
that now influence the world make it needful to 
discuss is. Whether the right of self-defence is 
absolute and unconditional — Whether every action 
whatever is lawful, provided it is necessary to the 
preservation of life. They who maintain the af- 
firmative, maintain a great deal ; for they maintain 
that, whenever life is endangered, all rules of morality 
are, as it respects the individual, suspended, anni- 
hilated. 

13 



146 PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



3S6. Yet the language that is ordinarily held upon 
the subject implies the supposition of all this. " If 
our lives are threatened with assassination or open 
violence from the hands of robbers or enemies/' says 
Grotius, any means of defence would be allowed 
and laudable.'' And, according to Paley, ''There is 
one case in which all extremities are justifiable, 
namely, when our life is assaulted, and it becomes 
necessary for our preservation to kill the assailant.'' 

387. If these propositions are true — if '' any means 
of defence are laudable" — if all extremities are 
justifiable," — then they are not confined to acts of 
resistance to the assailing party. Some rufiians seize 
a man in the highway, and will kill him unless he 
will conduct them to his neighbor's property, and 
assist them in carrying it ofi". May this man unite 
with them in the robbery to save his life, or may he 
not? If he may, what becomes of the law, '' Thou 
shalt not steal " ? If he may not, then not every 
means by which a man may preserve his life is ''lau- 
dable " or " allowed," and w^e have found an exception 
to the rule. 

388. A pagan has unalterably resolved to offer me 
up in sacrifice on the morrow, unless I will acknowl- 
edge his gods and w^orship them. I shall presume 
that the Christian will regard these acts as being, under 
every possible circumstance, unlawful. The night 
offers me an opportunity of assassinating the pagan. 
Am I at liberty to assassinate him ? The heart of the 
Christian surely answers, " No." Here, then, is a case 
in which I may not take a violent man's life to save my 
own. We have said that the heart of the Christian 
answers, " No ; " and we think this is a just species of 
appeal. But, if any one doubts whether the assassina- 
tion would be unlawful, let him consider whether one 
of the Christian apostles would have committed it in 
such a case. Here, at any rate, the heart of every man 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 147 

will answer, No because every man perceives such 
an act to be palpably inconsistent with the apostolic 
character and conduct ; that is, with Christian char- 
acter and conduct. The conclusion^ therefore^ again 
is, that there is a limit to the right of self-defence . 

389. It would be to no purpose to say that, in some 
instances, religious duties interfere with, and limit the 
right of, self-defence. This is a common fallacy. 
Religious duties and moral duties are identical in 
point of obligation, the authority for both being the 
same, viz., the will of God. He who violates the 
moral law is as truly unfaithful in his allegiance to 
God as he who denies Christ before men. 

390. So that we come, at last, to one single and 
simple question — Whether taking the life of a person 
who threatens ours is, or is not, compatible with the 
moral law. We refer for an answer to the broad 
principles of Christian benevolence ; that piety which 
reposes habitual confidence in the Divine Providence, 
and an habitual preference of futurity to the present 
time ; that benevolence which not only loves our 
neighbor as ourselves, but feels that the Samaritan or 
the enemy is a neighbor. 

391. The truth is, that he who, from motives of 
obedience to the will of God, spares the aggressor^s 
life even to the endangering of his own, exercises 
love both to the aggressor and himself, perfectly ; to 
the aggressor, because, by sparing his life, we give him 
the opportunity of repentance and amendment ; to 
himself, because every act of obedience to God is 
perfect benevolence towards ourselves; it is propitia- 
ting the favor of Him who is emphatically a rich 
rewarder.'' 

392. And, after all, if it were granted that a person 
is at liberty to take an assailant's life in order to 
preserve his oion^ how is he to know, in the majority 
of instances, whether his own will be taken ? When 



148 PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 

a man breaks into a person's house, and this person, 
as soon as he comes up with the robber, takes out 
a pistol and shoots him, we are not to be told that 
this man was killed ^' in defence of life." Besides, 
allowing an extreme probability that the robber meant 
to take life, you can still withdraw — you can fly. 
Perhaps you exclaim, Fly ! and leave your property 
unprotected!" Yes, unless you mean to say that 
preservation of property, as well as preservation of 
life, makes it lawful to kill an offender. But such a 
proposition, in an unconditional form, no one, surely, 
will tolerate. The laws of the land do not admit 
it, nor do they even admit the right of taking another's 
life because he is attempting to take ours. They 
require that w^e should be tender even of the mur- 
derer's life, and that we should fly rather than de- 
stroy it.* 

393. But all this is very far from concluding that 
no resistance is to be made to aggression. We may 
make, and we ought to make, a great deal. It is the 
duty of the civil magistrate to repress the violence of 
one man towards another ; and, by consequence, it is 
the duty of an individual, when the civil power can- 
not operate, to endeavor to repress it himself Many 
kinds of resistance to aggression come strictly within 
the fulfilment of the law of benevolence. He v/ho, 
by securing or temporarily disabling a man, prevents 
him from committing an act of great turpitude, is 
certainly his benefactor ; and if he be thus reserved 
for justice, th^ benevolence is great, both to him and | 
to the public. 

394. The exercise of Christian forbearance towards 
violent men is not tantamount to an invitation of out- 
rage. Cowardice is one thing, this forbearance is 
another. The man of true forbearance is, of all men, 



* Blackstone. 



PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 149 

the least cowardly. It requires courage in a greater 
degree, and of a higher order, to practise it when life 
is threatened, than to draw a sword or fire a pistol. 
No ; it is the peculiar privilege of Christian virtue to 
approve itself even to the bad. There is something 
in the nature of that calmness, and self-possession, and 
forbearance, that religion affects, which obtains, nay, 
which almost commands, regard and respect. Incon- 
testable experience has proved that the minds of few 
men are so depraved or desperate as to prevent them 
from being irifluenced by real Christian conduct. 

395. Of the consequences of forbearance, even in 
the case of personal attack, there are some examples. 
Archbishop Sharpe, when assaulted by an armed foot- 
pad on the highway, spoke to the robber in the lan- 
guage of a fellow-man and a Christian. The man 
was really in distress, and the prelate gave him such 
money as he had, and promised, if he would call at the 
palace, to make the amount up to fifty pounds, which 
was the sum of which the robber had said he stood in 
the utmost need. The man called and received the 
money. After about a year and a half, he called 
again, and brought back the same sum, professing the 
deepest gratitude for the archbishop's astonishing 
goodness." * Let the reader consider how different 
the prelate's feelings were from what they would have 
been if he had killed this man. 

396. Barclay, the Apologist, was attacked by a high- 
wayman. He substituted for the ordinary modes of 
resistance a calm expostulation. The felon dropped 
his presented pistol, and offered no further vio- 
lence. Leonard Fell was similarly attacked ; and from 
him the robber took both his money and his horse, and 
then threatened to blow out his brains. Fell spoke 
solemnly to him on the wickedness of his life ; and the 

* Life of Granville Sharpe, Esq., p. 13. 
13 * 



150 PRIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 

robber, astonished, returned both the horse and the 
money. 

397. That those over whom the influence of 
Christianity is weak, should think themselves at 
liberty, upon such occasions, to take the life of their 
fellow-men, needs to be no subject of wonder. 
Christianity, if we would rightly estimate its obliga- 
tions, must be felt in the heart. I know not, there- 
fore, that more appropriate advice can be given to 
him who contends for the lawfulness of taking 
another man's life in order to save his own, than 
that he would first inquire whether the influence of 
religion is dominant in his mind. If not, let him 
suspend his decision, until he has attained to the ful- 
ness of the stature of a Christian man. Then, as 
he will be of that number who do the will of Heaven, 
he may hope to know of this doctrine whether 
it be of God." 



151 



ESSAY III. 

POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



CHAPTER L 

PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL TRUTH AND POLITICAL 
RECTITUDE. 

398. The fundamental principles which are de- 
ducible from the law of nature, and from Christianity, 
respecting political affairs, appear to be these : — 

I. Political power is rightly possessed only when it 
is possessed by consent of the community ; 

II. It is rightly exercised only when it subserves 
the will of the community ; 

III. And only when it subserves this purpose by 
means which the moral law permits. 



L 

POLITICAL POWER IS RIGHTLY POSSESSED ONLY WHEN 
IT IS POSSESSED BY CONSENT OF THE COMMUNITY. 

899. Perfect liberty is desirable, if it were con- 
sistent with the greatest degree of happiness. But it 
is not. Men find that by giving up a part of their 
liberty, they are more happy than by retaining, or 
attempting to retain, the whole. Government, what- 
ever be its form, is the agent by which the inexpedient 
portion of individual liberty is taken away. Men in- 
stitute orovernment for their own advantaore, and be- 



152 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 

cause they find they are more happy with it than 
without it. This is the sole reason in principle, how 
little soever it be adverted to in practice. Governors, 
therefore, are the officers of the public, in the proper 
sense of the word ; not the slaves of the public ; for, if 
they do not incline to conform to the public will, they 
are at liberty, like other officers, to give up their office. 
They are servants in the same manner, and for the 
same purpose, as a solicitor is the servant of his client, 
and the physician of his patient. These are employed 
by the patient or the client voluntarily, for his own 
advantage, and for nothing else. A nation (not an 
individual^ but a nation) is under no other obligation 
to obedience than that which arises from the convic- 
tion that obedience is good for itself; — or, rather, in 
more proper language, a nation is under no obligation 
to obedience at all. Obedience is voluntary. If they 
do not think it proper" to obey, — that is, if they are 
not satisfied with their officers, — they are at liberty 
to discontinue their obedience, and to appoint other 
officers instead. 

400. It cannot be asserted that the people do not 
rightfully possess the supreme power, without assert- 
ing that governors may do what they will, and be as 
tyrannical as they will. Who may prevent them ? 
The people? Then the people hold the sovereign 
power. 

401. The rule that political power is rightly pos- 
sessed only when it is possessed by consent of the 
community," necessarily applies to the choice of the 
person who is to exercise it. If any governor were 
fully conscious that the community preferred another 
man or another kind of government, he ought to regard 
himself in the light of a usurper, if he, nevertheless, 
continues to retain his power. Not that every gov- 
ernment ought to dissolve itself, or every governor to 
abdicate his office, because there is a general but tem- 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 153 



porary clamor against it. This is one thing, — the 
steady, deliberate judgment of the people is another. 

402. The habitual consciousness, on the part of a 
legislature, that its authority is possessed in order to 
make it an efficient guardian and promoter of the 
general welfare and the general satisfaction, would 
induce a more mild and conciliating system of internal 
policy than that which frequently obtains. The best 
mode of governing, and the mo^i powerful mode, too, 
is, to recommend state measures to the judgment and 
the affections of a people. We should not wait for 
times of agitation to do what Fox recommended even 
at such a time, because at other periods it may be 
done with greater advantage and with a better grace. 

It may be asked,'' said Fox, " what I would propose 
to do in times of agitation like the present] I will 
answer openly : If there is a tendency in the dissenters 
to discontent, I would instantly repeal the corporation 
and test acts, and take from them thereby all cause of 
complaint. If there were other complaints of griev- 
ance, I would redress them where they were really 
proved ; but, above all, I would constantly , cheerfully, 
patiently, listen : I would make it known that, if any 
man felt, or thought he felt, a grievance, he might 
come freely to the bar of this house, and bring his 
proofs. And it should be made manifest to all the 
world, that where they did exist they should be re- 
dressed; where not, it should be made manifest."* 



II. 

POLITICAL POWER IS RIGHTLY EXERCISED ONLY WHEN 
IT SUBSERVES THE WELFARE OF THE COMMUNITY. 

403. This proposition is a consequent of the truth 
of the last. The community, which has the right to 



* Fell's Memoirs of the Public Life of C. J. Fox. 



154 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



withhold power, delegates it, of course, for its own 
advantage. It matters nothing whether the commu- 
nity have delegated specifically so much power for 
such and such purposes : the power, being possessed, 
entails the obligation. Whether a sovereign derives 
absolute authority by inheritance, or whether a presi- 
dent is intrusted with limited authority for a year, 
the principles of their duty are the same. 

404. But, how ready soever men are to admit the 
truth of this proposition as a proposition, it is very 
commonly disregarded in practice; and a vast variety 
of motives and objects direct the conduct of govern- 
ments, which have no connection with the public 
weal. Some pretensions are, indeed, usual. It is not 
to be supposed that, when public officers are pursuing 
their own schemes and interests, they will tell the 
people that they disregard theits. Yet, when we 
look over the history of a Christian nation, we shall 
find that a large proportion of the measures which 
are most prominent in it, had little tendency to sub- 
serve, and did not subserve, the public good. 

405. Governments commonly trouble themselves 
unnecessarily, and too much, with the politics of 
other nations. If governments were wise, it would 
ere long be found that a great portion of the endless 
and wearisome succession of treaties, and remon- 
strances, and embassies, and memorials, might be 
dispensed with, and this with so little inconvenience, 
that the world would wonder to think to what futile 
ends they had been busying themselves. 

406. But, indeed, communities frequently contrib- 
ute to their own injury. If governors are ambitious, 
or resentful, or proud, so, often, are the people ; and 
the public good has often been sacrificed, by the 
public, to jealousy or vexation. Some merchants are 
angry at the loss of a branch of trade ; they urge the 
government to interfere ; memorials and remonstrances 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 155 



follow; and, by that process of exasperation which 
is quite natural when people think that high language 
and a high attitude are politic, the nations soon begin 
to fight. The merchants applaud the spirit of their 
rulers, while, in one year, they lose more by the war 
than they would have lost by the want of the trade for 
twenty; and, before peace returns, the nation has lost 
more than it would have lost by the continuance of the 
evil for twenty centuries. Peace at length arrives, 
and the government begins to devise means of repair- 
ing the mischiefs of the war. Both government and 
people reflect very complacently on the wisdom of 
their measures, forgetting that their conduct is only 
that of a man who wantonly fractures his own leg 
with a club, and then boasts to his neighbors how 

j dexterously he limps to a surgeon. 

407. When philosophy and Christianity obtain 
their proper influence in the practice of government; 

I, when governments are content to do their proper 

I business, and to leave undone that which is not theirs ; 
when the whole system of irritability, and haughtiness, 
and temporary expedients, shall be laid aside, — we may 
reasonably expect a rapid advancement in the whole 
condition of the world. Domestic measures, which 

j are now postponed to the more stirring occupations 
of legislatures, will be found to be of incomparably 

i greater importance than they. A wise code of crimi- 
nal law will be found to be of more consequence and 
interest than the acquisition of a million square miles 
of territory ; a judicious encouragement of general 

' education will be of more value than all the glory " 
that has been acquired from the days of Alfred until 
, now. Of moral legislation, however, it will be our 
I after business to speak; meanwhile, the lover of 
mankind has some reason for gratulation in perceiv- 
ing indications that governments will hereafter direct 
i tb&ir attention more to the objects for which they are 



156 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



invested with power. The statesman who promotes 
this improvement, will be what many statesmen have 
been called — a great man. That government only 
is great, which promotes the prosperity of its own 
people ; and that people only are prosperous, who are 
wise and happy. 



III. 

POLITICAL POWER IS RIGHTLY EXERCISED ONLY WHEN 
IT SUBSERVES THE WELFARE OF THE COMMUNITY 
BY MEANS WHICH THE MORAL LAW PERMITS. 

408. It has been said by a Christian writer, that 
the science of politics is but a particular application 

of that of morals ; " and it has been said by a writer 
who rejected Christianity, that the morality which 
ought to govern the conduct of individuals, and of 
nations, is, in all cases, the same.'' If there be truth 
in the proposition that the moral law is supreme, these 
propositions are indisputably true. In the conduct 
of nations, this supremacy is pr actically* denied ; al- 
though, perhaps, few of those who make it subservient 
to other purposes, would deny it in terms. Such pro- 
cedure must be expected to produce much self-contra- 
diction, much vagueness of notions respecting political 
rectitude, and much casuistry, to educe something 
like a justification of what cannot be justified. 

409. The reasoning by which these vacillating 
doctrines are supported, is such as it might be ex- 
pected to be. We are told of the caution requisite 
in afi*airs of such magnitude," ''the great uncer- 
tainty of the future conduct of the other nation," 
and of ''patriotism." So, then, because affairs are 
of great magnitude, the laws of the Deity are not to 
be observed ! It is all very well, it seems, to observe 
them in little matters ; but, for our more important 
concerns, we want rules commensurate with their 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 157 



dignity ! The next reason is, that we cannot foresee 
the conduct of another nation. Then, surely, the 
more ought we to observe the laws of Him who can 
foresee. Then comes patriotism ; " and we are to 
be patriotic at the expense of treason to our religion ! 

410. The principles upon which these reasonings 
are founded lead to their legitimate results. In 
war and negotiation," says Adam Smith, the laws 
of justice are very seldom observed. Truth and fair 
dealing are almost totally disregarded." 

411. Now, against all endeavors to defend the 
rejection of the moral law, in political affairs, we 
would, with all emphasis, protest. Jesus Christ 
legislated for man, in all his relationships and in all 
his circumstances. In his moral law we discover no 
indication that states were exempted from its applica- 
tion, or that any rule which bound social, did not 
bind political, communities. 

412. Expediency is the rock upon which we split 
— upon which, strange as it appears, not only our 
principles, but our interests, suffer continual ship- 
wreck. We consult our interests so blindly, that we 
ruin them. We shall never know our real interests, 
while we imagine that we know them better than He 
who legislated for the world. Esteeming ourselves 
wise, we have, emphatically, been fools, of which no 
other evidence is necessary than the present political 
condition of the Christian world. 

413. Here is the great truth for which we would 
contend: To be unjust is to be unwise. And, since 
justice is not imposed upon nations more really than 
other branches of the moral law, the universal maxim 
is equally true : To deviate from purity of rectitude 
is impolitic, as well as wrong. Not that it is to be as- 
sumed that fidelity to Christian principles would cost 
nothing. But, whatever it might cost, it would be 
worth the purchase; and neither reason nor experi- 

14 



158 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



ence allows the doubt that a faithful adherence to the 
moral law would more effectually serve national in- 
terests, than they have ever yet been served by the 
utmost sagacity, while violating that law. 



CHAPTER IL 

CIVIL LIBERTY. 

414. Of personal liberty w^e say nothing ; because 
its full possession is incompatible with the existence 
of society. All government supposes the relinquish- 
ment of a portion of personal liberty. 

415. Civil liberty may, however, be fully enjoyed. 
It is enjoyed where the principles of political truth 
and rectitude are applied in practice, because there 
the people are deprived of that portion only of 
liberty which it would be pernicious to themselves to 
possess. If political power is possessed by the con- 
sent of the community, if it is exercised only for 
their good, and if this welfare is consulted by Chris- 
tian means, the people are free. 

416. Civil liberty (so far as its present enjoyment 
goes) does not depend upon forms of government. It 
may be enjoyed under an absolute monarch ; it may 
not be enjoyed under a republic. Actual existing lib* 
erty depends upon the actual existing administration. 

417. One great cause of diminutions of civil liberty 
is war ; and, if no other motive induced a people 
jealously to scrutinize the grounds of a war, this might 
be sufficient. 

418. There are many other acts of governments 
by which civil liberty is needlessly curtailed, among 
which may be reckoned the nvmher of laws. To 
multiply laws is to multiply restrictions, or, which is 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 159 



the same thing, to diminish liberty. A law being 
found to produce no sensible good effects, is a su& 
ficient reason for repealing it." It is not, therefore, 
sufficient to ask, " What harm does the law occasion ? " 
You must prove that it does good; because all laws 
which do no good do harm. They encroach upon 
the liberty of the community, without that reason 
which onli/ can make the deduction of any portion of 
liberty right — the public good. 



CHAPTER m. 

POLITICAL LIBERTY. 

419. This is, in strictness, a branch of civil liberty. 
Political liberty implies the existence of such political 
institutions as secure, with the greatest practicable 
certainty, the future possession of freedom. 

420. The possession of political liberty is of great 
importance. A Russian may enjoy as great a share 
of personal freedom as an Englishman ; that is, he 
may find as few restrictions upon the exercise of his 
own will; but he has no seciirity for the continuance 
of this. For aught that he knows, he may be arbi- 
trarily thrown into prison to-morrow; and, therefore, 
though he may live and die without molestation, he 
is politically enslaved. 

421.. The possession of political liberty is unques- 
tionably a right of a community. It is not enough 
for a government to say, None but beneficial laws 
are adopted." It should accumulate, to the utmost, 
securities for beneficial measures hereafter. 

422. It is a very common mistake among wri- 
ters, to assume some particular privilege or institu- 
tion as a test of political liberty, as something 



160 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 

without which it cannot be enjoyed; and yet, I 
suppose, there is no one institution or privilege under 
which it would not be possible to enslave a people. . 
Simple republicanism, universal suffrage, and frequent 
elections, 7mghf afford no better security for civil 
liberty than absolute monarchy. Political liberty is 
not a matter that admits of certain conclusions from" 
theoretical reasoning; it is a question of facts; a 
question to be decided, like questions of philosophy, 
by reasoning founded upon experience. 

423. It is always incumbent upon the legislature 
to prove the probable superiority of the existing 
institutions, when any considerable portion of the 
people desire an alteration. That desire constitutes 
a claim to investigation, and to an alteration, too, 
unless the existing institutions appear to be superior 
to those which are desired. To be satisfied^ is one 
great ingredient in the welfare of a people ; and in 
whatever degree a people are not satisfied, in the 
same degree civil government does not effect its 
proper ends. To deny satisfaction to a people with- 
out showing a reason, is to withhold from them the 
due portion of civil liberty. 



CHAPTER IV. 

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY. 

424. Those advocates of religious liberty appear 
to assert too much, who assert, as a fundamental 
principle, that a government never has, nor can have, 
any just concern with religious opinions. Unless 
these persons can show that no advertence to them is 
allowed by Christianity, and that none can contribute 
to the public good, circumstances may arise in which 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 161 



an advertence to them may be right. A government 
may surely endeavor to diffuse just notions and prin- 
ciples, moral and religious, into the public mind ; and 
it may as reasonably discourage what is wrong, as 
cherish what is right. 

425. But by what means 1 By influencing opinions, 
not by punishing those who hold them. When a 
man publishes a book, or delivers a lecture, for the 
purpose of enlightening the public mind, he does 
well. A government may take kindred measures 
for the same purpose; but this is all. If the gov- 
ernment, findincr its measures do not influence or 
alter the views of the people, proceeds to injure those 
who reject its sentiments, it acts immorally. A man's 
opinions are not alterable at his o\vn will, and it is 
not right to injure him for doing that which he cannot 
avoid. Besides, in religious matters especially, it is 
our Christian duty first to seek truth, and next to 
adhere to what we believe to be such. 

426. This reasoning proceeds upon the supposi- 
tion that a man does not, in consequence of his 
opinions, disturb the peace of society by any species 
of violence. If he does, he is doubtless to be 
restrained. He is to be restrained, not for his prin- 
ciples, but for his conduct. 

427. And even in the case of conduct, it is 
needful to discriminate accurately, what is a proper 
subject of animadversion, and what is not. I perceive 
no truth in the ingenious argument that a man may 
entertain opinions, however pernicious, but he may 
not be allowed to disseminate them ; as he may keep 
poison in his house, but may not be allowed to 
administer it to others as a wholesome medicine.'' 
To support this argument, you must have recourse 
to a petiiio principiu How do you know that an 
opinion is pernicious? By reasoning and examination, 
if at all ; and that is the very end which the dis- 
semination of an opinion attains. 

14* 



162 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGiTIONS. 

428. All reference to creeds, in framing laws far 
general society, is wrong. And it is somewhat humil- 
iating, that, in England, it should now be necessary 
to establish this position by formal proof In America, 
the question is not, What is the creed of a candidate 
for office?" but, What is his conduct?" Jews have 
all the privileges of Christians. No religious test is 
required to qualify- for public office, except, in some 
cases, a mere verbal assent to the truth of the Christian 
religion. And where is the man who will affect to 
deny that the effect of this is good? 

429. Toleratio7i is a word which ought scarcely 
to be heard out of a Christianas mouth. I tolerate the 
religion of my brother ! I might as w^ell say, I tolerate 
the continuance of his head upon his shoulders I The 
idea of toleration is a relic of the effects of the Papal 
usurpation. That usurpation did not tolerate; and 
Protestants thought it was a great thing for them to 
do what the Papacy had thus refused. And so it was, 
imperfectly as they did it. And it was a great thing 
for Penn, brought up in a land of intolerant Protest- 
ants, to declare universal toleration for all within his 
borders. But we live in happier times. We have 
advanced from intolerance to toleration ; and now it 
is high time to advance from toleration to religious 
liherty — to that religious liberty which excludes all 
reference to creeds in the civil institutions of a 
people. 



CHAPTER V. 

CIVIL OBEDIENCE. 

430. Submission to government is involved in the 
very idea of the institution. None can govern, if 
none submit ; and hence is derived the duty of sub- 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. J^T.j 

mission, so far as it is independent of Christianity. 
Government being necessary to the good of society, 
submission is necessary also, and therefore it is right. 

431. This duty is enforced with great distinctness 
by Christianity. The question, therefore, is, whether 
the duty be absolute and unconditional ; and if not, 
what are its limits, and how are they to be ascertained ? 

432. The law of nature proposes few motives to 
obedience except those which are dictated by expedi- 
ency. If, in any case, a government does not effect its 
proper object, — the good of the governed, — it may 
be changed, and that by any means which may tend, 
on the whole, to the public good. Resistance, arms, 
civil war — every act, is, in the view of natural reason, 
lawful, if it is useful. But it is, as a general rule, more 
necessary to the welfare of a people that governments 
be regularly obeyed, than that each of their measures 
should be good and right. In practice, therefore, 
even considerations of utility are sufficient, generally, 
to oblige us to submit to the civil power. 

433. When we turn from the law of nature to 
Christianity , we find, as we are wont, that the moral 
cord is tightened, and that not every means of oppos- 
ing government for the public good is permitted to us. 
The consideration of what modes of opposition Chris- 
tianity allows, and what it forbids, is of great interest 
and importance. 

434- See Romans xiii. 1 — 5. Let every soul be 
subject unto the higher powers," &:c. Upon this 
often-cited and often-canvassed passage, three things 
are to be observed — 

(1.) That it asserts the general duty of civil obedi- 
ence, because government is an institution sanctioned 
by the Deity. 

(2.) That it asserts this duty, under the supposition 
that the governor is a minister of God for good. 

(3.) That it gives but little other information re- 
specting the duty of obedience. 



164 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



435. In considering the general principles of 
Christianity, I think very satisfactory knowledge may 
be deduced respecting resistance to the civil power, 
although specific rules respecting the extent of civil 
obedience are not given us in Scripture. Those pre- 
cepts to forbearance, to gentleness, to love, to mild- 
ness, which are iterated as the essence of Christian 
morality, apply, surely, to the question of resistance. 
Surely there may be some degrees and kinds of resist- 
ance, which, being incompatible with the observance 
of these principles, Christianity distinctly forbids. 

436. In attempting, upon these grounds, to illus- 
trate our civil duties, I am solicitous to remark, that 
the individual Christian, who, regarding himself as a 
journeyer to a better country, thinks it best for him not 
to meddle in political affairs, may rightly pursue a 
path of simpler submission and acquiescence than that 
which I believe Christianity allows. The business of 

however, is, to act the Christian citizen, — not 
merely to prepare himself for another world, but to do 
such good as he may, political as well as social, in 
the present. And yet so utterly incongruous with 
Christian rectitude is the state of many branches of 
political affairs at the present day, that I know not 
whether he who is solicitous to adhere to this rectitude, 
is not both wise and right in standing aloof This 
consideration applies especially to circumstances in 
which the limits of civil obedience are brought into 
practical illustration. 

437. Referring, then, to political truth, it is to be 
remembered that governors are established, not for 
their own advantage, but the people's. If they so far 
disregard this object of their establishment as greatly 
to sacrifice the public welfare, the people (and conse- 
quently individuals) may rightly consider whether a 
change of governors is not dictated by utility; and, if 
it is, they may rightly endeavor to effect such a change, 
by recommending it to the public, and by transferring 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 165 



their obedience to those who, there is reason to be- 
lieve, will execute the offices for which government is 
instituted. 

438. Now, the lawful means of discouraging or pro- 
moting an alteration of a government must be deter- 
mined by the general duties of Christian morality. 
There is, as we have seen, nothing in political affairs 
which conveys a privilege to throw off the Christian 
character; and whatever species of opposition or sup- 
port involves a sacrifice or suspension of this charac- 
ter, is, for that reason, wrong. Clamorous and ve- 
hement debatings and harangues, vituperation and 
calumny, acts of violence and bloodshed, or insti- 
gations to such acts, are, I think, measures in which 
the first teachers of Christianity would not have par- 
ticipated — measures which would have violated their 
own precepts, and which, therefore, a Christian is not 
at liberty to pursue. Objections to these sentiments 
will no doubt be. at hand : we shall be told that such 
opposition would be ineffectual against the encroach- 
ments of power and the armies of tyranny ; that it 
would be to no purpose to reason with a general whose 
orders were to enforce obedience ; and that the nature 
of the power to be overcome dictated the necessity of 
corresponding power to overcome it ; — to all which, 
it is, in the first place, a sufficient answer, that the 
question is not what evils may ensue from an adher- 
ence to Christianity, but what Christianity requires. 
We renew the oft-repeated truth, that Christian recti- 
tude is paramount. When the first Christians refused 
obedience to some of the existing authorities, they did 
not resist forcibly. They exemplified their own pre- 
cepts. And if resistance to the civil power was thus 
unlawful when the magistrate commanded actions that 
were morally wrong, much more clearly is it unlawful 
when the wrong consists only in political grievances. 
And if any one should insist upon the magnitude of 



166 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



political grievances, the answer is at hand : — These 
evils cannot cost more to the community as a state 
than the other class of evils costs to the individual as 
a man. If fidelity is required in private life, through 
whatever consequences, it is required also in public. 
The national suffering can never be so great as the 
individual may be. The individual may lose his life 
for his fidelity, but there is no such thing as a national 
martyrdom. Besides, it is by no means certain that 
Christian opposition to misgovernment would be so 
ineffectual as is supposed. Nothing is so invincible 
as determinate non-compliance. He that resists by 
force may be overcome by greater force ; but nothing 
can overcome a calm and fixed determination not to 
obey. Violence might, no doubt, slaughter those who 
practised it; but it were an unusual ferocity to de- 
stroy such persons in cool malignity. It would be, I 
believe, " a new thing under the sun,'' to go on 
slaughtering a people of whom it was known not only 
that they had committed no violence, but that they 
would commit none. 

439. The Americans thought, some fifty or sixty 
years ago, that it was best for the general welfare that 
they should be independent ; but England persisted 
in imposing a tax. Imagine, then, America to have 
acted upon Christian principles, and to have refused 
to pay it, but without those acts of exasperation and 
violence which they committed. England might have 
sent a fleet and an army. To what purpose ? Still no 
one paid the tax. The soldiery, perhaps, committed 
outrages, and they seized goods instead of the impost; 
still the tax could not be collected, except by a system 
of universal distraint. Does any man, who employs 
his reason, believe that England would have overcome 
such a people? Does he believe that any government 
or any army would have gone on destroying them? 
especially if the Americans continually reasoned, coolly 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 167 

and honorably, with the other party, and manifested, 
by the unequivocal language of conduct, that they 
were actuated by reason and by Christian rectitude ? 
It is not in human nature to do such things ; and 1 
am persuaded not only that American independence 
would have been secured, but that very far fewer of 
the Americans would have been destroyed, — that 
very much less of devastation and misery would have 
been occasioned, — if they had acted upon these princi- 
ples, instead of upon the vulgar system of exasperation 
and violence. In a word, they would have attained 
the same advantage, with more virtue and at less cost. 
With respect to those voluble reasoners who tell us of 
meanness of spirit, of pusillanimous submission, of base 
crouching before tyranny, and the like, it may be 
observed of them that they do not know what mental 
greatness is. Courage is not indicated most unequiv- 
ocally by wearing swords, or by wielding them. Many 
who have courage enough to take up arms against a 
bad government, have not courage enough to resist it 
by the unbending firmness o the mind; to maintain 
a tranquil fidelity to virtue, in opposition to power, or 
to endure, with serenity, the consequences which 
may follow. 



CHAPTER VI. 

FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. 

440. There is one cause which prevents the po- 
litical moralist from describing, absolutely, what form 
of government is preferable to all others, — which is, 
that the superiority of a form depends, like the proper 
degree of civil liberty, upon the existing condition of 
a community. 



168 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 

441. It is, however, manifest that the form of gov- 
ernment, like the administration of power, should be 
conformable to the public wish. In a certain sense, 
and in a sense of no trifling import, that form is best 
for a people which the people themselves prefer; and 
this rule applies, even although the form may not be 
intrinsically the best ; for public welfare and satisfac- 
tion are the objects of government ; and satisfaction 
may sometimes be insured by a form which the pub- 
lic prefer, more effectually than by a form essentially 
better, which they dislike. Besides, a nation is likely 
to prefer that form which accords best with what is 
called the national genius; and thus there may be a 
real adaptation of a form to a people, which is yet 
not abstractedly the best. 

442. In the present condition of mankind, it is 
probable that some species of monarchy is best for 
the greater part of the world. The virtue of the gen- 
erality of mankind is not sufficiently powerful to 
prompt them to political moderation, without the 
application of an external curb; and thus it happens 
that the order and stability of a government are more 
efficiently secured by the indisputable supremacy of 
one man. Now, order and stability are among the first 
requisites of a good constitution ; for the objects of 
political institutions cannot be secured without them. 

443. I accept the word monarchy in a large sense. 
It is not necessary to the security of these advantages, 
even in the existing state of human virtue, that the 
monarch should possess what we call kingly power. 
By monarchy, I mean a form of government in which 
one man is invested with power greatly surpassing 
that of every other. 

444. I call the president of the United States a 
monarch. He is not called, indeed, an emperor, or a 
king, or a duke, but he exercises much of regal power. 
The power of the president differs, I believe, less 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



169 



from that of the king of England, than the power of 
the king differs from that of the Russian emperor. 
No man can define the maximum of power which 
might be conferred, without public mischief, by the 
election of the public. When the genius of a people^ 
and the whole mass of their political institutions, are 
favorable to an election of the supreme magistrate, 
election would be preferable to hereditary succession. 
But election is not without its disadvantages, especially 
if the appointment be for a short time. When there 
are several candidates, and when the inclinations of 
the community are consequently divided, he who 
actually assumes the reins is the choice of only a 
portion of the people. The rest prefer another ; 
which circumstance is not only likely to -animate the 
hostilities of faction, but to make the elected party 
regard one portion of the people as his friends, and 
another as his enemies* But he should be the pareat 
of all the people. 

445. Whatever be the form of a government, one 
quality appears to be essential to practical excellence, 
— that it should be susceptible o{ peaceable change. 
The science of government, like other sciences, ac- 
quires a constant accession of light. The intellectual 
condition of the world is advancing with onward 
strides. And both these considerations intimate that 
forms of government should be capable of admitting, 
without disturbance, those improvements which ex- 
perience may dictate, or the advancing condition of 
a community may require. To reject improvement, 
is absurd ; to incapacitate ourselves for adopting it, is 
absurd also. 

446. Upon these grounds, no constitution should 
be regarded as sacredly and absolutely fixed, so that 
none ought, and none have a right, to alter it. The 
question of right is easily settled. It is inherent in 
the community, or in the legislature, as their agents. 

15 



170 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



Such checks ought, no doubt, to be opposed to altera- 
tions, that they may not be lightly or crudely made. 
The exercise of political wisdom is, to discover that 
point in which sufficient obstacles are opposed to 
hasty innovation, and in which sufficient facility is 
affi)rded for real improvement, by virtuous means. 

447. Let no new practice in politics be intro- 
duced, and no old one anxiously superseded, till called 
for by the public voice."* The same advice may be 
given respecting the alteration of forms; because al- 
terations which are not so called for, may probably fail 
of a good effect, from the want of a congenial temper 
in the people. The public miud, however, should be 
enlightened by a government. The legislator who 
perceives that another form of government is better 
for his country, does not do all his duty if he declares 
himself willing to concur in the alteration when the 
country desires it ; he should create that desire by 
showing its reasonableness. 

448. Turning to the probable future condition of 
the world, there is reason to think that the popular 
branches of all governments will progressively increase 
in influence, and perhaps eventually predominate. 
This appears to be the natural consequence of the 
increasing power of public opinion. If public opin- 
ion governs, it must govern by some agency by which 
public opinion is expressed; and this expression can 
in no way be so naturally effected as by some modifi- 
cation of popular authority. There is a manifest ten- 
dency in the world to the increase of the power of the 
public voice. Few permanent revolutions are effected 
in which the community do not acquire additional 
influence in governing themselves. 

449. It will not, perhaps, be disputed that, if the 
world were wise and good, the best form of govern- 



* Godwin's Political Justice. 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 171 



ment would be that of democracy in a very simple 
state. Nothing would be wanting but to ascertain 
the general wish, and to collect the general wisdom. 
If, therefore, the propriety of other forms of govern- 
ment results from the present conditiou of mankind^ 
there is reason to suppose that they may gradually 
lapse away, as that condition, moral and intellectual, 
is improved. 

451). As no limit can be assigned to that degree 
of excellence which it may please the Universal 
Parent eventually to diffuse through the world, so 
none can be assigned to the simiplicity and purity of 
the form in which government shall be carried on. 
In truth, the mind, as it passes onward in its antici- 
pations of purity, stops not until it arrives at the period 
when all governments shall cease; when there shall 
be no wickedness to require the repressing arm of 
power ; when all shall do well from higher and better 
motives than the praise of man. 

451. In speaking of political constitutions, it is 
not sufficiently remembered in how great a degree 
good government depends upon the character and the 
virtue of those who conduct it. The great present 
concern of mankind, in the selection of their legisla- 
tors, respects their political opinions, rather than their 
moral and Christian character. This exclusive refer- 
ence to political biases is surely unwise, because it 
leaves the passions and interests to operate, without 
that control which individual virtue alone can impart. 
Political tendencies are important, but moral tenden- 
cies far more so. Rectitude of intention is the pri- 
mary requisite ; and of all politicians, I should prefer 
the enlightened Christian, knowing that character 
is the best pledge of political uprightness, and that 
political uprightness is the best security of good 
government 



172 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS, 



CHAPTER VII. 

POLITICAL INFLUENCE. PARTY. 

452. The system of governing by influence ap- 
pears to be a substitute for the government of force, 
an intermediate step between awing by the sword and 
directing by reason and virtue. When the general 
character of political measures is such that reason and 
virtue do not sufficiently recommend them, on their 
own merits, to the public approbation, these measures 
must be rejected, or they must be supported by foreign 
means; and when, by the political institutions of a 
people, force is necessarily excluded, nothing remains 
but to have recourse to some species of influence. 

453. While the generality of subjects continue to 
be what they are, influence is inseparable from the 
privilege of appointing to offices. With whomsoever 
that privilege is intrusted, lie will possess influence, 
and, consequently, power. Now, there is no way 
of destroying this influence but by making men good; 
for, until they are good, they will continue to sacrifice 
their judgments to their interest, and support men or 
measures, not because they are right, but because 
the support is attended with reward. 

454. The degree of this influence which may be 
required to give stability to an executive body, will 
vary with the character of its own policy. The more 
widely that policy devia4;es from rectitude, the greater 
will be the demand for influence to induce concurrence 
in its measures. 

455. If a government should faithfully act upon 
moral principles, that demand for influence which is 
occasioned by the ill principles of senators or the 
public would be diminished or done away. There is 
no reason to doubt that, if political measures were 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 173 

more generally conformable with the sober judgments 
of a community, respect and affection would soon 
become so general and powerful, that that clamorous 
opposition which it is now attempted to oppose by 
influence, would be silenced by the public voice. 



PARTY. 

456. The system of forming parties in governments 
is perfectly congruous with the general character of 
political affairs, but totally incongruous with political 
rectitude. 

457. What does the very nature of party imply ? 
That he who adheres to it speaks and votes, not 
always according to the dictates of his own judgment, 
but according to the plans of other men. This sac- 
rifice of individual judgment violates one of the first 
and greatest duties of a legislator — to direct his 
separate and unbiased judgment to the welfare of the 
state. 

458. It will be said that there is no means of 
expelling a bad administration from office but by a 
systematic opposition to its measures. If this were 
true, it would be nothing to the question of rectitude, 
unless it can be shown that the end sanctions the 
means. But, even with respect to political objects, it is 
not very certain that simple integrity would not be the 
most efficacious. The speeches, statements, and ar- 
guments of political partisans are listened to with 
suspicion ; and an habitual and large deduction is 
made from their weight. But when the man stands 
up, of whom it is known that he is sincere, — that what 
he says he thinks, and what he asserts he believes, — 
the mind opens itself to his statements without appre- 
hension of deceit. Integrity carries with it its proper 
sanction. 

15 » 



174 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



CHAPTER Vin. 

MORAL LEGISLATION. 

459. Among the multitude and variety of legislative 
acts, it is surprising to find how small a proportion 
are for the express object of benefiting the moral 
character of the people. There is a general want of 
advertence to this object, arising in part, perhaps, from 
the insufiicient degree of conviction that virtue is the 
best promoter of the general weal. 

460. So far as is practicable, a government ought 
to be to a people what a judicious parent is to a fami- 
ly — not merely the ruler, but the instructor and the 
guide. Now, a judicious father adopts a system of 
moral culture^ as well as restraint; he does not merely 
lop the vagrant branches of his intellectual plant; he 
trains and directs them in their proper course. The 
second object is to punish vice, — jirst, to pro- 
mote virtue. You may punish vice without secur- 
ing virtue ; if you secure virtue, the whole work is 
done. 

461. Among that portion of a legislator's office 
which consists in endeavoring the moral amelioration 
of a people, the amendment of political institutions is 
conspicuous. A government of which the principles 
and practice were accordant with rectitude, would 
very powerfully affect the general morals. He, there- 
fore, who explodes one vicious principle, or who 
amends one corrupt practice, is to be regarded as 
among the most useful and honorable of public men. 

462. It is further to be observed, that, if public vir- 
tue is increased, by whatever means, it will react upon 
the governing power. A good people will not long 
tolerate a bad government. 

463. Among the most obvious means of rectifying 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



175 



the general morals, by positive measures-, one is, en- 
couraging a judicious education of the people. Is it 
known, or is it considered, that the expense of an or- 
dinary campaign would endow thousands of schools? 
Prevent, by a just and conciliating policy, one single 
war, and the money thus saved would provide ample 
means of education for millions of people. 

4(54. I suppose that the British and Foreign Bible 
Society, during the thirty or forty years it has ex- 
isted, has done more direct good in the world than 
all the measures which have been directed to the 
same ends, of all the governments of Europe during 
a century. 

465. No consideration of emolument can be put 
in competition with the morals of a nation ; and no 
minister can be justified, either on civil or religious 
grounds, in rendering the latter subservient to the 
former." * Such a truth should be brouorht into prac- 
tical operation. If it had been, lotteries had not been 
so long endured ; if it were, the prodigious multi- 
tude of public houses would not be endured now. 
That these haunts and schools of vice are pernicious, 
no one doubts. Why are they permitted I They 
increase the revenue. Even on grounds of political 
economy, however, the evil is great ; for they diminish 
the effective labor of the population. 

466. The sound proposition that neither on civil 
nor relicrious grounds" is it right to consult policy at 
the expense of morals, is the basis of political truth. 
Here, then, let political truth be applied. It will be 
found, by the far-seeing legislator, to be expedient as 
well as right. 



Gifford's Life of Pitt. 



176 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



CHAPTER IX. 

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. 

467. The dictate of simple truth respecting the ad- 
ministration of justice is, that, if two men differ upon 
a question of property or of right, that decision should 
be made between them which justice, in that specific 
case^ requires; that, if a person has committed a pub- 
lic offence, that punishment should be awarded which 
his actual deserts and the proper objects of punish- 
ment demand. 

468. Yet it is difficult to obtain judges who are 
capable of administering simple equity without im- 
proper biases ; so much so that it has been advanced 
as a fundamental maxim, that the law shall be made by 
one set of men, and its execution intrusted to another. 

469. But when we have gone so far as to allow 
that questions between man and man shall be decided 
by a rule that is independent of the merits of the pres- 
ent case, we have departed far from the pure dictate 
of rectitude. We have made the standard to consist, 
not of justice, but of law. 

470. The consideration of this state of things indi- 
cates one satisfactory truth — that w^e should pursue 
the rule of abstract rectitude to the utmost of our 
power, and that, in whatever degree it is practicable 
to find men who will decide every specific question 
according to the dictates of justice upon that question, 
in the same degree it is right to supersede the appli- 
cation of inferior principles. The administration of 
justice according to a previously-made rule labors 
under this fundamental objection — that it assumes a 
knowledge in the maker of the rule, which he does 
not possess. It assumes that a party who judges a 
case before it exists, can better tell what is justly due 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 177 



to an offended or an offending person, than those who 
hear all the particulars of the individual case. This 
objection, which it is evident can never be got over, is 
practically felt and acknowledged. 

471. Another inconvenience, which is inseparable 
from the use of fixed rules, is, that they almost pre- 
clude a court from attending sufficiently to one very 
important point in the administration of justice — the 
intention of offending parties. If it is said that a court 
may take intention and motives into the account in 
its sentence — so it may ; but, in whatever degree it 
does this, in the same degree it acknowledges the in- 
competency and inaptitude of fixed laws. 

472. The next great objection is, that, to place 
men's property at the discretion of a court of equity, 
that was not bound down by fixed rules, would make 
the possession of every man's property uncertain. 
But this supposes that the decisions of these courts 
would be arbitrary and capricious ; whereas, the sup- 
position upon which we set out is, that means can be 
devised by which their decisions shall be, generally, 
at least, accordant with rectitude. They must devi- 
ate very widely from rectitude, if they took away a 
man's estate without some reason which appeared to 
them to be good ; and it could hardly appear to be 
good, on a full hearing of the case, unless the merits 
of that case were very questionable. If a person holds 
an estate by a decision of laiv which he would not 
have held by a decision of rectitude, we do not listen 
to his complaints though it be taken away. It is just 
what we desire. 

473. The requisition of what is called legal proof , 
is one result of fixed law that is attended with much 
'evil. It not unfrequently happens that a man who 
claims a right adduces such evidence of its validity, 
that the court — that every man — is convinced he 
ought to possess it ; but there is some deficiency in 



178 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



that precise kind of proof which the law prescribes ; 
and so, in deference to law, justice is turned away. 
It is the same with crimes. Crimes are sometimes 
proved to the satisfaction of every one who hears the 
evidence ; but because there is some want of strict 
legal proof, the criminal is again turned loose upon 
society. Such things decisions founded upon equity 
would do away. 

474. The proper ground on which to seek objec- 
tions to decision on rules of equity is, not the want 
of adaptation of present judicial institutions, but the 
impracticability of framing institutions in which these 
rules might safely prevail ; and this impracticability 
has never, so far as the writer knows, been shown. 

475. Now, without assigning the extent to which 
arbitration may eventually take place of law, or the 
degree in which it may be adopted in the present state 
of any country, it may be asked, — Since a large num- 
ber of disagreeaients are actually settled by arbitra- 
tion, that is, by rules of equity, why may not that 
number be greatly increased ? The members of these 
courts are appointed by the disputants themselves, or 
by some party to whom they mutually agree to commit 
the appointment. Supposing, then, the worst, — that 
the disputing parties appoint men who are interested 
in their favors ; still the balance is equal ; both may do 
the same. If they cannot agree, they appoint an um- 
pire, or the disputants appoint one. This umpire 
must be presumed to be impartial, otherwise the dis- 
putants would not both have assented to his appoint- 
ment. At the worsts then, an impartial decision may 
be confidently hoped ; and what may not be hoped 
under better circumstances? 

476. There is one advantage — a collateral one, but 
not the less worthy of consideration — attending the 
administration of equity, — that it would have a strong 
tendency to diffuse sound ideas of justice in the public 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 179 

mind. As it is, it may unhappily be affirmed that 
courts of judicature spread an habitual confusion of 
ideas upon the subject, and, what is worse, very fre- 
quently inculcate that as just which is really the con- 
trary. A court of judicature ought to be a place 
sacred to justice ; but when it is the fact that, by many 
of its decisions, justice is put into the background, 
and law elevated into supremacy, — that the technicali- 
ties of form and the finesse of pleaders triumph over 
the decisions of rectitude in the mind, — the effect can- 
not be otherwise than bad. A court seriously en- 
deavoring to discover the decision of justice, and up- 
rightly awarding it between man and man, would be 
a spectacle of which the moral influence could not be 
lost upon the people. 



477. As to the particular modes of securing the 
administration of simple justice, the writer would say, 
that those he has suggested he has suggested with 
deference. His business is rather with the principles 
of sound political institutions than with ih^form and 
mode of applying them to practice. 

^ 

CHAPTER X. 

OF THE POPULAR SUBJECTS OF PENAL ANIMADVERSION. 

478. The man who compares the actions which 
are denounced as wrong in the moral law, with 
those which are punished by civil government, will 
find that they are far from an accordance. The moral 
law declares many actions to be wicked which human 
iflstitutions do not punish ; and there are some that 



180 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



these institutions punish, of which there is no direct 
reprehension in the communicated will of God. 

479. The practical rule which appears to be 
regarded in the selection of offences for punishment, 
is founded upon the existing circumstances of the 
community. 

480. Offences against w^hich, from any cause, the 
public disapprobation is strongly directed, are usually 
visited by the arm of the civil magistrate. Thus it 
is with almost all offences against property, and with 
those .which personally injure or alarm us. 

481. Examples of the contrary kind are to be 
found in the crimes of drunkenness, of profane 
swearing, of duelling, 6lc. Not that we have any 
reason to expect that, at the bar of Heaven, some of 
these crimes will be at all less obnoxious to punish- 
ment than the former, but because the public very 
negligently cooperate with the law in punishing them. 
An habitual drunkard does much more harm to his 
family and to the world, than he who picks my pocket 
of a guinea; yet we raise a hue and cry after the 
thief, and suffer the other to become drunk every 
day. The magistrate may make laws; but, without 
the cof peratlon of public sentiment, they will remain 
a dead letter. 

482. Another rule, which appears to be practically, 
though not theoretically, adopted, is, to punish those 
offences of which there is a natural prosecutor. The 
opposite fact is exhibited in the case of many offences 
against the public, such as smuggling. No individual 
is especially aggrieved, and the consequence is, that 
the government is obliged to employ persons to detect 
and to prosecute the offenders. 

483. Such considerations lead the inquirer to 
expect that the offences which are denounced in a 
statute-book will bear some relation to the state of 
virtue in the people. The more virtuous the people 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIOXS. 



181 



are, the greater will be the number of crimes which 
can be efficiently visited by the arm of power. In 
a well-ordered family, many things are held to be 
offences, and are noticed as such by the parent, which, 
in a vicious family, pass unregarded. 



484. That which has been called the creation of 
offences, demands peculiar solicitude on the part of 
a government. By a created offence is meant an act 
which, hut for the law^ would be no offence at all. 
The most fruitful cause of these factitious offences is 
in extensive taxation. When a new tax is imposed, 
the legislature endeavors to secure its due payment 
by requiring or forbidding certain acts. These acts, 
which antecedently were indifferent, become criminal 
by the legislative prohibition, or obligatory by the 
legislative command ; and a non-compliance is there- 
fore punished as an offence by the civil power. 

485. These created offences ought to be as few 
as possible; first, because they are encroachments 
upon civil liberty, and secondly, — which is our present 
concern, — that they are pernicious to the public. The 
penalties of the law ought to be accompanied in men's 
minds by the sanctions of morality. When, instead 
of this, we see some things which are, simply regarded, 
innocent, visited by the same punishment as others, 
that all men feel to be wicked, men are likely to feel 
a diminished respect for penal law itself 



486. The general conclusion that is suggested by 
the present chapter is, that the legislator should 
endeavor, so far as, from time to time, becomes practi- 
cable, to direct penal animadversion to those actions 
which are prohibited by the moral law; that he should 
endeavor this both by ceasing to punish that which 
16 



1S2 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



morality does not condemn, and by extending pun- 
ishment to more of those actions which it does 
condemn. 



CHAPTER XL 

OF THE PROPER ENDS OF PUNISHMENT. 

487. Why is a man who commits an offence 
punished for the act ? Is it for his own advantage, or 
for that of otliers, or for both ? For both, and pri- 
marily for his own. 

488. When we recur to the precepts and the spirit 
of Christianity, w^e find that the one great pervading 
principle by which it requires us to regulate our 
conduct towards others, is that of operative, practical 
good-will — the good-will which, if they be in suffer- 
ing, will prompt us to alleviate the misery ; if they 
be vicious, will prompt us to reclaim them from vice. 
That the misconduct of the individual exempts us 
from the obligation to regard this rule, it w'ould be 
futile to imagine. There appears to be no reason 
why, in the case of public criminals, the spirit of the 
rule should not be acted upon — "If a brother be 
overtaken in a fault, restore such a one. ' 

489. When, therefore, a person has committed a 
crime, the great duty of those who, in common with 
himself, are candidates for the mercy of God, is to 
endeavor to meliorate and rectify the dispositions in 
which his crime originates ; to subdue the vehemence 
of his passions, to raise up in his mind a power that 
may counteract the power of future temptation. 

499. There is one great practical advantage in 
directing the attention especially to this moral cure, 
which is this — that, if it be successful, it prevents the 
offender from offending again. It is well known that 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



183 



the proportion of those who, having once suffered 
the stated punishment, again transgress the laws, and 
are again convicted, is great. But to whatever extent 
reformation was attained, this unhappy result would 
be prevented. 

491. The second object of punishment — exainple 
— appears to be recognized as right by Christianity. 
There can be no reason for speaking of punishment 
as a terror," unless it were right to adopt such 
punishments as would deter. In the private discipline 
of the church, the same idea is kept in view — Them 
that sin, rebuke before all, thai others also may fear. 

492. In stating reformation to be the first object, 
w^e conclude that if, in any case, the attainment of 
reformation and the exhibition of example should be 
found to be incompatible, the former is to be preferred. 
The point for the exercise of wisdom is, to attain the 
second object in attaining the first. A primary regard 
to the first object is compatible with many modifica- 
tions of punishment, in order more effectually to attain 
the second. If there are two measures, of which both 
tend alike to reformation, and one tends most to ope- 
rate as example, that one should, unquestionably, be 
preferred. 

493. A third object might profitably receive more 
attention than it. is wont to do — restitution, or com- 
pensation. Since what are called criniinol actions, 
are commonly injuries committed by one man upon 
another, it appears to be a very obvious dictate of 
reason, that the injury should be repaired as far as 
possible. 

494. I do not imagine that, in the present state of 
penal law, a general regard to com[)en»ation is practi- 
cable ; but this does not prove that it ought not to be 
rr'garded. If, in an improved state of penal affairs, it 
should be found practicable to oblige offenders to 
recompense by their labor those who had suffered by 



184 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



their crime, this advantage would attend — that, while 
it would probably involve considerable punishment, it 
would approve itself to the offender's mind as the 
demand of reason and of j ustice ; and this is no trifling 
consideration. 

495. Respecting the relative utility of different 
modes of punishment and of prison discipline, we have 
little to say — partly because the practical recognition 
of reformation^ as a primary object, afTords good secu- 
rity for the adoption of judicious measures, and partly 
because these topics have already obtained much of 
the public attention. 



CHAPTER Xn. 

PUNISHMENT OF DEATH. 

496. Of the three great objects which have just 
been proposed as the proper ends of punishment, the 
punishment of death regards but one, and that one not 
the first and greatest. The only end which is con- 
sulted in taking the life of an offender is that of 
example to other men. Now, if reformation be the 
primary object, the punishment of death is wrong. 

497. To take the life of a fellow-creature is to 
perform an action the most serious and awful which 
a human being can perform. Respecting such an 
action, then, can any truth be more manifest than that 
the dictates of Christianity ought especially to be taken 
into account? Yet what is the fact? Why, that, in 
defending capital punishments, these dictates are al- 
most placed out of the question. Is it conceivable 
that, in the exercise of the most tremendous agency 
which is in the power of man, it can be right to exclude 
all reference to the expressed will of God? 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 185 

498. This exclusion of the Christian law from the 
defences of the punishment, is to me almost a conclu- 
sive argument that the punishment is wrong. Noth- 
ing that is right can need such an exclusion ; and we 
should not practise it if it were not for a secret per- 
ception, that to apply the pure requisitions of Chris- 
tianity would not serve the purpose of the advocate. 
Look for a moment upon the capital offender and upon 
ourselves. He, a depraved and deep violator of the 
laws of God, — one who is obnoxious to the vengeance 
of Heaven, — one, however, whom Christ came pecu- 
liarly to call to repentance, and to save. Ourselves, 
his brethren, — brethren by the relationship of nature, 
— brethren, in some degree, in offences against God, — 
brethren especially in the trembling hope of a common 
salvation. How ouorht beinors so situated to act to- 
wards one another ? Ought we to kill or to amend 
him ? Ought we, so far as is in our power, to cut off 
his future hope, or, so far as is in our power, to 
strengthen the foundation of that hope ? 

499. Since so much is sacrificed to extend the 
terror of example, we ought to be indisputably certain 
that the terror of capital punishments is greater than 
that of all others. Are we thus certain ? We are not, 

590. A man, some time ago, was executed [in 
England] for uttering forged bank notes, and the body 
was delivered to his friends. What was the effect of 
the example upon them ? Why, with the corpse lying 
on a bed before them, they were themselves seized in 
the act of uttering forged hank notes. The testimony, 
upon a subject like this, of a person who has had, 
probably, greater and better opportunities of ascer- 
taining the practical efficiency of punishments than 
any other individual in Europe, is of great importance. 

Capital convicts," says Elizabeth Fry, "pacify their 
conscience with the dangerous and most fallacious 
notion that the violent death which awaits them will 
16* 



186 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



serve as a full atonement for all their sins." And with 
respect to example, this unexceptionable authority 
speaks in decided language. *^The terror of example 
is very generally rendered abortive by the predesti- 
narian notion, vulgarly prevalent among thieves, that 
' if they are to be hanged, they are to be hanged, and 
nothing can prevent it.' '' * 

501. But if capital punishments do little good, they 
do much harm. To familiarize men with the destruc- 
tion of life, is to teach them not to abhor that destruc- 
tion. It is the legitimate process of the mind in other 
things. We 'Mower the estimate of the life of man." 
There is much of justice in an observation of Bec- 
caria's : Is it not absurd that the laws which detect 
and punish homicide, should, in order to prevent mur- 
der, publicly commit murder themselves 1 " Respect- 
ing *' the contempt and indignation with which every 
one looks upon an executioner," Beccaria says the rea- 
son is, '* that in a secret corner of the mind, in which 
the original impressions of nature are still preserved, 
men discover a sentiment which tells them that their 
lives are not lawfully in the power of any one." 

502. But, further: the execution of one offender 
excites in others the spirit of revenge. This is 
extremely natural. But upon whom is the revenge 
inflicted? Upon the legislature, or the jury, or the 
witnesses ? No, but upon the first person whose life 
is in their power, and which they are prompted to take 
away. 

503. Of a system which is thus unsound, — un- 
sound both because it rejects some of the plainest dic- 
tates of the moral law, and because so many of its 
effects are bad, — I should be ready to conclude that 
it was as bad in morals as it was bad in policy. And 
such appears to be the fact. 

* Observations on the Visiting, &c., of Female Prisoners 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLTGATIOXS. 187 



594. Finally, the best of substitutes for capital 
punishment will be found injudicious management of 
criminals in prison/' * — which management is Chris- 
tian management, — a system in which reformation is 
made the first object, but in which it is found that, 
in order to effect reformation, severity to hardened 
offenders is needVul. 

505. Thus, then, we arrive at the goal. We be- 
gan with urging the system that Christianity dictates, 
as right; we conclude by discovering that, as it is 
the right system, so it is practically the best. 



506. But an argument in favor of capital punish- 
ments has been raised from the Christian Scriptures 
themselves : — If I be an offender, or have committed 
any thing worthy of death, I refuse not to die." But 
this is merely an assertion of innocence — an assertion 
that the speaker had done nothing worthy of death. 
His enemies were endeavoring to take away his life ; 
and he, in earnest asseveration of his innocence, says, 

If you can fix your charges upon me, take it." 

507. Some persons, again, suppose that there is a 
sort of moral obligation to take the life of a murderer. 

Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood 
be shed." But our law is the Christian law; and if 
Christianity, by its precepts or spirit, prohibits the pun- 
ishment of death, it cannot be made right to Christians 
by referring to a command given to Noah. And, be- 
sides, the fourth, fifth, and sixth verses of Genesis ix., 
each contains a law delivered to Noah. Of these 
three laws, we habitually disregard two : how, then, 
can we, with reason, insist on the authority of the 
third ? 

508. The grounds upon which the United States 
* Observations on the Visiting, &c., of Female Prisoners. 



188 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



of America still affix death to murder of the first 
degree, do not appear very clear. For, if other pun- 
ishments are found effectual in deterring from crimes 
of all degrees of enormity up to the last, how is it 
shown that they would not be effectual in the last 
also? 

509. It is one objection to capital punishment that 
it is absolutely irrevocable. It is not sufficiently con- 
sidered that a jury or court of justice never knoio that 
a prisoner is guilty. A witness may know it, who saw 
him commit the act ; but others cannot know it, who 
depend upon testimony, for testimony may be mistaken 
or false. Ail verdicts are founded upon probabilities 
— probabilities which, though they sometimes ap- 
proach to certainty, never attain to it. It is, unhap- 
pily, certain that some have been put to death for 
actions which they never committed. At one assizes^ 
we believe that not less than six persons were hanged^ 
of whom it was afterwards discovered that they 
were entirely innocent. Others, equally innocent, but 
whose innocence has never been made known, have, 
doubtless, shared the same fate. These are tremen- 
dous considerations, and ought to make men solemnly 
pause before they take away that life which God has 
given, and which they cannot restore. 



510. The argument respecting the punishment of 
death is both distinct and short. 

It rejects, by its very nature, a regard to the first 
and greatest object of punishment. 

It does not attain either of the other objects so well 
as they may be attained by other means. 

It is attended with other evils peculiarly its own. 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 189 



CHAPTER XIIL 

RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS. 

511. Religious establishments, in Christian coun- 
tries, have been erected by the influence or the assist- 
ance of the civil power. In one country, a religion may 
have owed its political supremacy to the superstitions 
of a prince ; in another, to his policy or ambition ; 
but the effect has been similar. Whether superstition 
or policy, the contrivances of a priesthood, or the 
fortuitous predominance of a party, have given rise 
to the established church, is of comparatively little 
consequence to the fundamental principles of the 
institution. 

512. The only grounds upon which it appears that 
religious establishments can be advocated, are, first, 
that of example or approbation in the primitive 
churches; and, secondly, that of public utility. 

513. I. The primitive church was not a religious 
establishment in any sense or in any degree. No 
establishment existed until the church had lost much 
of its purity. In the discourses and writings of the 
first teachers of our religion, we find such absolute 
disinterestedness, so little disposition to assume politi- 
cal superiority, that to have become the members of 
an established church, would certainly have been 
inconsistent in them. It is, indeed, almost incon- 
ceivable that they should ever have desired the 
patronage of the state for themselves or for their 
converts. No man conceives that Paul or John 
could have participated in the exclusion of any por- 
tion of the Christian church from advantages which 
they themselves enjoyed. 

514. II. The question of the utility of religious 



190 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



establishments is to be decided by a comparison of 
their advantages and their evils. 

515. Of their advantages, the first and greatest 
appears to be, that they provide, or are assumed to 
provide, religious instruction for the whole com- 
munity. 

516. To estimate the relative influence of religion 
in two countries is no easy task. Yet I believe, if 
we compare its influence in the United States with 
that which it possesses in most of the European coun- 
tries which possess state religions, it will be found 
that the balance is in favor of the community in which 
there is no established church. A traveller in Amer- 
ica has remarked, There is more religion in the 
United States than in England, and more in England 
than in Italy. The closer the monopoly, the less 
abundant the supply." * Another traveller writes al- 
most as if he had anticipated the present disquisition 
— It has been often said that the disinclmation of 
the heart to religious truth renders a state establish- 
ment absolutely necessary for the purpose of Chris- 
tianizing the country. Ireland and Am.erica can 
furnish abundant evidence of the fallacy of such an 
hypothesis. In the one country we see an ecclesiasti- 
cal establishment of the most costly description utterly 
inoperative in dispelling ignorance or refuting error; 
in the other, no establishment of any kind, and yet 
religion making daily and hourly progress, promoting 
inquiry, difl*using knowledge, strengthening the weak, 
and mollifying the hardened." t 

517. Paley says that the knoicledge and profession 
of Christianity cannot he upholden without a clergy 
supported by legal provision, and belonging to one sect 
of Christians. The justness of this proposition is 
founded upon the necessity of research. Whatever 



* Hall. t Duncan's Travels in America. 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 191 



may have been the validity of this argument in other 
times, it has but little now. The evidences of religion 
are brought before the world in a form so clear and 
accessible to literary and good men, that, in the pres- 
ent state of society, there is little reason to fear they 
will be lost for want of an established church. 

518. Such are among the principal of the direct 
advantages of religious establishments, as they are 
urged by those who advocate them. 

519. Their disadvantages respect either the insti- 
tution itself, or religion generally, or the civil welfare 
of a people. 

520. 1. The institution itself. The single end 
we ought to propose by religious establishments is the 
preservation and communication of religious knowl- 
edge.^'* But how can we frame any religious estab- 
lishment without making it an engine or ally of the 
state? The state selects and prefers, and grants 
privileges to, a particular church. The privileged 
church is, therefore, interested in supporting the state, 
in standing by it against opposition ; or, which is the 
same thing, that church becomes an ally of the state. 
When, therefore, Dr. Paley says that to make an 
establishment an ally of the state, is to introduce into 
it numerous corruptions and abuses, he in fact says, 
that, to make an establishment at all, is to introduce 
into a church numerous corruptions and abuses. 

521. II. The second class of disadvantages attend- 
ant upon religious establishments, regards their ill 
effects upon religion genercdly. 

522. It is indisputable that much of the irreligion 
of the world has resulted from those things which have 
been mixed up with Christianity, and placed before 
mankind as parts of religion. In some countries, the 
mixture has been so flagrant, that the majority of the 



* Palej. 



192 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



thinking part of the population have almost rejected 
religion altogether. 

523. III. As to the effect of religious establish- 
ments upon the civil v^elfare of a state, we know that 
the connection between civil and religious welfare is 
intimate and great. Whatever, therefore, diminishes 
the influence of religion upon a people, diminishes 
their general welfare. 



524. The discussions of the present chapter con- 
duct the mind of the reader to these short conclu- 
sions : — That of the two grounds upon which the 
propriety of religious establishments is capable of 
examination, neither affords evidence in their favor; 
that religious establishments derive no countenance 
from the nature of Christianity, or from the example 
of the primitive churches; and that they are not rec- 
ommended by practical utility. 



CHAPTER XIV. 

PATRIOTISM. 

525. We are presented with a beautiful subject of 
contemplation, when we discover that the principles 
which Christianity advances, upon its own authority, 
are recommended and enforced by their practical 
adaptation to the condition and wants of man. 

526. ^' Christianity does not encourage particular 
patriotism, in opposition to general benignity. * If 
it did, it wou.d LOt be adapted /or the world. Chria- 



* Bishop Watson. 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 193 

tianity is designed to benefit, not a community, but 
the world. The promotion of the interests of one 
community by injuring another, it utterly rejects as 
wrong. 

527. Patriotism, as it is often advocated, is a low 
and selfish principle — a principle wholly unworthy 
of that enlightened and expanded philanthropy which 
religion proposes. 

528. Nevertheless, Christianity appears not to en- 
courage the doctrine of being a citizen of the world," 
and of paying no more regard to our own community 
than to every other. And why ? Because such a 
doctrine is not rational ; because it opposes the exer- 
cise of natural and virtuous feelings ; and because, if 
it were attempted to be reduced to practice, it may be 
feared that it would destroy confined benignity with- 
out effecting a corresponding amount of universal 
philanthropy. 

529. Christianity rejects alike the extravagance of 
patriotism, and the extravagance of seeming philan- 
thropy. Its precepts are addressed to us as men with 
human constitutions, and as men in society. But to 
do good to my neighbor rather than to strangers, to 
benefit my own country rather than another nation, 
does not imply that we may injure other nations in 
order to do good to our own. Here is the point for 
discrimination — a point which vulgar patriotism and 
vulgar philosophy have alike overlooked. 

530. The proper mode in which patriotism should 
be exercised is that which does not necessarily respect 

' other nations. He is the truest patriot who benefits 
his own country without diminishing the welfare of 
another ; for which reason, those who induce im- 
provements in the administration of justice, in the 
I maxims of governing, in the political constitution of 
I the state ; or those who extend and rectify the educa- 
17 



194 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 

tion, or in any other manner amend the moral or 
social condition of a people, — possess incomparably 
higher claims to the praise of patriotism than mul- 
titudes of those who receive it from the popular 
voice. 

531. That patriotism which is manifested in polit- 
ical partisanship, is frequently of a very questionable 
kind. The motives to this partisanship are often far 
other than the love of our country, even when the 
measure which a party pursues tends to the country's 
good ; and many are called patriots, of whom both 
the motives and the actions are pernicious or impure. 
The most vulgar and unfounded talk of patriotism 
is that which relates to the agents of military opera- 
tions. In general, the patriotism is of a kind that 
Christianity condemns, because it is in opposition 
to general benignity." It does more harm to another 
country than good to our own. These agents, there- 
fore, if they were patriotic at all, would commonly be 
so in an unchristian sense ; and, as to their being 
influenced by patriotism as a motive, the notion is 
ordinarily quite a fiction. Men do not enter armies 
because they love their countries, but because they 
want a living, or are pleased with a military life ; 
and when they have entered, they do not fight because 
they love their country, but because fighting is their 
business. 

532. I do not wholly coincide with the writer who 
says, The love of our country is one of those specious 
illusions which have been invented by impostors, in 
order to render the multitude the blind instruments of 
their crooked designs." * The specious illusion" 
consists in calling that ^Move of our country," which 
ought to be called by a far other name. In whatever 

* Godwin : Political Justice. 



POLITICAL mCHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 195 

manner the fiction originated, a fiction it assuredly is; 
and the circumstance that it is still industriously im- 
posed upon the world, is no inconsiderable evidence 
that the system which it is employed to encourage, 
would shrink from the eye of virtue and the light of 
truth. 

— — ♦ — — • 

CHAPTER XV. 

SLAVERY. 

583. At a future day, it will probably become a 
subject of wonder, how it could have happened that, 
upon such a subject as slavery, men could have 
inquired, and examined, and debated, year after year, 
and that many years actually passed before the minds 
of a nation v^ere so fully convinced of its enormity, 
and of their consequent duty to abolish it, as to sup* 
press it to the utmost of their power. I say, this will 
probably be a subject of wonder ; because the question 
, is so simple, that he who simply applies the requisi* 
I tions of the moral law, finds no time for reasoning or 
I for doubt. The question, as soon as it is proposed, is 
decided. How, then," it will be asked in future 
I days, " could a Christian legislature argue and con- 
tend, and contend and argue again, and allow an age 
I to pass without deciding?" 

534. The cause is, that men do not agree as to the 
rule of decision, — as to the test by which the question 
I should be examined. One talks of the right to prop- 
erty ; one, of the interests of merchants ; one, of safety ; 
one, of policy ; all which are valid and proper con- 
siderations, but they are not the primary consideration. 
The first question is, Is slavery right ?" Is it 
consistent with the moral law ?" This question is in 



196 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



practice postponed to others, even by some who 
theoretically acknowledge its primary claim ; and 
when to the indistinct principles of some is added 
the want of principle in others, it is easy to account 
for the delay and opposition with which the advocate 
of simple rectitude is met. 

535. To him who examines slavery by the standard 
to which all questions of human duty should be re- 
ferred, the task of deciding, we say, is short. Whether 
it is consistent with the Christian law for one man to 
keep another in bondage without his consent, and to 
compel him to labor for that other's advantage, admits 
of no more doubt than whether two and two make 
four. It were humiliating, then, to set about the proof 
that the slave system is incompatible with Christianity, 
because no man questions its incompatibility, who 
knows what Christianity is and what it requires. 
Unhappily, some, who can estimate, with tolerable 
precision, the duties of morality upon other subjects, 
contemplate this through a veil — a veil which habit 
has suspended before them, and which is dense enough 
to intercept the view of the moral features of slavery 
as they are presented to others, who examine it without 
an intervening medium, and with no other light than 
the light of truth. To these, the best counsel that 
we can offer is, to simplify their reasonings, to recur 
to first principles ; and first principles are few. Look, 
then, at the foundation of all the relative duties of 
man — benevolence — love ; — that love and benevo- 
lence which are the fulfilling of the moral law — that 
*^ charity " which prompts to actions of kindness, and 
tenderness, and fellow-feeling for all men. Does he 
who seizes a person in Guinea, and drags him shriek- 
ing to a vessel, practise this benevolence? When they 
have reached another shore, does he who gives money 
to the first for his victims, keeps them as his property, 
and compels them to labor for his profit, practise 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 197 

this benevolence? Would either of these persons 
think, if their relative situations were exchanged with 
the African's, that the African used them kindly ? 
No. Then the question is decided : Christianity con- 
demns the system, and no further inquir.y about 
rectitude remains. The question is as distinctly set- 
tled as, when a man commits burglary, it is distinctly 
certain that he has violated the law. 

536. But of the flagitiousness of the system in the 
view of Christianity, its defenders are themselves 
aware ; for they tell us (if not with decency, at least 
with openness) that Christianity must be excluded 
from the inquiry. What does this exclusion imply ? 
Obviously that the advocates of slavery are conscious 
that Christianity condemns it. They take her away 
from the judgment-seat, because they know she will 
pronounce a verdict against them. Does the reader 
desire more than this ? Here is the evidence, both 
of enemies and friends, that the moral law of God 
condemns the slave system. If, therefore, we are 
Christians, the question is not merely decided, but 
confessedly decided ; and what more do we ask ? 

537. It is, to be sure, a curious thing, that they 
who affirm they are Christians, will not have their 
conduct examined by the Christian law, and, while 
they baptize their children, and kneel at the com- 
munion table, tell us that with one of the greatest 
questions of practical morality our religion has no 
concern. 

538. Two reasons induce the writer to confine 
himself, upon this subject, to little more than the 
exhibition of fundamental principles; first, that the 
details of the slavery question are already laid, in 
unnumbered publications, before the public ; and, 
secondly, that he does not think it will long remain, 
at least in his own country, a subject of discussion. 
That the system will, so far as the British government 

17* 



198 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 

is concerned, at no distant period be abolished, ap- 
pears nearly certain ; and he is unwilling to fill the 
pages of a book of general morality with discussions 
which, ere many years have passed, may possess no 
relevance to the affairs of the Christian world. 

539. Yet one remark is offered as to a subordinate 
means of estimating the goodness or badness of a 
cause, — that which consists in referring to the princi- 
ples upon which each party reasons, to the general 
spirit, to the tone and temper of the disputants. Now, 
I am free to confess that, if I had never heard an 
argument against slavery, I should find, in the WTi- 
tings of its defenders, satisfactory evidence that 
their cause is bad. So true is this, that, if at any 
time I needed J)eculiarly to impress myself with the 
flagitiousness of the system, I should take up the 
book of a determined advocate. There I find the 
most unequivocal of all testimony against it. There 
I find, first, that the fundamental principles of mo- 
rality are given to the winds ; that the proper foun- 
dation of the reasoning is rejected and ridiculed. 
There I find that the temper and dispositions which 
are wont to influence the advocates of a good 
cause are scarcely to be found, and that those which 
usually characterize a bad one continually appear ; 
and, therefore, even setting aside inaccurate statements 
and fallacious reasonings, I am assured, from the 
general character of the defence and conduct of the 
defenders, that the system is radically vicious and 
bad. 

540. The distinctions which are made between the 
original robbery in Africa, and the purchase, the in- 
heritance, or the " breeding " of slaves in the colo- 
nies, do not at all respect the hind of immorality that 
attaches to the whole system. They respect nothing 
but the degree. The man who wounds and robs another 
on the highway, is a more atrocious offender than he 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 199 



who plunders a hen-roost ; but he is not more truly 
an offender, he is not more certainly a violator of the 
law. And so with the slave system. He who drags 
a wretched man from his family in Africa, is a more 
flagitious transgressor than he who merely compels 
an African to labor for his own advantage; but the 
transgression, the immorality, is as real and certain in 
one case as the other. He who had no right to steal 
the African, can have none to sell him. From him 
who is known to have no right to sell, another can 
have no right to buy or to possess. Sale, or gift, or 
legacy, imparts no right to me, because the seller, or 
giver, or bequeather, had none himself The sufferer 
has just as valid a claim to liberty at my hands, as at 
the hands of the ruffian who first dragged him from 
his home. 

541. Every hour of every day, the present pos- 
sessor is guilty of injustice. Nor is the case altered 
with respect to those who are born on a man's estate. 
The parents were never the landholder's property, and 
therefore the child is not. Nay, if the parents had 
been rightfully slaves, it would not justify me in mak- 
ing si ives of their children. No man has a right to 
make a child a slave but himself What are our 
sentiments upon kindred subjects? What do we 
think of the justice of the Persian system, by which, 
when a state offender is put to death, his brothers 
and his children are killed or mutilated too? Or, 
to come nearer to the point as well as nearer home, 
what should we say of a law which enacted that of 
every criminal who was sentenced to labor for life, all 
the children should be sentenced so to labor also? 
And yet, if there is any comparison of reasonable- 
ness, it seems to be in one respect in favor of the cul- 
prit. He is condemned to slavery for his crimes; 
the African, for another man's profit. 

542. That any human being, who has not forfeited 



200 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



his liberty by his crimes, has a right to be free, and 
that whosoever forcibly withholds liberty from an 
innocent man, robs him of his right, and violates the 
moral law, are truths which no man would dispute or 
doubt, if custom had not obscured our perceptions, 
or if wickedness did not prompt us to close our eyes. 

543. The whole system is essentially and radically 
bad ; injustice and oppression are its fundamental 
principles. Whatever lenity may be requisite in 
speaking of the agent, none should be shown, none 
should be expressed, for the act. I do not affirm or 
imagine that every slaveholder is therefore a wicked 
man ; but, if he be not, it is only upon the score of 
ignorance. If he is exempt from the guilt of viola- 
ting the moral law, it is only because he does not per- 
ceive what it requires. Let us leave the deserts of 
the individual to Him who knoweth the heart; of his 
actions we may speak ; and we should speak in the 
language of reprobation, disgust, and abhorrence. 

544. Even if it could be shown that the slave 
system is expedient, it would not affect the question 
whether it ought to be maintained ; yet it is re-* 
markable that it is show^n to be impolitic as well as 
bad. We are not violating the moral law because it 
fills our pockets. We injure ourselves by our own 
transgressions. The slave system is a costly iniquity, 
both to the nation and to individual men. It is matter 
of great satisfaction that this is known and proved ; 
and yet it is just w^hat, antecedently to inquiry, we 
should have reason to expect. The truth furnishes 
one addition to the many evidences that, even with 
respect to temporal affairs, that w^hich is right is 
commonly politic ; and it ought, therefore, to furnish 
additional inducements to a fearless conformity of 
conduct, private and public, to the moral law. 

545. It is quite evident that our slave system will 
be abolished, and that its supporters will hereafter be 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 201 

regarded with the same public feelings as he who was 
an advocate of the slave trade is now. How is it that 
legislators, or that public men, are so indifferent to 
their fame ] Who would now be willing that biogra- 
phy should record of him, This man defended the 
slave trade'' 1. The time will come when the record, 
This man opposed the abolition of slavery will 
occasion a great deduction from the public estimate 
of w^orth of character. When both these atrocities 
are abolished, and, but for the page of history, for- 
gotten, that page will make a wide difference between 
those who aided the abolition and those who obstructed 
it. The one will be ranked among the Howards that 
are departed, and the other among those who, in ig- 
norance or in guilt, have employed their little day in 
inflicting misery upon mankind. 



CHAPTER XVI. 

WAR. 

546. It is one among the numerous moral phe- 
nomena of the present times, that the inquiry is 
silently, yet not slowly, spreading in the world, Is 
war compatible with the Christian religion ? '' There 
was a period when the question was seldom asked, 
and when war was regarded, almost by every man, 
as inevitable and right. That period has certainly 
passed away ; and not only individuals but public 
societies, and societies in distant nations, are urging 
the question upon the attention of mankind. 

547. It is the business of him whose inquiries have 
conducted him to the conclusion that war is not right, 
to exhibit the evidence upon which the conclusion is 
founded. And in order to do this with impartiality 



202 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



and justice, he should endeavor to divest his mind of 
those illusions by which the subject is habitually 
surrounded. And perhaps he may derive some as- 
sistance in this necessary but not easy dismissal of 
previous opinions, by referring first to some of the 
ordinary causes and consequences of war. The 
reference will enable us also to estimate more satis- 
factorily the moral character of the practice itself ; 
for it is no unimportant auxiliary, in forming such an 
estimate of human actions or opinions, to know how 
they have been produced, and what are their effects. 



CAUSES OF WAR. 

548. Of these causes, one undoubtedly consists in 
the want of inquiry. Want of inquiry has been the 
means by which long-continued practices, whatever 
has been their enormity, have obtained the general 
concurrence of the world, and by which they have 
continued to pollute or degrade it, long after the 
few who inquire into their nature have discovered 
them to be bad. It was by these means that the sl-ive 
trade was so long tolerated by this land of humanity. 
Men did not tliink of its iniquity. We were induced 
to think, and we soon abhorred, and then abolished, it. 

549. Another cause of our complacency with war, 
and therefore another cause of war itself, consists in 
that callousness to human misery which the custom 
induces. They who are shocked at a sin^rle murder 
on the highway, hear with indifference of the slaugh- 
ter of a thousand on the field. The inconsistency 
which has been occasioned in our sentiments of be- 
nevolence, offers a curious moral phenomenon. 

550. Another consists in national irritability. It is 
assumed (not, indeed, upon the most rational grounds) 
that the best way of maintaining the dignity and 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 203 

security of a nation, is, when occasions of disagree- 
ment arise, to assume a high altitude and a fearless 
tone. What is the experience of private life? The 
man who is always on the alert to discover trespasses 
on his honor or his rights, never fails to quarrel with 
his neighbors. 

551. It is with nations as with men. If on every 
offence we fly to arms, we shall of necessity provoke 
exasperation ; and if we exasperate a people as petu- 
lant as ourselves, we may probably continue to butcher 
one another, until we cease only from emptiness of 
exchequers or weariness of slaughter. To threaten 
war, is often, therefore, equivalent to beginning it. 

552. So well, indeed, is national irritability known 
to be an efficient cause of war, that they who, from 
any motive, wish to promote it, endeavor to rouse the 
temper of a people by stimulating their passions, — 
just as the boys in our streets stimulate two dogs to 
fight. These persons talk of the insults, or the en- 
croachments, or the contempts, of the destined enemy, 
with every artifice of aggravation : they tell us of 
foreigners who want to trample upon our rights ; of 
rivals who ridicule our power ; of foes who would 
crush, of tyrants who would enslave, us. They pur- 
sue their object certainly by efficacious means ; when 
men are angry, they are easily persuaded to fight. 

553. Wars are often promoted from considerations 
of interest. There are always many whose incomes 
depend on the continuance of war. A countless host 
of commissaries, and purveyors, and agents, and 
mechanics, commend a war, because it fills their 
pockets. And, unhappily, destruction and slaughter 
weigh but little against a hundred a year. 

554. A support more systematic and powerful, is, 
however, given to war, because it offers to the higher 
ranks of society a profession which unites gentility 
with profit, and which, without the vulgarity of 



204 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 

trade, maintains or enriches them. It is of little con- 
sequence whether the distinction of vulgarity between 
the toils of war and the toils of commerce be fictitious. 
Of this species of reputation, public opinion holds the 
balance, and public opinion is in favor of war. 

555. Boys are, therefore, educated for the army as 
they are educated for the bar; and parents appear to 
have no other idea than that war is part of the busi- 
ness of the world. They would not know what to do 
without the army and navy. To many of these the 
news of peace is a calamity ; and though they do not 
lift their voices in favor of new hostilities for the sake 
of gain, it is, unhappily, certain that they often secretly 
desire it. 

556. Of those causes of war which consist in the 
ambition of princes, or statesmen, or commanders, it 
is not necessary to speak, because no one to whom 
the world will listen is willing to defend them. 

557. Perhaps the most operative cause of the 
popularity of war consists in this that an idea of 
glory is attached to military exploits, and of honor to 
the military profession. The glory of those who 
perish in battle, or who return in triumph to their 
country, is a favorite topic with the historian, the 
biographer, and the poet. 

558. Into the nature and principles of this fame 
and glory we have already inquired, and in the view 
alike of virtue and of intellect they are low and bad. 
They may, therefore, well be despised by philosophy 
and intellect ; and they are condemned silently, 
though emphatically, by Christianity. 

559. Those who desire a reputation that shall 
outlive guilt and fiction, should look well to the basis 
of military fame. If this fame should one day sink 
into oblivion and contempt, it will not be the first 
instance in which wide-spread glory has been found 
to be a glittering bubble, that has burst and b3en for- 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 205 

gotten. Look at the days of chivalry. Of the ten 
thousand duixotes of the middle ages, where is now 
the honor ? Where are now the glories of the tour- 
nament ? Where are now the triumphs of Duns 
Scotus, and where the folios that perpetuated his 
fame? The glories of war have, indeed, outlived these; 
human passions are less mutable than human follies ; 
yet I am willing to avow my conviction that these 
glories are alike destined to sink into forgetfulness. 
Let him who seeks for fame other than that which 
an era of Christian purity will allow, make haste ; for 
every hour that he delays its acquisition will shorten 
its duration. This is certain, if there be certainty 
in the promises of Heaven. 



CONSEQUENCES OF WAR. 

560. To expatiate upon the miseries which war 
brings upon mankind, appears a trite and a needless 
employment. We all know that its evils are great 
and dreadful. Yet these are calamities of which 
the world thinks little. By the slaughter of a war, 
there are thousands who weep in unpitied secrecy, 
whom the world does not see ; and thousands who 
retire in silence to hopeless poverty, for whom it does 
not care. It is not my intention to insist upon these 
calamities, intense, and irreparable, and innumerable, 
as they are ; but those who begin a war without tak- 
ing them into their estimates of its consequences, 
must be regarded as, at most, half-seeing politicians. 

56L If the happiness of the people were, as it 
ought to be, the primary and the ultimate object of 
national measures, I think it would be found that 
even the pecuniary distresses resulting from a war 
make a greater deduction from the quantum of feli- 
city than those evils which the war may have been 
designed to avoid. 



206 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS* 

562. But war does more harm to the morals of 
men than even to their property and persons/' says 
Erasmus : how enormous, then, must its mischiefs be ! 

563. I do not know whether the greater sum of 
moral evil resulting ftom war is suffered by those who 
are immediately engaged in it, or by the public. The 
mischief is most extensive upon the community, but 
upon the profession it is most intense. 

564. Look for illustration to the familiarity with 
the plunder of property and the slaughter of mankind, 
which war induces. Mankind do not generally re- 
sist the influence of habit. If we rob and shoot 

enemies" to-day, we are in some degree prepared to 
rob and shoot those who are not enemies to-morrow. 
This alienation of the mind from the practice, the 
love, and the perception, of Christian purity, of neces- 
sity extends its influence to the other circumstances 
of life, and the whole evil is imputable to war, and 
forms a powerful evidence against it* 

565. Military subjection not only requires the re- 
linquishment of our reasoning faculties, but also of our 
moral agency; it requires us to obey, how criminal 
soever the command, and how criminal soever we 
know it to be. 

566. To what a situation is a rational and respon- 
sible being reduced, who commits actions, good or 
bad, at the word of another ! I can conceive no 
greater degradation. It is the lowest and the final 
abjectness of the moral nature ; such as is not con- 
tended for nor tolerated in any one other circumstance 
of human life. War stands upon this pinnacle of 
depravity alone. 

567. Let the reader imagine to himself any other 
cause or purpose, for which freemen shall be subjected 
to such a condition, and he will then seethe condition 
in its proper light. The influence of habit and the 
gloss of public opinion make situations, that would 
otherwise be loathsome, not only tolerable, but pleas- 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 207 



urable. Take away this influence and this gloss from 
the situation of a soldier, and what should w^e call it 1 

56S. Yet I do not know whether, in its effects on 
the military character, the greatest moral evil of war 
is to be sought. Upon the community its effects are, 
indeed, less apparent, because they who are the sec- 
ondary subjects of the immoral influence are less in- 
tensely affected by it than the immediate agents of its 
diffusion. But it requires no unusual acuteness to 
discover that the prodigious mass of immorality and 
crime which is accumulated by a war, must have a 
powerful effect in demoralizing the public. During 
a war, a whole people become familiarized with the 
utmost excesses of enormity, — with the utmost in- 
tensity of human wickedness, — and they rejoice and 
exult in them. 

569. Those who know what the moral law of God 
is, and who feel an interest in the virtue and the hap- 
piness of the world, will not regard the animosity of 
party, and the restlessness of resentment, which arfe 
produced by a war, as trifling evils. The very es- 
sence and spirit of our religion are abhorrent from 
resentment. Yet, when a war is in contemplation or 
in progress, what are the endeavors of its promoters ? 
Every agent is put in requisition to irritate us into 
malignity. War and Christianity are like the oppo- 
site ends of a balance, of which one is depressed by 
the elevation of the other. 



LAWFULNESS OF WAR. 

570. It may properly be a subject of wonder that 
the arguments which are brought to justify a custom 
such as war, receive so little investigation. It mUwSt 
be a studious ingenuity of mischief which could de- 
vise a practice more calamitous or more horrible ; 



208 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 

and yet it is a practice of which it rarely occurs to us 
to inquire into the necessity, or to ask whether it 
cannot be, or ought not to be, avoided. In one truth, 
however, all will acquiesce, — that the arguments in 
favor of such a practice should be unanswerably 
strong. 

571. It is some satisfaction to be able to give, on a 
question of this nature, the testimony of some great 
minds against the lawfulness of war, opposed, as these 
testimonies are, to the general prejudice and the gen- 
eral practice of the world. 

572. They w^ho defend war," says Erasmus, 
must defend the dispositions which lead to war; and 

these dispositions are absolutely forbidden By the gas- 
peV^ I am persuaded," says Bishop Watson, that 
ivhen the spirit of Christianity shall exert its proper 
influence, war will cease throughout the whole Chris- 
tian world." A living writer of eminence bears this 
remarkable testimony : *^ There is but one community 
of Christians in the world, and that, unhappily, one of 
the smallest, enlightened enough to understand the 
prohibition of war by our divine Master, in its plain, 
literal, and undeniable sense, and conscientious enough 
to obey it, subduing the very instinct of nature to 
obedience." * 

573. Dr. Vicesimus Knox speaks in language 
equally specific : " Morality and religion forbid war, 
in its motives, conduct, and consequences." 

574. Let us now refer to some of those requisi- 
tions of the moral law, which appear peculiarly to 
respect the question of the moral character of war : — 

575. Have peace one with another." By this 
shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye 
have love one to another." Walk with all lowli- 
ness and meekness, forbearing one another in love." 



* Southey's History of Brazil. 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 209 

See that none render evil for evil unto any man.'* 
God hath called us unto peace." 

576. Avenge not yourselves.'' If thine enemy 
hunger, feed him ; if he thirst, give him drink.'' 

Recompense to no man evil for evil." Overcome 
evil w^ith good." 

577. Now, we ask any man who looks over these 
passages, Could any approval or allowance of war 
have been subjoined to these instructions without ob- 
vious and most gross inconsistency? 

578. Yet it is not from general principles alone 
that the law of Christianity respecting war may be 
deduced, Ye have heard that it hath been said. 
An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth ; but / say 
unto you, That ye resist not emV." Ye have heard 
that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor 
and hate thine enemy ; but I say unto you. Love your 
enemies ; bless them that curse you, do good to them 
that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully 
use you and persecute you." 

579. Whatever might have been allowed under the 
Mosaic institution as to retaliation or resentment, 
Christianity says, If ye love them only which love 
you, what reward have ye ? Love your enemies 
Now, what sort of love does a man bear his enemy 
who runs him through with a bayonet ? 

580. We willingly grant that all the precepts from 
the Mount were not designed to be literally obeyed 
in the intercourse of life. But we ask, in our turn, 
What is the meaning of the precept, Resist not 
evil 1 " Does it mean to allow bombardment, devasta- 
tion, slaughter? If not, it does not mean to allow 
war. All the precepts we have cited forbid not spe- 
cifically the act, but the spirit j of war ; and this meth- 
od of prohibition Christ ordinarily employed. He did 
not often condemn the individual doctrines or cus- 
toms of the age, but he condemned the passions by 

18* 



210 POUTICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 

which only vice could exist, and inculcated the truth 
which dismissed every error. And he not only cen- 
sured the passions that are necessary to war, but in- 
culcated the affections which are most opposed to them. 

581. Of his benedictions I think the most em- 
phatical is that pronounced upon the peace-makers. 

Blessed are the peace-makers, for they shall be 
called the children of God." Higher praise, or a 
higher title, no man can receive, 

582. It is with the apostles as with Christ himself. 
The incessant object of their discourses and writings 
is the inculcation of peace, of mildness, of placability. 
We ask the advocate for war whether he discovers in 
the writings of the apostles, or of the evangelists, any 
thing that indicates they approved of war. It is not 
often directly noticed in their writings ; but, when it 
is noticed, it is condemned just in the way we should 
suppose any thing was condemned that was notori- 
ously opposed to the whole system, — just as murder 
is condemned at the present day. Who can find in 
;modern books that murder is formally censured ? I 
'no not believe that the apostles imagined that Chris- 
tianity would ever be charged with allowing war. 
They write as if the idea of such a charge had never 
occurred to them, 

583. In examining the arguments by which war is 
defended, two important considerations should be 
borne in mind — first, that those who urge them are 
not simply defending war, but are also defending 
themselves ; and, secondly, that the defenders of war 
come to the discussion prepossessed in its favor. 
Their decisions, therefore, may be regarded as in some 
degree the decisions of a party in the cause. Now, 
these things cannot be predicated of the advocates of 
peace ; they are opposing the influence of habit ; they 
are contending against the general prejudice, and 
perhaps dismissing their own previous opinions. 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 211 

584 The narrative of the centarion who came to 
Jesus at Capernaum furnishes one of the arguments 
adduced in favor of war. It is said that Christ found 
no fault with the centurion's profession ; and that, far 
from taking the opportunity to censure it, he highly 
commetided the officer, and said of him, I have not 
found so great faith, no, not in Israel." 

535. An obvious weakness in this argument is 
this — -that it is founded, not upon an approval, but 
upon silence. Approbation is, indeed, expressed, but 
it is directed, not to his arms, but to his faith." A 
censure on his profession might, undoubtedly, have 
been pronounced, but it would have been a gratuitous 
censure — a censure that did not naturally arise out 
of the case. 

536. But how happens it that Christ did not notice 
the centurion's religion ? He was surely an idolater. 
And is there not as good reason for maintaining that 
Christ approved idolatry because he did not condemn 
it, as that he approved war because he did not con- 
demn it? Reasoning from analogy, we should con- 
clude that idolatry was likely to have been noticed 
rather than war ; and it is, therefore, singularly unapt 
to bring forward the silence respecting war as an evi- 
dence of its lawfulness. 

587. A similar argument is advanced from the 
case of Cornelius ; of whom it is said that we do not 
find that he quitted his profession, or that it was con- 
sidered inconsistent with his new character. I might 
answer. Neither do we find that he continued in it 
We only know nothing of the matter. Yet, if the 
primary object of Christianity had been the reforma- 
tion of existing institutions, or even the regulation of 
the external conduct, this might have been a reason- 
able ground of argument. But her primary object 
was neither of these. She embraced, indeed, both 
morality and policy, and has reformed, or will reform. 



212 POLITICAL RIGHTS AXD OBLIGATIONS, 



both ; but not so much by fihering the current, as by 
purifying the spring. The argument of silence on 
particular points, is reduced to nothingness when it 
is opposed to the universal tendency and object of reve- 
lation. 

588. It ha^ sometimes been urged that Christ paid 
taxes to the Roman government at a time when it 
was engaged in war. He did : but those who u'ould 
offer this as a proof of his approbation of war, forget 
that it proves too much. The taxes were thrown into 
the exchequer, and a part of the money was, doubtless^ 
appropriated to purposes confessedly iniquitous, — 
probably sometimes to the gratification of the em- 
peror's vices, and certainly to the support of a miser- 
able idolatry. Did Christ sanction these enormities ? 
The payment of tribute was in accordance with our 
Lord's usual system of avoiding to interfere in the 
civil or political institutions of the world. 

589. It has been said, again, that, when soldiers 
came to John the Baptist to inquire of him what they 
should do, he did not direct them to leave the service^ 
but to be content with their wages. This is, at best, 
but a negative evidence ; and if it were other, it would 
not concern us. John belonged to another dispensa- 
tion, to that which allowed an eye for an eye, and a 
tooth for a tooth ; " and our Savior himself said of 
him, The least in the kingdom of heaven is great- 
er than he." 

590. Perhaps the real absence of sound Christian 
arguments in favor of war, is in no circumstance so 
remarkably intimated as in the citations of Milton in 
his Christian Doctrine. On this subject, he refers ta 
thirty-nine passages of Scripture, thirty-eight of which 
are from the Hebrew^ Scriptures ; and what is the in- 
dividual one from the Christian? — ''What king 
goeth to war with another king," &c. ! 

591. In an inquiry whether Christianity allows of 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 213 

war, there is a subject that always appears to me to 
be of peculiar importance — the prophecies of the 
Old Testament respecting the arrival of a period of 
universal peace. That such a period will come, we 
know assuredly, for God has promised it; and that 
Christianity will be the means of introducing this 
period of peace. Whatever the principles of Chris- 
tianity will require hereafter, they require now. It 
becomes, therefore, an absurdity, a simple contradic- 
tion, to maintain that the principles of Christianity 
allow of war, when they, and they only, are to erad- 
icate it. 

59*2. It is not from an alteration of Christianity, 
but from an assimilation of Christians to its nature, 
that we are to hope. It is because we violate the 
principles of our religion, because we are not what 
they require us to be, that wars are continued. If we 
will not be peaceable, let us, then, at least, be honest, 
and acknowledge that we continue to slaughter one 
another, not because Christianity permits it, but be- 
cause we reject her laws. 

593. During a considerable period after the death 
of Christ, it is certain that his followers believed he 
had forbidden war ; and that, in consequence of this 
belief, many of them refused to engage in it, braving 
reproach, imprisonment, or death. It is as easie," 
says a learned writer of the seventeenth century, to 
obscure the sun at midday, as to deny that the prim- 
itive Christians renounced all revenge and war." 

594. It is related in the Acts of Ruinart, that Max- 
imilian was brought before the tribunal to be enrolled 
as a soldier. He replied, I am a Christian, and 
cannot fight." He was told that there was no alter- 
native between bearing arms and being put to death. 
His answer was still the same — I am a Christian ; 
I cannot fight, if I die." He was consigned to the 
executioner. 



214 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



595. Marcelius was a centurion in the legion called 
Trajana. While holding this commission, he became 
a Christian, and immediately resigned. It is not 
lawful," said he, for a Christian to bear arms for any 
earthly consideration." And he was, in conse- 
quence, put to death. 

596. These were not the sentiments, and this was 
not the conduct, of insulated individuals merely. 
Their principles were the principles of the body. 
They were recognized and defended by the Christian 
writers, their contemporaries. 

597. Christians, however, afterwards became sol- 
diers : and when ? — When their general fidelity to 
Christianity became relaxed ; when in other respects 
they violated its principles ; when they had begun to 

dissemble " and to falsify their word ; " when 
Christian casuists" had persuaded them that they 
might ^' sit at meat in the idoVs tempJeJ^ In a word, 
they became soldiers when they had ceased to be 
Christians. 

598. The departure from original faithfulness was, 
however, not suddenly general. Like every other 
corruption, war , obtained by degrees. During the 
first two hundred years, not a Christian soldier is 
upon record. In the third century, when Christianity 
became partially corrupted, Christian soldiers were 
common. The number increased with the increase 
of the general profligacy, until, in the fourth century, 
Christians became soldiers without hesitation, perhaps 
without remorse. 

599. The argument to which the greatest impor- 
tance seems to be attached by the advocates for war, 
and by which thinking men are induced to acquiesce 
in its lawfulness, is this — That a distinction is to 
he made between rules which apply to us as individu-^ 
als, and rules which apply to us as subjects of the 
state ; and that the pacific injunctions of Christ 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 215 



have no reference to our conduct as memhers of the 
political bod I/. 

600. If there be soundness in the doctrines which 
have been delivered at the commencement of the 
Essay upon the Elements of Political Rectitude," 
this argument possesses no force or application. 

601. When such broad distinctions are made be- 
tween the obligations of Christianity on private and 
on public affairs, the proof of the correctness of the 
distinction must be expected of those who make it. 
General rules are laid down by Christianity, of which, 
in some cases, the advocate of war denies the appli- 
cability. He, therefore, is to produce the reason, and 
the authority for the exception ; and that authority 
must be a competent authority — the authority, medi- 
ately or immediately, of God. It is to no purpose to 
tell us of the magnitude of political affairs, — of the 
greatness of the interests which they involve, — of 
''necessity," — or of expediency. If it be said that 
Christianity allows to individuals some kind and 
degree of resistance, and that some resistance is, 
therefore, lawful to states, we do not deny it. But if 
it be said that lawful resistance extends to the slaugh- 
ter of our fellow-Christians, — that it extends to war, 
— we do deny it. The duty of forbearance is ante- 
cedent to all considerations respecting the condition 
of man. 

602. The only truth which appears to be elicited 
by the present argument is, that the difficulty of obey- 
ing the forbearing rules of Christianity is greater in 
the case of nations than in the case of individuals : 
the obligation to obey them is the same in both. Nor 
let any one urge the difficulty of obedience in opposi- 
tion to the duty ; for he who does this has yet to 
learn one of the most awful rules of his religion — 
the rule which requires that we should be obedient 
even unto death." 



216 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 

603, Let it not, however, be supposed that we be- 
lieve the difficulty of forbearance would be great in 
practice as it is great in theory. Our interests are 
commonly promoted by the fulfilment of our duties ; 
and we hope to show that the fulfilment of the duty 
of forbearance forms no exception to the applicability 
of the rule. 



OF THE PROBABLE EFFECTS OF ADHERING TO THE 
MORAL LAW IN RESPECT TO WAR. 

604. We have seen that the duties of the religion 
which God has imparted to mankind, require irresist- 
ance ; and surely it is reasonable to hope, even with- 
out a reference to experience, that he will make our 
irresistance subservient to our interests ; that if, for 
the purpose of conforming to his will, we subject 
ourselves to difficulty or danger, he will protect us in 
our obedience, and direct it to our benefit ; that he 
will not desert those who have no other protection, 
and who have abandoned all other protection because 
they confide in his alone. 

605. This we may reverently liope; yet it is never to 
be forgotten that our apparent interests in the present 
life are sometimes, in the economy of God, made 
subordinate to our interests in futurity. 

606. Yet, even in reference only to the present 
state of existence, I believe we shall find that the tes- 
timony of experience is, that forbearance is most con- 
ducive to our interests. 

607. The reader of American history will recol- 
lect that, in the beginning of the last century, a des- 
ultory and most dreadful warfare was carried on by 
the natives against the European settlers — a warfare 
that was provoked, as such warfare has almost always 
originally been, by the injuries and violence of the 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 217 

Christians. The mode of destruction was secret and 
sudden. The barbarians sometimes lay in wait for 
those who might come within their reach on the 
highway or in the fields, and shot them without warn- 
ing ; and sometimes they attacked the Europeans in 
their houses, scalping, some, and knocking out the 
brains of others." From this horrible warfare the 
inhabitants sought safety by abandoning their homes, 
and retiring to fortified places, or to the neighborhood 
of garrisons ; while those who could not do this pro- 
vided themselves with arms for their defence. But, 
amid this dreadful desolation and universal terror, the 
society of Friends, who were a considerable portion 
of the whole population, were steadfast to their prin- 
ciples. They would neither retire to garrisons nor 
provide themselves with arms. They pursued their 
occupations in the fields or at their homes, without a 
weapon either for annoyance or defence. And what 
was their fate? They lived in security and quiet. 

608. The fate of the Quakers during the rebellion 
in Ireland was nearly similar. It is well known that 
the rebellion was a time not only of open war, but of 
cold-blooded murder ; of the utmost fury of bigotry 
and the utmost exasperation of revenge. Yet the 
duakers were preserved, even to a proverb ; and the 
Moravians, whose principles upon the subject of war 
are similar to those of the Quakers, experienced sim- 
ilar preservation. 

609. It were to no purpose to say, in opposition to 
the evidence of these facts, that they form an excep- 
tion to a general rule. The exception to the rule 
consists in the trial of the experiment of nonresist- 
ance, not in its success. Neither were it to any pur- 
pose to say that the savages of America, or the des- 
peradoes of Ireland, spared the Quakers because they 
were previously known to be an unoffending people. 
We concede all this ; it is the very argument which we 

19 



218 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 

maintain. We say that a uniform^ undeviating regard 
to the peaceable obligations of Christianity becomes 
the safeguard of those who practise it. 

610. A national example of a refusal to bear arms 
has only once been exhibited to the world; but that 
one example has proved, so far as its political circum- 
stances enabled it to prove, all that humanity could 
desire, and all that skepticism could demand, in favor 
of our argument. 

611. It has been the ordinary practice of those 
who have colonized distant countries, to force a foot- 
ing, or to maintain it, with the sword. The adven- 
turers became soldiers, and the colony was a garrison. 
Pennsylvania was, however, colonized by men who 
believed that war was absolutely incompatible with 
•Christianity, and who therefore resolved not to prac- 
tise it. Having determined not to fight, they main- 
tained no soldiers, and possessed no arms. They 
planted themselves in a country which was surround- 
ed by savages, and by savages who knew that they 
were unarmed. Yet these were the people who pos- 
sessed their country in security, while those around 
them were trembling for their existence. Theirs was 
a land of peace, while every other was a land of war. 
The conclusion is inevitable, though it is extraordi- 
nary. They were in no need of arms, because they 
would not use them. 

612. The security and quiet of Pennsylvania was 
not a transient freedom from war, such as might acci- 
dentally happen to any nation. She continued to en- 
joy it for more than seventy years, and subsisted, in 
the midst of six Indian nations, without so much as a 
militia for her defence. 

613. And when was the security of Pennsylvania 
molested, and its peace destroyed ? When the men 
who had directed its counsels, and who would not en- 
gage in war, were outvoted in its legislature ; when 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 219 

they who supposed that there was greater security in 
the sword than in Christianity became the predomi* 
nating body. From that hour the Pennsylvanians have 
been subject to war. 

614. If the evidence which we possess do not satisfy 
us of the expediency of confiding in God, what evi- 
dence do we ask, or what can we receive ? We have 
his promise that he will protect those who abandon 
their seeming interests in the performance of his will ; 
and we have the testimony of those who have confided 
in him that he has protected them. 

615. This is the point from which we wander — - 
We do not believe in the providence of God. 
"When this statement is formally made to us, we think, 
perhaps, that it is not true ; bat our practice is an evi- 
dence of its truth ; for, if we did believe, we should 
also confide in it, and should be willing to stake upon 
it the consequences of our obedience. We can talk 
with sufficient fluency of trusting in Providence;^' 
but of the application of it to our conduct in life, we 
know wonderfully little. Those w^ho are ready to 
sustain the consequences of undeviating obedience, 
are the supporters of whom Christianity stands in 
need. She wants men who are willing to suffer for 
her principles. 

616. The positions, then, which we have endeav- 
ored to establish, are these : — 

I. That those considerations which operate as gen- 
eral causes of war, are commonly such as Christianity 
condemns ; 

II. That the effects of war are, to a very great 
extent, prejudicial to the moral character of a people, 
and to their social and political welfare ; 

III. That the general character of Christianity is 
wholly incongruous with war, and that its general 
duties are incompatible with it; 



220 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 

IV. That some of the express precepts and declara* 
tions of the Christian Scriptures virtually forbid it ; 

V. That the primitive Christians believed that 
Christ had forbidden war, and that some of them suf- 
fered death in affirmance of this belief; 

VL That God has declared in prophecy, that it is 
his will that war should eventually be eradicated from 
the earth ; and that this eradication will be effected 
by Christianity, by the influence of its present prin- 
ciples ; 

VII. That those who have refused to engage in war 
in consequence of their belief of its inconsistency 
with Christianity, have found that Providence has 
protected them. 

617. Now, we think that the establishment of any 
considerable number of these positions is sufficient for 
our argument. The establishment of the whole forms 
a body of evidence to which I am not able to believe 
that an inquirer, to whom the subject was new, would 
be able to withhold his assent. But, since such an 
inquirer could not be found, I would invite the reader 
to lay prepossession aside, to suppose himself to have 
now first heard of battles and slaughter, and dispas- 
sionately to examine whether the evidence in favor of 
peace be not very great, and whether the objections 
to it bear any proportion to the evidence itself. But, 
whatever may be the determination upon this question, 
it is surely reasonable to try the experiment, whether 
security cannot be maintained without slaughter. 
Whatever be the reasons of war, it is certain that it 
produces enormous mischief Even waiving the obli- 
gations of Christianity, we have to choose between 
evils that are certain and evils that are doubtful, 
between the actual endurance of a great calamity and 
the possibility of a less. It certainly cannot be proved 
that peace would not be the best policy ; and since 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 221 

we know that the present system is bad, it were rea- 
sonable and wise to try whether the other is not better. 
Whenever a people shall pursue, steadily and uni- 
formly, the pacific morality of the gospel, and shall 
do this from the pure motive of obedience, there is no 
reason to fear the consequences ; there is no reason 
to fear that they would experience any such evils as 
we now endure, or that they would not find that 
Christianity understands their interests better than 
themselves ; and that the surest and the only rule of 
wisdom, of safety, and of expediency, is to maintain 
her spirit in every circumstance of life. 



I 



222 



CONCLUSION. 



618. In exhibiting a standard of rectitude, such as 
that which it has been attempted to exhibit here, — a 
standard to which not many, in the present day, are 
willing to conform, and of which many would will- 
ingly dispute the authority, — some encouragement 
was needed; and no human encouragement could be 
so efficient as that which consisted in the belief that 
the principles would progressively obtain more and 
more of the concurrence and adoption of mankind. 

619. That there are indications of an advancement 
of the human species towards greater purity in prin- 
ciple and in practice, cannot, I think, be disputed. 
Lamentations over the happiness or excellence of 
other times have generally very little foundation in jus- 
tice or reason. In truth, they cannot be just, because 
they are perpetual. If these lamentations had been 
well founded, the world must have perpetually sunk 
deeper and deeper in wickedness, and retired farther 
and farther towards intellectual night. But the in- 
tellectual sun has been visibly advancing towards its 
noon ; and there never was a period in which greater 
efforts were made to diffuse the influence of religion 
among mankind. Men are to be judged of by their 
fruits; and why should men thus more vigorously 
exert themselves to make others religious, if the 
power of religion did not possess increased influence 
upon their own minds ? 

620. And assuredly there is a perceptible advance 
in the sentiments of good men towards a higher stand- 



CONCLUSION. 



223 



ard of morality. The lawfulness is now frequently 
questioned of actions, of which, a few ages ago^few 
or none doubted the rectitude. Nor is it to be dis- 
puted, that these questions are resulting more and 
more in the conviction that this higher standard is 
proposed and enforced by the moral law of God. 

621. Such considerations, I say, have afforded 
encouragement in the attempt to uphold a standard 
which the majority of mankind have been little accus- 
tomed to contemplate; and now, and in time to come, 
they will suffice to encourage, although that standard 
should be (as by many it undoubtedly will be) re- 
jected and contemned. 

622. I am conscious of inadequacy — what if I 
speak the truth, and say I am conscious of unworthi- 
ness ? — thus to attempt to advocate the law of God. 
Let no man identify the advocate with the cause, nor 
imagine, when he detects the errors and the weak- 
nesses of the one, that the other is, therefore, erro- 
neous or weak. I apologize for myself; especially 
I apoloorize for those instances in which the character 
of the Christian may have been merged in that of the 
exposer of the evils of the world. There is a Christian 
love which is paramount to all, — a love which he only 
is likely sufficiently to maintain, who remembers that 
he who exposes an evil and he who partakes in it will 
soon stand together as suppliants for the mercy of God. 

623. And, finally, having written a book which is 
devoted almost exclusively to disquisitions on morality ^ 
I am solicitous lest the reader should imagine that I 
regard the practice of morality as all which God re- 
quires of man. I believe far other ; and am desirous 
of here expressing the conviction, that, although it 
becomes not us to limit the mercy of God, or curiously 
to define the conditions on which he will extend that 
mercy, yet that the true and safe foundation of our 
hope is in the redemption that is in Christ Jesus." 



QUESTIONS. 



INTRODUCTORY NOTICES. 

What are the causes of deviations from rectitude ? 
Of these, which is the most operative 1 

How do v^^e acquire many of our notions of right and wrong 1 
What deduction may we draw from this ? 

Why add another to the numerous works on moral philosophy ? 
What is the scope of the First Essay ? 
What is included in the term " principles of morality ? 
What is the advice of Tindal, which the author has endeavored 
to follow? 

What is the aim of the Second Essay ? 

Are the illustrations selected on account of their pEiramount im* 
portance ? 

On what principle are they chosen ? 

What may be said of the subjects of the Third Essay 1 

What is the desire of the author as to those conclusions which may 
strike the reader as new, or contradictory of received opinions ? 



ESSAY I. 



PART I. 

PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 



CHAPTER I. 
(Page 15.) 
MORAL OBLIGATION. 

Is it necessary to define moral oblijration ? 
What is alone important on this subject ? 
Why is man under an obligation to obey his Creator ? 
Can you mention other grounds more likely to be especially 
^ the Deity? 



226 



QUESTIONS. 



CHAPTER 11. 
(Page 16.) 

STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG. 

What is the first inquiry of him who seeks a knowledge of his 
duty ? 

What is generally conceded to be the standard of duty ? 
Do men agree as to the best means of ascertaining this 1 
Why is it necessary to seek the best mode ? 



THE WILL OF GOD. 

Do all moral philosophers base their systems expressly upon this 
as the standard 1 

Mention the theory of Dr. Price of Adam Smith of Bish- 
op Butler of Dr. Paley. 

What is the implied origin of duty in all these differing systems ? 
What especial objection applies to them all ? 
Why is this dangerous ? 

In what manner can we learn the divine will ? 



THE COMMUNICATION OF THE WILL OF GOD, 

What is said of the communication of the will of God to mankind ? 

What may be observed of the views of those who have had no 
access to written revelations ? 

What was said of Lord Herbert's effort to disprove the validity 
of revelation ? 

What conclusion is dravm from the acknowledged usefulness of 
this communication ? 

What general characteristic do we observe in the vvnritten expres- 
sion of the divine will ? in the teachings of our Savior ? 

Does this excuse us from seeking out the wisdom of God ? 

Does the duty of obedience depend in any degree upon our being 
able to discover the reason of a divine command ? 

What conclusion^ then^ do we draw as to the ultimate standard of 
rectitude ? 

Is it possible, then^ to exalt any other rule of conduct to an equali- 
ty with this ? 

What follows, inevitably, from the supposition that we may, un- 
der certain circumstances, dispense with the paramount obligation ? 

Is the supremacy of the will of God usually acknowledged and 
acted upon ? 

What reasons do you assign for this ? 

What is required in order to a faithful adherence to divine pre- 
cepts ? 

Which is the most generally approved of those principles which 
have been proposed as standards of rectitude ? 

Under what general term is this usually expressed ? 



aVESTIONS. 



227 



What do you observe respecting this popular doctrine ? 
Under what restrictions is the rule of expediency a good one ? 
What, then, is the point in question ? 

What is the first consideration offered to the reader on this 
subject ? 

Express briefly the second consideration. 

What objection to the doctrine is stated in the third consideration ? 
Can you give an abstract of the fourth consideration ? 
What is stated in the fifth consideration 1 
What is the last objection ? 

Give the author's illustration of the unpractical nature of the 
doctrine of expediency. 



What objection is here anticipated ? 

Give the substance of the first reply. 

What is the second and more direct reply ? 

What is said of the direct communication of the will of God ? 



CHAPTER III. 
(Page 24.) 

SUBORDINATE STANDARDS OF RIGHT AND WRONG 

How is a subordinate authority illustrated 1 
How is this applied 1 



CHAPTER IV. 
(Page 25.) 

IDENTICAL AUTHORITY OF MORAL AND RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS. 

What is said of the identity of moral and religious duty ? 
Does every violation of the divine will involve equal guilt ? 
Why is the reader requested to bestow particular attention upon 
this subject? 



THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 

What is the purpose of a reference to this subject ? 
What is said of our power of judging of these attributes ? 
Can we, then, safely deduce rules of conduct from them ? 
Have any erred on this point ? 

State some of the evils to which. these attempts give rise. 
What would be the natural consequence of persisting in this 
course ? 

What is to be learned from this ? 



228 



QUESTIONS. 



VIRTUE. 

\^^y are differing definitions given of virtue 1 
What is the author's definition ? 

What is remarked concerning performance and intention 1 
Wliat should we endeavor to correct I with regard to our- 
selves ? with regard to others 1 



CHAPTER V. 

(Page 28.) 

THE MORALITY OF THE PATRIARCHAL, MOSAIC^ AND CHRIS- 
TIAN DISPENSATIONS. 

What do we remaj-k as to three distinct periods noticed in the 
sacred writings ? 

What is stated respecting these differing dispensations 1 
Give one example. 

What is the opinion of some as to these differing laws ? 
What is the reply ? 

Why should the moral law of Christianity be considered para- 
mount ? 

Give the remaining reasons. 

Why are these considerations important ? 

What should we especially notice as to these indiscriminate 
references ? 

In what cases are we to consider the laws of the former dispen- 
sations binding upon us 1 

Are these laws, then, to be disregarded ? 



How are some persons said needlessly to perplex themselves ? 
Does the author attempt to solve these difficulties ? 
What does he then remark ? 

From whose mistakes should we draw a salutary caution 1 
"WTiat is the most rational course 7 



MODE OF APPLYING THE PRECEPTS OF SCRIPTURE, &C. 

For what reasons is peculiar circumspection required in the 
application of Scripture precepts? 

Should we apply them in all cases literally ? 

Are we, then, to consider them uniformly as general directions? 

What is stated to be necessary in order to a just appreciation and 
correct application of the precepts of Scripture ? 

How may we limit the application of a precept which is couched 
in absolute language ? 

Quote a precept which is to be taken conditionally. 



QUESTIONS, 



229 



Mention one which is to be understood figuratively. 
"What appears to have been the object of some precepts ? 
Give an example. 

Does the author^ then, attempt to lower the authority of Scrip- 
ture 1 

What are we ever to consider as our ultimate law ] 
In what manner are we to treat precepts which are evidently in- 
tended as absolute rules ? 

By what two modes are moral obligations imposed in Scripture ? 

What should giiide us in the application of general rules ? of 

particular precepts ? 

\Vhat is to be mferred from the ^ide practical applicability of 
many of the Christian precepts ? 

What difficulty attends the promulgation of specific precepts ? 

What is mentioned of the Mussulman code ? 



What very important rule of Scripture is stated to have been ob- 
jected to ? 

And on what ground ? 
WTiere lies the real difficulty ? 
A\Tien is it not applicable ? 
Give an example. 
Another example. 

What says Paley of the rule not ''to do evil that good may 
come ? 

What evil *' is thus prohibited ? 

What is Paley's view of the *' evil " in such cases ? 

\Miere is the error in this reasoning ? 

Contrast the rule of Christianity with that of the philosophy of 
expediency. 

What is observed of such theories as these ? 



BENEVOLENCE; AS PROPOSED IN THE CHRISTIAN SCRIPTURES. 

What is the pervading peculiarity of the Christian system ? 
Could any other general principle be equally powerful and com- 
prehensive ? 

Was this principle kncvNTi to the ancients ? 
How long since it was given to the world ? 

^^^lat is said of the manner m which this benevolence is incul- 
cated in the Christian Scriptures ? 

WTiat deduction does the writer draw from this ? 

\Vhat is said of offences against the relative duties ? 

How is the universal applicabilit}' of the law of love illustrated ? 

How is that integrity which is founded upon love particularly 
recommended ? 

Are the obligations of Christian benevolence merelv prohibitory ? 
What then? 

20 



230 



QUESTIONS. 



What is said of the negative virtues ? 

Describe a legislator who conforms to the Christian standard. 



CHAPTER Vh 

(Page 36.) 

THE IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATION OF THE WILL OF GOD. 

What distinction must we be careful to make in investigating thie 
serious subject ? 

What is the effect of a want of this distinction ? 
What preparatory subject is now to be examined ? 



SECTION L 

CONSCIENCE, ITS NATURE AND AUTHORITY. 

Give a definition or explanation of the term conscience.'^ 
What does the possession of such notions or belief imply ? 
To what does this sense of obligation usually refer ? 
Will this sense of duty be found connected in all minds with the 
same subjects ? 
Why is this 1 

What ought we to understand, when a person says, "My con- 
science dictates to me that I ought to perform such an action 1 

Are all our moral opinions derived from education or reasoning ? 

How is the conscience more fully enlightened 1 

WTiat appears to be the benefit, in this respect, of a careful study 
of the Scriptures ? 

Does Scripture, then^ decide every question respecting: human 
dutv ? 

I^rom what higher source is another portion of our judgments 
respecting moral affairs derived ? 

Does this necessarily correct all errors of judgment^ on all 
subjects ? 

Is this divinely-derived " light equally powerful and perfect in 
all individuals ? 

What is said of the authority of conscience ? 

May a man, then, ever violate his conscience ? 

Give the concurrent opinions of Furneaux and Sir William Tem- 
ple on this point. 

For what, then, may a man, who acts in a particular case con- 
scientiously, still be justly held criminal ? 

How is it that men often judge amiss ? 

Might not most people obtain more accurate perceptions of the 
moral law ? 

Is not this wilful ignorance justly punishable 1 



QUESTIONS. 



231 



^V^lat IS sometimes sent as a dreadful retribution for great degrees 
of wickedness 1 



REVIEW OF OPINIONS RESPECTING A MORAL SENSE. 

What is the purpose of this review 1 

Can you srive an abstract of Blair's opinions 1 of Shaftesbu- 
ry's ? of Dr. Reid's ? 

What passage of Scripture does this resemble ? 

What says Beattie on this subject ? Voltaire ? Dr. Shep- 
herd ? Locke ? Adam Smith ? 

Is there any thing of weight on this point to be found in faley's 
Philosophy ? 

Where, then, do we find his opinion as to the moral sense ? 

Can you give the author's quotation from Milton's Paradise Lost 
on this subject ? that from his Christian Doctrine ? 

What says Sir Matthew Hale 1 Marcus Antoninus ? — 

Aristotle ? 

What other ancient ^vriters have touched on this point ? 
What general observation applies to these various opinions 1 
What is the great point for our attention on this subject 1 
VvHiat appears to be the character of its attributes ? 



IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATION OF THE WILL OF GOD. 

I. What proposition is demonstrated in the first paragraph ? 
Where do barbarous nations obtain a knowledge of the will of the 

Supreme Being ? 
What must be their condition without this communication ? 

II. Does this argument apply only to those which are called 
Heathen nations ? 

How does it apply to the inhabitants of countries professedly 
Christian 1 

WTiat is the object or design of these considerations ? 

Does the writer mean to imply that the Divine Being has impart- 
ed his light in the same degree, in all ages of the world, and to each 
individual ? 

Does this affect the nature of the gift or illumination ? 

Where do we find the first mention of a direct communication 
from God to the human race ? 

What other passage to this effect can you cite from the Old Tes- 
tament ? 

Give some examples of similar expressions from the New Testa- 
ment ? 

As to the moral power of this divine agent, can you cite any 
testimony from the Christian Scriptures ? 

What objection can be urged against this evidence ? 
What is the author's reply ? 



232 



QUESTIONS. 



What is the ground of the objections urged against the reality of 

an immediate communication of the will of God ? 

Give an abstract of the author's reply to these objectors. 

What is observed with regard to the degree of moral knowledge 
possessed by communities and by individuals ? 

Is there no uniformity of human opinion on moral duty 1 

Do the objections here noticed impeach the existence of a direct 
and universal communication of the divine will ? 

What is the especial usefulness of the discussion of this point ? 

Is the law written in the heart adapted to the formation of exter- 
nal rules of conduct ? 

WherC; then^ lies its high and solemn importance ? 



PART 11. 

ON THE SUBORDINATE MEANS OF DISCOVERING THE 
DIVINE WILL. 



CHAPTER 1. 
(Page 51.) 
THE LAW OF THE LAND. 

Where do we find a high sanction for the authority of civil gov- 
ernment ? 

Give citations to that effect. 

How, then, may a multitude of questions respecting human duty 
be at once decided ? 

Are the precepts of revelation the only ground of the obligations 
of civil obedience 1 

What other considerations are mentioned as being of themselves 
of great weight ? 

What is remarked as to bad governments ? 

What is the character of the motives to civil obedience which are 
proposed in the Christian Scriptures ? 
Quote passages on this subject. 

What will be the peculiar excellence of obedience on such prin- 
ciples ? 

Is it necessary to the authority of a law^ that it should be enforced 
by considerations of morality ? 

There is, then, a moral obligation resulting from the law of the 
land? 

How ought this question to be set at rest ? 

Where do* you find a limit to this duty of civil obedience ? 

What examples have we on this point ? 



QUESTIONS. 



233 



Give an account of the course taken by the apostles. 

Is it, then, a light thing to disobey the civil magistrate 1 

What should be the Christian's course in such cases ? 

Are we justified in making /om6Z€ resistance to the execution of 
laws which our conscience forbids us to obey ? 

Does the authority of the law extend so far that a mere permis- 
sion to perform a given act makes that act a right one ? 

Give an illustration of this. 

What would be the ground of objection in this case ? 
What has been advanced as to the propriety of availing ourselves 
of iniquitous laws 1 

Can this maxim be sustained ? 

Give an historical case in point. 

How was this ultimately decided ? 

On what assumption is this error founded ? 

How can a part of the errors and deficiencies of the laws be 
remedied ? 



CHAPTER n. 
(Page 55.) 
I'HE LAW OF NATURE. 

How is the term " law of nature " here employed 1 

What is the ground or authority of natural rights ? 

Give an explanation of this. 

Is the authority of this law supreme ? 

Give some citations from Scripture in support of this. 

Which of the natural instincts is here shown to be subordinate ? 

Give an instance from Scripture of the required subjection of 
another important law of nature. 

Why do these directions seem to have been given ? 

Do we find any thing to the same effect in another class of 
Writings ? 

Give the example from Godwin. 

What is the popular tone on this subject ? 

What instinct, or impulse, is especially considered as of supreme 
authority 1 

Can this be correct ? 
Why do you object to it ? 

Would our being placed in a state of nature," or in a situation 
which was beyond the reach of human laws, alter the case in this 
respect ? 

Would these circumstances alter our moral responsibility ? 

How do you apply this rule to Certain cases which may arise even 
in a state of society ? 

Have, then, the natural rights of man no desrree of authority ? 

What would be the result if we construed tliese laws more im- 
particdly ? 

What sometimes cause us to forget that we are all brethren 7 

20* 



334 



QUESTIONS. 



Would it^ theii; be advisable to endeavor to do away with all 
these distinctions ? 

Where; then^ lies the error ? 

Enumerate some of the common errors on this point. 

What is urged as the highest motive to a kind and impartial con- 
struction of the natural rights of others ? 

Are the rights of nature sufficiently regarded in the political insti- 
tutions of the day ? 



What is remarked in the conclusion of this chapter ? 
Where is the danger arising from this indistinctness 1 



CHAPTER 111 
(Page 60.) 
UTILITY. 

Is practical utility recommended in the expression of the divine 
will? 

What does that will require ? 

How do you derive the obligations of utility from considerations 
connected with our reason ? 

Give an instance of the obligations resulting from utility. 

Are thesO; then^ questions of morals ? 

How do these obligations apply to political affairs ? 

Where do you find the limit of the obligations of utility ? 

What is indicated by the great prominence of the future in the 
teachings of Scripture ? 

What is necessary in order to a proper estimate of utility as it 
respects mankind ? 

What would be the maxim for this world, if there were no here- 
after? 

Would it be rational to adopt this rule now ? 
What iS; after all, the general experience ? 

Can cases ever arise when the divine will requires the sacrifice 
of our present interests ? 
Are these cases usual ? 

Would this affect in any degree the truth of the principle ? 
Why not ? 

What species of utility is frequently disregarded in the conduct 
of life ? 

Give instances. 

Do these persons rightly estimate expediency ? 

What is remarked as to the conduct of political affairs ? 

Can this be justified ? 

What; then, must we think of the character of received opinions^ 
on this subject ? 



QUESTIONS. 



235 



CHAPTER IV. 

(Page 63.) 

THE LAW OF NATIONS. — THE LAW OF HONOR. 

SECTION 1. 
THE LAW OF NATIONS. 

Give the different grounds for the authority of the law of nations. 
What are the principal considerations which present themselves 
on this subject ? 

What does the author remark upon the first of these consider- 
ations ? 

What should be the course of any state which did not choose to 
conform to this law ? 

What is mentioned as an inducement to a strict compliance with 
its requisitions ? 

Can we deduce the present maxims of international law from the 
moral law ? 
Why not ? 

Is the second consideration properly regarded in the conduct of 
civilized nations ? 
State an instance. 

What is mentioned as affording a parallel case ? 

Upon what maxim do civilized states appear to have acted ? 

What has been the consequence of this ? 

Who is said to have acted upon sounder principles 1 

What course did he pursue ? 

Has the result been favorable ? 

What is observed respecting the third consideration ? 
How only are we to assert our acknowledged rights ? 
In what cases are we bound to refrain ? 
How are we to apply this consideration to public affairs ? 



SECTION II. 

THE LAW OF HONOR. 

What do you understand by the law of honor ? 
Has this any authority beyond the agreement of the parties con- 
cerned ? 

What is noticed with respect to Paley's view of the law of honor ? 

What is stated to be the proper rule with regard to what are 
called debts of honor ? 

Is it right to pay these to the exclusion of lawful debts ? 

What is the probable motive to the prompt payment of gaming 
debts ? 

What IS the authority of those maxims which require conduct for- 
bidden by the moral law ? 
Give an instance. 



236 



QUESTIONS. 



What is the general character of the law of honor ? 

Has it any decided advantages ? 
What are its practical effects ? 
How should wC; then^ view it ? 



ESSAY II. 

PEIVATE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



CHAPTER I. 
(Page 69.) 
RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS. 

What is true devotion ? 
What is the probable error of some persons ? 
Why do they thus deceive themselves ? 
What is remarked of some preachers and some hearers ? 
May similar effects be produced by other causes ? 
Should such warmth of feeling be relied on ? 
How shall we distinguish it from true piety ? 
What is required in order to a real prostration of soul in the 
divine presence ? 

Is piety necessary to a consistent observance of the moral law 1 
What does the author recommend ? 



SABBATICAL INSTITUTIONS. 

What is cited as sufficient authority for a set day for the exercise 
of public worship ? 

Why should we thus devote a portion of our time 1 
Are we bound to observe the Hebrew Sabbath ? 
What was the practice of the early Christians ? 
What is our duty on this point ? 

How shall we judge of the propriety of our employment of this 
day? 

What is remarked as to physicians ? 
Are excursions of pleasure allowable ? 
Is all relaxation forbidden ? 
How shall we best determine the question ? 
What say you of travelling on this day ? 
What is the value of the ordinary excuse for this ? 
What evil is to be guarded against, besides the injury to the 
individual himself by the disregard of this class of obligations 1 



QUESTIONS. 



237 



What is the writer's caution to young persons in their intercourse 
with those who profess skepticism ? 

What is the fact with regard to the unbelief of these people ? 

Are they usually profound reasoners l 

What did Dr. Priestley say of the Fren/)h philosophers ? 

What is supposed to be the reason why infidels are so desirous to 
make known their opinions ? 

Why are they objects of curiosity ? 

Are these the worst motives to the adoption of infidel opinions ? 
What ought to be the course of young persons towards those who 
attempt thus to poison their minds ? 

— 

CHAPTER II. 
(Page 74.) 
PROPERTY. 

What is said as to the origin of property ? 
What is the usual foundation of the right to property ? 
What is one of the great offices of civil government 1 
Is this an invariable rule ? 

How shall the evils resulting from the laws be prevented ? 
Why must a man pay his debts ? 
What is the conduct of an honest bankrupt ? 
Why is he bound to pay ? 
Is the interest also due to the creditor ? 
What here is the Christian duty of the creditor ? 
How ought a man who is unable to pay his debts, to conduct 
himself? 

Is the evil of insolvency a great one ? 
What is said of frauds practised in this way ? 
How ought such conduct to be viewed ? 

What would be the advantages of a reformed public opinion on 
this subject 1 

Would insolvency probably be rendered less frequent ? 
What is remarked as to the ruJes of the Society of Friends on 
this point ? 

Relate the case of the man cited as an example by the author : 
of the honest female. 

What is the right to bequeath property ? 

How are wills sometimes made ? 

How alone can this be remedied 1 

What ought to be the standard of the heir's conduct ? 
I Give an example where the exercise of this kind of virtue would 
I become necessary. 

Another. 

] What is mentioned as an error with regard to charitable bequests 1 
Are these benefactions to be regarded as generous ? 



238 



QUESTIONS. 



my not ? 

What would be the true course ? 

What is said of the moral obligation of minors v»-ith regard to 
their debts ? 

Does the tradesman who cajoles a young person into improper 
expenses deserve to be paid ? 

Ought the young person to profit by his punishment ? 

What is said with regard to distraints for debt ? 

Would it be right in all cases for the landlord to go to the full 
extent of the law 1 

Is it right to resist until compelled by the law to act justly ? 

Is this a common fault ? 

What is the true character of such persons ? 

Does this apply to suits for damages ? 

What kind of principle do these persons lack ? 

What is a common mode of extorting money 1 

Can it be said that such sums are voluntarily paid ? 

Describe the occurrence at Sheridan's funeral. 

"SMiat would be the duty of a person who came into possession 
of slaves ? 

How should we treat those who feel slaveholding to be wrong, 
yet have not quite resolution enough to sacrifice interest ? 
Would selling the slaves amend the matter ? 
What instance is given of virtuous conduct in such a case 1 
Is it right to accept the gifts of those who do not pav their debts ? 
Why ? 

Can privateering be tolerated by moral persons ? 

What further consideration is advanced by the writer ? 

How may a man act dishonestly, with no intention to defraud ? 

What is a common case with regard to settlements ? 

Why is this ^Tong ? 

Should the finder of an advertised article demand the promised 
reward ? 
Why not ? 

Can we say the reward is ofi'ered voluntarily ? 
How might a needy person accept any thing in such a case ? 
'WTiat is said respecting the attention ordinarily paid to this class 
of moral obligations ? 
How are we apt to err ? 



CHAPTER HI. 

(Page 84.) 
INEQ,UALITY OF PROPERTY. 

What is the real evil with regard to the inequality of property so 
much complained of? 

How may the evil be diminished ? 



aUESTICVS. 



239 



What considerations are offered for the diminution of property 
after it exceeds what we really need ? 

What is said as to the ordinary effects of wealth ? 
What authorities are cited in support of this view ? 
What was Voltaire's remark ? 

Where do we find the greatest proportion of virtue ? 
What is the language of Scripture on this subject ? 
What is our duty ? 
What is the usual plea ? 
Is this strictly correct ? 
What would be a good rule ? 

How can we limit the amount of property which a man ought not 
to exceed ? 

What should he consider ? 

How may he determine the right limit ? 

What effect would a strict regard to these considerations have 
with reference to the inequality of property ? 
Can any other reason be advanced ? 
How ought a Christian to view this '! 



CHAPTER IV. 
(Page 87.) 
LITIGATION. — ARBITRATION. 

What ought to be the inquiry of an individual who is in dispute 
with another as to property or rights ? 
How many modes of adjustment are there ? 
Which is the best ? 
What is said of the others ? 

What is quoted for our instruction on this point ? 

Are we, then, forbidden to go to law at all? 

What appears to have been the meaning of the apostle '? 

What effect would the complete influence of Christianity have 
upon this practice ? 

When may a Christian properly appeal to the law ? 

What are mentioned as evils of litigation which are avoided by 
arbitration ? 

Is arbitration usually a sure mode of obtaining justice ? 

' 

CHAPTER V. 
(Page 89.) 

THE MORALITY OF LEGAL PRACTICE. 

What is the state of public opinion with respect to legal practice 
in general ? 



MO 



QUESTIONS. 



What seems to be the original cause of this t 
What is the first kind of fault ? 
What the second ? 

How does this affect the practice of the legal profession 1 

What, then, is necessary to an efficient reform in legal practice t 

Do lawyers add to the evil effects of these defects in law ? 

In what manner ? 

What, then, must be the result ? 

Is this now the case ? 

Can a lawyer morally enforce the application of legal rules, when 
such rules contravene the claims of equity ? 
By what must he be limited 1 
Give Paley's doctrine. 
How does our author refute this ? 
is it true that no credit is given to legal pleadings ? 
What would follow if this were really the case 1 
What is the real practice ? 

How do you prove that such advocates intend to deceive 1 

What, then, is the plain deduction ? 

How does Gisborne defend the common legal practice ? 

What do you reply ? 

What says Dr. Johnson ? 

Why is such reasoning satisfactory 7 

State the last argument. 

How do you answer this ? 

Give a view of some of the practical results of the ordinary legal 

practice : -in civil suits. 

What is the true view of such conduct ? 
How are criminal suits affected by it ? 

What is the true nature of the action which thus defrauds public 
justice 1 

What is the remark with respect to this class of strictures ? 

What ought we to think of a lawyer who undertakes all causes 
indiscriminately ? 

What course is recommended to the lawyer who would avoid 
these great errors ? 

Is there any thing necessarily immoral in the profession of law ? 

How may he who is firm in integrity pursue the profession 
blamelessly ? 

What should he avoid ? 

What did Murray the grammarian state respecting his own legal 
practice ? 

What serious consideration remains ? 
To what danger is the lawyer exposed 1 
Can these customs, then, be justified ? 
Why ? 

Is it certain that honesty might not be the best policy, in this as 
in other cases, even in an interested point of view ? 

How would a reputation for unbending integrity operate upon 
juries ? upon clients ? 



QUESTIONS. 



241 



What general good might result from this ? 

What, then, do you remark as to the responsibility incurred ? 

• 

CHAPTER VI. 
(Page 95.) 
'promises. — LIES. 

What is a promise 1 

What do you say of the obligation of a promise ? 

Whence is the obligation derived 1 

How do people sometimes deceive ? 

What is the sense in v^'hich a promise is binding 1 

Is an implied promise binding ? 

Give examples. 

What is said of the obligation of parole ? 

What of those promises where performance is unlawful 1 

What instance is cited ? 

What of conditional promises ? 

In what spirit ought we to form our ordinary engagements ? 
What is to be considered with regard to extorted promises ? 
What is an extorted promise ? 
What is usually considered such ? 

What must be our course if we have been weaK enough to prom- 
ise what is unlavdul to perform ? 
Recite the anecdote of John Fletcher and his nephew. 



LIES. 

What is the ground of the guilt of lying ? 

What is a lie ? 

What is Milton's idea of it ? 

What says Paley's Philosophy ? 

Would it be possible for a man under temptation to consider the 
" inconveniency " of lying ? 

What is said of falsehoods told to the insane for their advantage ? 
What of falsehoods to the sick ? 

What is the nature of hyperboles and other figures, and of fictions 
generally ? 

Are fictions never useful ? 

What caution is given respecting the use of them ? 
What is the writer s view of the falsehoods sometimes prescribed 
by a factitious politeness ? 
Are these defensible ? 

Can we justify the practice called " denying " one's self to visitors 1 
What will probably be the disadvantage incurred by the domestic 
mho is required by his employer to do this ? 

21 



3«2 



QUESTIONS. 



CHAPTER VII. 
(Page 101.) 
OATHS, 

What is an oath ? 

What is the objection to this form of attestation ? 

What do we, in fact, assume in taking an oath 7 

What ought to be our endeavor in examining points of questiona- 
ble morality 1 

What should be our inquiry 1 

Recite our Savior's instructions on this point. 

Does the enumeration in this injunction limit its prohibition to 
those particular objects 1 

Why not ? 

How is it that " whatsoever is more than this cometh of evil 1 
What says Grotius on the subject of oaths ? 
Tertullian ? 
Chrysostom ? 
Gregory of Nysse ? 

What is gathered from this concurrent testimony of the early 
converts ? 



EFFICACY OF OATHS. 

Are men supposed to be naturally inclined to falsehood ? 

What hcLs the power of overcoming inducements to falsehood ? 

What is observed as to the first of these 1 

What will be the efficacy of oaths with regard to good men ? 

What, with respect to bad men ? 

What, with men of ambiguous character ? 

Does experience show that oaths are particularly sacred with 
«uch men ? 

What is the power of the second inducement ? 

Are religious sanctions, then, less operative than public opinion 7 

How are religious sanctions affected by public opinion ? 

What is observed of legal penalties ? 

What is the effect of oaths as religious sanctions solely ? 

What description of oaths is cited ? 

What is the occasion of the different view usually taken of the 
violation of the oaths of witnesses ? 

Does not this seem to prove that the oath, as such, has no bind- 
ing force ? 

Wliat is stated respecting custom-house oaths ? 
What is the inference ? 

What is said as to the application of public opinion to simple 
affirmation 1 

Is it to be supposed that the abolition of oaths would increase 
the public reprobation of falsehood ? 



dPESTIONS. 



243 



Recapitulate the chain of reasoning as to the inefficacy of oaths 
as securities for veracity. 
What is the conclusion ? 



EFFECTS OF OATHS* 

What does the author observe with respect to the Christian re- 
ligion ? 

Ought a Christian to do any thing which virtually allows that his 
word is not sufficient to bind him ? 

What is reported to have been the view of a pagan sage ? 
How do oaths affect the moral character ? 
How do they affect the public estimation of falsehood ? 
What Was Godwin's opinion ? 

To what purpose are the investigations of this chapter directed 1 

Wliat is required of those who disapprove of oaths ? 

Do such persons generally perform their duty on this subject ? 



CHAPTER Vm. 

(Page 108.) 
IMMORAL AGENCY. 

To what is much moral evil to be attributed 1 
How are the evil wishes of the bad encouraged 1 
How does the lack of good example operate on persons of feeble 
virtue ? 

How do you define immoral agency as distinguished from the 
direct performance of immoral actions 1 
How does this affect society ? 

What, then, becomes the duty of a conscientious man ? 
Give an instance of manifest inconsistency ? 
What is related of John Woolman ? 

What is said of our conduct with regard to pernicious books, and 
those who aid in circulating them 1 

What of the g^iilt of those concerned ? 
What is our duty with regard to this ? 

Would the fact that purity of conduct lessened our gains, be a 
Valid excuse for participating in the evil ? 
What might be said by some persons ? 
What is the reply to this ? 

What must we think of those who encourage intoxication for the 
sake of gain ? 

Give the instance cited. 

Does the innkeeper's guilt arise from the fact that life was sacri- 
ficed in this case 1 

Is it our duty to prosecute when we know the penalty to be un* 
warrantably severe ? 



244 



QUESTIONS. 



Since we cannot always be certain that we are free from all par- 
ticipation in evil, what is the limit of our duty ? 



■4- 



CHAPTER IX. 
(Page 112.) 

INFLUENCE OF INDIVIDUALS UPON PUBLIC OPINION. 

What is the fact with regard to the influence of public opinion 
upon the practice of virtue 1 

What, then, becomes highly important ? 
What is the duty of individuals ? 

Does the estimate which society forms of the merit or guilt of 
actions conform, in all cases, to the standard of Christianity 1 
What reasons do you assign for this ? 

How do individuals manage to quiet conscience, as to these 
things ? 

What is the effect of the misdirection of public opinion ? 
How are individuals concerned in this evil ? 
What is the effect of softening the names which we give to bad 
things ? 

How does the author illustrate the real nature of duelling ? 

What appears to be the duty of individuals with regard to this 
horrible practice ? 

How do we, in effect, offer encouragements to duelling ? 

Since the credit of duelling depends entirely on public opinion, 
how ought we to do our part towards discountenancing it ? 

What is observed concerning war ? 

How are men's eyes blinded as to its true nature and conse- 
quences ? 

What is, nevertheless, the general conclusion ? 

Is public opinion supposed to be favorable to war itself, or to some 
of its concomitants ? 

What is the evil consequence of our manner of talking of the 
profession of arms, and of the conduct of those who have signalized 
themselves in war ? 

Does the present state of public opinion promote all wars, without 
reference to the causes for which they are undertaken ? 

What is said of the writers of some books ? 

What is the distinguishing characteristic of the military virtues? 
Is this the case with the real virtues ? 

What other striking difference do you observe between them ? 
What is the true state of the case ? 

What does the author think of the popular estimate of the crime 
of unchastity in man, as compared with the same in woman ? 
What is the effect of this departure from the moral law ? 
What, then, is evidently wrong ? 



QUESTIONS. 



245 



Is there any benefit resulting from the severity of public censure 
upon women who have transgressed in this particular ? 

Is not this an argument for exercising a corresponding severity 
towards the other sex ? 

What is the popular language in such cases ? 

What is the effect of such expressions ? 

What is said of the power of character as a restraint ? 

What is, then, the natural effect of the extreme severity of popular 
judgment upon women ? 

What would be the effect of a relaxation of this severity ? 

What is the author's view of the degree of public reprobation 
which ought to attach to him who has been guilty of but one great 
offence against morality 1 

What should be our guide 1 

What is the Christian rule ? 

Of what should we be careful in estimating the characters of men 
of talent and genius ? 

Ought we to excuse their faults more than those of less gifted 
persons ? 

Is the usual judgment of posterity, with regard to great men, 
usually more correct than that of their contemporaries 1 

To what degree is the press responsible for the misdirection of 
public opinion ? 

The periodical press in particular ? 



CHAPTER X. 
(Page 120.) 
INTELLECTUAL EDUCATION. 

In what does knowledge consist ? 

What should be the first object of education 1 

Give a definition of education. 

What is the inference ? 

What is the author's view of the relative importance of the study 
of the ancient languages ? 

Would he, then, exclude them as useless ? 
State his views in general terms. 

Would the languages probably be essentially useful to those who 
are intended for active business 1 

Would this objection exclude all polite literature ? 
Why not ? 

What is the peculiar value of the study of languages, as it respects 
the exercise of the memory and attention, and the improvement of 
the reasoning powers ? 

What consideration should influence our selection of different 
branches of study ? 

What do you say of the importance of society as compared with 
literature ? 

21* 



246 



QUESTIONS. 



What of the study of natural philosophy? of that of poli- 
tics? 

Is the science of politics a peculiarly abstruse one ? 
Where, then, lies the difficulty ? 
What kind of general education is most desirable ? 
Hels there been any essential improvement in modes of educa- 
tion ? 

What rule does the writer propose as to the mode of imparting 
instruction ? 

What is stated as to a natural desire of knowledge ? 



Should the education of females be regulated by different princi- 
ples from that of men ? 
Why not ? 

What is said of the general manner of treating women in society ? 
Is this really respectful ? 

What are the prominent errors observable in the education of 
women ? 

What evils flow from these errors ? 

What would be some of the benefits of a contrary system ? 



CHAPTER XI. 
(Page 127.) 
MORAL EDUCATION. 

What two things are required for a good moral education ? 
How is moral education, to a great extent, acquired ? 
Will such influences be usually good ? 

What should, then, be the endeavor of those who have the charge 
of the young ? 
Can we prevent entirely the influence of bad example ? 
How must we attempt to counteract it ? 
What must ever be the foundation of moral excellence ? 
Is moral culture always direct? 

How should we instruct the advancing mind in the rules of duty ? 
What must be avoided if we would succeed in establishing pure 
moral principles ? 

Must we, then, seclude the pupil ? 
What is said of the influence of books? 
How shall the young discriminate ? 

How shall we form a taste for reading which will recoil from 
what is contemptible or vicious ? 

What influence does intellectual education exercise over moral 
culture ? 

Is it best to try to know every thing"? 



QUESTIONS. 



247 



As to OTir adherence to what is right^ where lies the deficiency, 
generally ? 

Do we often sin through ignorance ? 

What, then, is the main object of moral education? 

How shall we begin ? 

Cite the opinion of Hartley ; of Carpenter. 

Is not this a mean-spirited virtue ? 

How is it that we decide upon the quality of our actions ? 
What, then, shall the parent do ? 

What benefit arises from this habitual reference to the man 
within the breast ? 

What advantage is found in this species of knowledge ? 

What objection does the writer advance to the ordinary modes of 
moral and religious instruction ? 

What, then, must be the solicitous care of the parent ? 

What important advantages flow from an habitual reference to the 
dictates of enlightened conscience ? 

What may the parent hope from this habit when early established ? 



CHAPTER XH. 

(Page 133.) 
EDUCATION OF THE PEOPLE. 

What seems to be the present question as to the education of the 
people ? 

Does it seem that any special limit is needed ? 

What objections have been urged against extended education ? 

Is there any weight in these objections ? 

Why ? 

What are the advantages of a more liberal system ? 

Will the education of a people be productive of political good ? 

How do you support this proposition 1 

What has usually been the error of those who have attempted 
political reform ? 

What will be likely to operate best ? 
Why? 

What reply have you for those who fancy that extended informa- 
tion will be apt to render the people dissatisfied with their institu- 
tions ? 

How shall we select the subjects of study for the poor ? 
Will he be obliged to omit what is most valuable ? 
What essential good may the poor hope to acquire by intellectual 
cultivation ? 



248 



QUESTIONS. 



CHAPTER XIII. 
(Page 136.) 
AMUSEMENTS. 

What has been the general opinion of the wise and good as to 
public amu&ements 1 

Is this probably correct ? 

To what, then, are we to ascribe the popularity of such things ? 

To what must we trace their generally objectionable character ? 

What rank does amusement hold among the concerns of life ? 

By what rules may we safely judge of the lawfulness of a given 
amusement ? 

What must the question be respecting all ? 

How ought we to examine the lawfulness of the drama? 

What is said of the only defence which can be offered for encour- 
aging an amusement of this nature ? 

Is this the chief evil ? 

Which side lies the balance 1 

Do you apply the same test to other popular amusements ? 
What is frequently the character of the pleasure enjoyed on these 
occasions ? 

What does a resort to certain amusements imply ? 

What do you say of field sports 1 

What appears to be their general influence ? 

Do we usually look to the professed sportsman for the exemplifi- 
cation of the higher order of virtues ? 

What do you think as to the expenditure of time and money on 
such recreations ? 

Of the cruelty inflicted upon animals ? 

What is said of ^'the turf" ? 

Of other and kindred sports ? 

Are mere spectators free from the guilt of such scenes ? 
What will posterity probably think of our taste for these gross 
amusements ? 



What is the general conclusion as to public amusements ? 

Shall we not, then, give up all enjoyment ? 

What is the ordinary mode of estimating pleasure ? 

Where shall we find it more surely 1 

Why do not more seek it there ? 



CHAPTER XIV. 
(Page 140.) 
DUELLING. 

What must be the aim of the advocate of duelling ? 
What was Dr. Johnson's excuse for it ? 



QUESTIONS. 



249 



What is the value of this reasoning 1 

What is the motive of the false gloss usually thrown over foolish 
or vicious things ? 

How does this apply to duelling ? 

What is the real reason of duelling ? 

What does Mr. GifFord remark as to Pitt's duel ? 

WTiat, then, seem to be the motives for this crime ? 

What is the difference between false and true greatness of mind ? 

WTiat would be the course of the truly great man on receiving a 
challenge ? 

What consideration is mentioned as worthy of particular atten- 
tion ? 

What must we infer will be the Almighty's estimate of the guilt of 
duelling ? 



CHAPTER XV. 
(Page 142.) 
SUICIDE. 

Why IS it peculiarly difficult to write or to legislate efficiently 
upon this subject ? 

Will philosophy probably avail ? 
Why not ? 

To what, then, alone, can we look as a remedy 1 
What effect will this have ? 

Will the suicide find countenance in natural religion ? 
Why not ? 

Why is this a particularly aggravated crime ? 
Do all suicides probably flee from excess of misery ? 
What, then, are their motives ] 
How does this compare with dying for glory ? 
Which will be most likely to attain his object, the lover or the 
hero ? 



What should be the object in legislating on this subject? 
What benefit would probably be attained by this ? 
What is usually the effort of surviving friends in these cases 1 
What use might a legislator probably make of this feeling 1 



CHAPTER XVI. 
(Page 145.) 
RIGHTS OF SELF-DEFENCE. 

From what is the right to defend ourselves against violence de- 
duced ? 



250 



QUESTIONS. 



What is the question to be decided ? 

What does he who asserts this right without limitation undertake 
to maintain ? 

Quote Grotius on this subject 5 and Paley. 

To what do these doctrines conduct us ? 

Give the instance of the pagan. 

What would a Christian do in such a cEise ? 

What^ then, is again the conclusion ? 

What fallacy is often advanced 1 

What is the truth on this point ? 

What, then, is the simple question ? and what the answer ? 

What is the writer's view of Christian duty in this case 1 

What difficulty arises, if the right of sacrificing the life of an- 
other in order to save our own, be conceded ? 

What ought we to do in extremity of danger ? 

May we kill to preserve our property ? 

What is the view of our laws upon this subject 1 

Are we, then, never to resist aggression ? 

Would not such forbearance be an invitation to outrage ? 

Does it require courage to exercise forbearance 1 

What effect may we hope from the exhibition of a true Christian 
temper ? 

Can you give an instance of the happy effects of Christian for- 
bearance ? that of Barclay ? and of Leonard Fell ? 

What is the reason that some persons look upon these views as 
so impracticable 1 

What is the author's advice to such ? 



ESSAY III. 



POLITICAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. 



CHAPTER I. 
(Page 15L) 

PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL TRUTH AND POLITICAL RECTITUDE. 

What are the fundamental principles deducible from the law of 
nature, and from Christianity, respecting political affairs ? 



Is perfect liberty consistent with the greatest degree of happiness ? 
What is the office of government, on this point ? 



Q,UESTIONS. 



251 



Why do men institute government ? 
What are governors, then ? 
What are they not ? 

Is a nation properly under an obligation to obedience ? 
Who possesses the sovereign power ? 

What ought to be the conduct of a governor, or a government, 
when rejected by the deliberate judgment of a people ? 
What is the best and most powerful mode of governing 1 
What course did Fox recommend with regard to discontents 
among the people 1 



What is the only correct principle with regard to political power ? 
Is this rule usually regarded in practice ? 
What is a frequent fault in governments ? 
Are the people always exempt from blame in such cases ? 
What is the consequence of the exasperating course frequently 
pursued 1 

When may we reasonably expect a great advancement in the 
whole condition of the world ? 

What species of public measures will then receive the principal 
share of the public attention ? 

Are there any indications of this improvement ? 



What has been said by a Christian writer 1 
And what by an infidel ? 

What is the conduct of nations in this respect ? 

What is the character of the reasoning which is brought in sup- 
port of this course ? 

Give some of the usual excuses for national rejections of the 
moral law. 

What are the results of such reasoning ? 

What is said of the Savior's laws ? 

What is the rock on which we split ? 

Where is the evidence that we have been acting on wrong prin- 
ciples ? 

What, then, may we consider a maxim universally true ? 
Are we, then, to conclude that Christian fidelity would cost 
nothing % 

♦ 

CHAPTER II. 

(Page 358.) 
CIVIL LIBERTY. 

May civil liberty be fully enjoyed ? 
When is it enjoyed ? 

Does it depend upon forme of government ? 
Upon what, then 1 



252 



QUESTIONS. 



By what causes is civil liberty needlessly abridged ? 
What must be done with unnecessary laws 1 



CHAPTER 111. 
(Page 159.) 
POLITICAL LIBERTY. 

What does political liberty imply ? 

What is the difference between political and personal freedom ? 
What is the duty of a government on this point ? 
What is a common mistake with regard to political liberty ? 
How should such questions be decided 1 

What is the duty of the legislature when the people desire 
changes in the government ? 
What is justly due to a people ? 



CHAPTER IV. 
(Page 160.) 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY. 

[s it true that a government can never have any just concern vsith 

religious opinions ? 

How can it concern itself 1 
And by what means ? 

When does a government act immorally with regard to opinions ? 
What must a man be restrained from doing 1 
What ingenious argument has been offered in favor of restraining 
the expression of opinions supposed to be pernicious ? 
Is this sound 1 

What is said of a reference to creeds in framing laws ? 
What is remarked respecting the use of the word toleration? 
Whence arose the idea of toleration ? 
What should be the improvement in these advanced times ? 

— 

CHAPTER V. 
(Page 162.) 
CIVIL OBEDIENCE. 

What is involved in the idea of government ? 
How do we know that submission is right 1 
Does Christianity enforce this duty ? 



QUESTIONS. 



253 



What must we ascertain respecting it ? 

What does the law of nature propose as a motive to obedience ? 
What does this involve ? 

Is it not generally useful to submit to the civil power ? 

How shall we determine what modes of resistance to the civil 
power are lawful ? 

Quote the passage referred to, Rom. xiii. 1 — 5. 

What three things are to be observed on this passage ? 

What class of scriptural precepts seems applicable to the question 
of resistance ? 

When, then, is forbidden ? 

May a Christian lawfully abstain from all interference in public 
affairs ? 

What is the general duty on this subject ? 
What difficulties arise in the way of conscientious persons ? 
What mode is to be pursued with regard to unprincipled rulers ? 
How shall we determine the lawfulness of our course in such 
cases ? 

What modes are mentioned as being inconsistent with the Chris- 
tian character ? 

How shall we refute the objections which may be brought against 
the strict rule of right in these cases ? 

Is any more license allowed to the Christian in redressing politi- 
cal than personal grievances ? 

What is, after all, the most invincible mode of opposition to bad 
government ? 

What would probably have been the consequence if the Ameri- 
cans, at the time of their revolution, had adhered strictly to Chris- 
tian principles 1 

What is observed respecting certain voluble reasoners on these 
subjects ? 

Show the distinction between false and true courage. 



— ♦ 

CHAPTER VI. 
(Page 167.) 
FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. 

What prevents the political moralist from attempting to define 
the best form of government ? 
What rule should be observed ? 

What form is likely to be most satisfactory to a nation ? 

What is the author's opinion respecting the utility of a monarchi- 
cal government ? 

In what sense does he use the word monarchy 7 

How does he look upon the office of the president of the U. S. ? 

What does he enumerate as disadvantages attending frequent 
elections ? 

22 



QUESTIONS. 



What is advanced as an essential feature of a good form of got^ 
eminent ? 

What two considerations are mentioned as making this an essen* 
tial feature ? 

What is said of the right of a people to alter their constitution ? 
What must be determined by political wisdom 1 
What is remarked respecting the alteration of forms of govern- 
ment ? 

What is the duty of the government itself in this respect 1 

What will probably become the predominating branch in all gov- 
ernments ? 

What power is manifestly increasing ? 

What is the result of most permanent revolutions ? 

What would probably be the best form of government if the 
world were wise and good ? 

Will this be likely to prevail as the condition of mankind im- 
proves ? 

What, then, may be the ultimate result of progressive improve* 
ment ? 

What ought to be the leading motives in selecting legislators ? 
Is it wise to select them solely on account of political bias ? 
Why? 

What is the primary requisite 1 

Who would be the best of all politicians 1 



CHAPTER Vn. 
(Page 172.) 
POLITICAL INFLUENCE. — PARTY. 

What is said of the system of governing by influence ? 
What is the natural result of the power of appointing to offices 1 
In what circumstances will this influence naturally be the most 
powerful ? 

What would diminish it, or do it away ? 
What would be substituted for influence ? 



PARTY* 

Is the system of forming parties in governments consistent with 
political rectitude ? 
Why not ? 

What duty is violated by this sacrifice of individual judgment ? 
What apology will be attempted ? 
Is this valid ? 

What would be the advantage of integrity in these cases 7 



QUESTIONS. 



255 



CHAPTER Vm. 

(Page 174.) 
MORAL LEGISLATION. 

What is remarked as to the general character and objects of 
legislative acts ? 
From what does this deficiency arise ? 

What should be the relation between a government and its sub- 
jects ? 

Describe this relation. 

What should be among the efforts of conscientious legislators ? 

What would be the consequence of this moral amelioration of 
the people by the government 1 

What may be reckoned among the most obvious means of recti- 
fying the public morals ? 

What might be accomplished by a different use of the money 
appropriated to war ? 

What is supposed of the British and Foreign Bible Society 1 

Quote the remark of Gifford as to the care which should be taken 
of the morals of a nation. 

What would be among the consequences of a practical regard to 
this maxim ? 



CHAPTER IX. 
(Page 176.) 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. 

What does simple truth dictate with respect to the administration 
of justice ? 

What difficulty attends a practical regard to this ? 
What remedy has been attempted ? 
Where lies the evil of this ? 

What truth is indicated by this state of things ? • 
What difficulty attends the administration of justice according to 
a previously-made rule ? 

Is this objection practically felt ? 
Mention another inconvenience. 

How is the objection which relates to the uncertainty of property 
answered ? 

What great evil attends the requisition of what is called legal 
proof? 

Would these things occur in decisions founded upon equity ? 
What is the proper ground of objection to courts of equity? 
Give the author's views of the utility and practicability of settling 
disputes by arbitration. 

What seems to be a reasonable hope in such decisions 7 



256 



QUESTIONS. 



What is mentioned as an important collateral advantage attending 
the administration of equity ? 
What seems to be the effect of the present system 1 



CHAPTER X. 
(Page 179.) 

OF THE POPULAR SUBJECTS OF PENAL ANIMADYERSIO^. 

Are the actions which are denounced as wrong by the moral law, 
those which are always punished by the civil government ? 

What practical rule is referred to in the selection of offences for 
punishment 1 

Where do we find examples of a contrary kind 1 

Why are these offences passed over ? 

How do they compare with those which are punished by the law ? 
What appears to be another rule with regard to punishments ? 
What do such considerations lead the inquirer to expect 1 
Hosv is this illustrated ? 



^^^lat demands peculiar solicitude on the part of a government ? 
What is meant by a created offence ? 
What is the most fruitful occasion of these offences ? 
Why ought these created offences to be as few as possible ? 
What ought to be associated in the minds of men with the penal- 
ties of the law 7 

What is the general conclusion suggested by the present chapter ? 



CHAPTER XI. 

(Page 182.) 

• OF THE PROPER ENDS OF PUNISHMENT. 

Is punishment properly awarded for the benefit of the offender, or 
for that of others ? 

What is obviously the great pervading principle of Christianity ? 

Does the misconduct of an individual exempt us from the obser- 
vation of this rule ? 

What, then, is our Christian duty when a person has committed a 
crime ? 

What great practical advantage attends the fulfilment of this 
duty? 

Does punishment for the sake of example appear to be sanctioned 
by Christianity ? 

What is implied when we state reformation to be the j^r^f^ object ? 



QUESTIONS. 



257 



What should be our endeavor in awarding punishment ? 
What third object might reasonably receive more attention than 
It is vv^ont to do ? 

Is this generally practicable ? 

What does the author suggest with regard to it ? 



CHAPTER Xir. 
(Page 184.) 
PUNISHMENT OF DEATH. 

What objection is primarily urged against the punishment of 
death ? 

Is it supposed that the rules of Christianity are taken into account 
in awarding this punishment ? 

What is the inference from this ? 

What ar« we desired to consider ? 

How ought we to act in view of these considerations 1 

Does experience assure us that the terror of capital punishments is 
such as to render them peculiarly useful by way of example ? 

What instance is adduced in proof? 

Give the testimony of Mrs. Fry. 

What idea does she state to be prevalent among that class of 
persons ? 

What further objections are urged ? 

Quote the opinion of Bec<:ariaj also that which refers to the 

public feeling towards executioners. 

What spirit is said to be excited by public executions. 
Upon whom does this fall ? 

Does policy plead for the system of capital punishment ? 
What is the best substitute for this kind of punishment ? 



What is the argument drawn from the Christian Scriptures ? 

How is this answered ? 

What do some persons suppose ? 

How is the argument from the Old Testament answered ? 
What is remarked respecting the United States ? 
State another objection to capital punishment.. 
What is the ground of verdicts 7 

Have fatal errors been known to result from the uncertainty of 
testimony 1 



State the sum of the argument on this subject. 



22* 



258 



QUESTIONS. 



CHAPTER XIll. 

(Page 189.) 
RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS, 

How are religious establishments created ? 
WTiat are the only g-rounds upon which they can be advocat-ed ? 
Was the priuiitiYe church an tstablislied church ? 
Hovr would the apostles probably have looked upon such an in- 
stitution I 

How must the question of utility be decided ? 
What advantage is first mentioned 1 
In what light does our author view this ? 
Wnat has been often said ? 

What example is adduced in op{>osition to this sentiment ? 
\^'hat opinion of Paley is here cited 1 
How is this answered" ? 

Such being the advantages claimed, how are we to consider the 
disadvantages ? 

What single end " is stated as the proper one ? 

How do you show that this end is never solely pursued ? 

State the second class of disadvantages \ and the third. 



To what conclusions is the mind of the reader conducted by the 
discussions of this chapter ] 



CHAPTER XIV. 
(Page 192.) 

PATRIOTISM, 

Wliat is the author's remark as to the principles of Christianity? 
Quote Bishop Watson on patriotism, 

VTnx would this be inconsistent \^ith the Christian scheme ? 
What is the common view of patriotism ? 

Is patriotism, then, discountenanced in the Christian Scriptures f 
Wnat might be feared in such a c-ase ? 
State what Christianity does recommend on this subject ? 
What is the proper mode in which patriotism should be exerci&ed ? 
Wh(i, then, are the truest patriots ? 
What is said of the patriotism of political partisanship ? 
What is the most vulgar and unfounded talk of patriotism 1 
Are men influenced in their choice of a military' life by moiiFes 
of pure patriotism ? 
Quote the remark of Godwin. 
Does the author agree with him ? 
Where lies the " illusion *' ? 
What inference is to be dra\^Ti from this ? 



QUESTIONS. 



259 



CHAPTER XV. 
(Page 195.) 

SLAVERY. 

What will be likely to appear wonderful to posterity ? 
Why? 

WTiat is the reason of indecision on so clear a point ? 
Wliat considerations take the place of the primary one ? 
What is XhQ jirst question ? 

What is the consequence of deferring this to others ? 
How is the question to be decided ? 
What is said to be a difficulty with some inquirers ? 
What counsel is offered to such ? 

Contrast the various particulars which belong to slavery wdth the 
requisitions of the gospel. 
What is the result ? 

What do the defenders of the system tell us ? 

W^hy is this ? 

What is the inference 1 

How does this comport vnth a profession of Christianity ? 

What is mentioned as one means of estimating the goodness or 
badness of a cause ? 

What is the conclusion of the author upon this view of the dis- 
' cussions upon slavery ? 

What is his view of the distinction which is made between those 
who steal men and those who go on to profit by the robbery ] 

What parallel is here drawn ? 

What is the view taken of the act of depriving an innocent man 
of his liberty ? 

What are said to be the fundamental principles of the system ? 

What distinction is recommended ? 

Can the slave system be shown to be expedient? 

What is the fact ? 

Wnat general inference is drawn from this ? 

What was the author's prediction respecting the British slave 

system 1 and respecting the opposers of its abolition ? 

What will probably be the verdict of history ? 



CHAPTER XVI. 
(Page 201.) 
WAR. 

What is reckoned among the moral phenomena of the present 
times ? 

Was this question formerly agitated ? 



260 



QUESTIONS. 



What should be the endeavor of those who attempt the investi- 
gation of this subject ? 
How may this be aided ? 



CAUSES OF WAR. 

What cause is first mentioned ? 
What is the next ? 
And the next ? 

What is said of the habit of assummg a lofty tone ? 
Does this apply equally to nations and to individuals ? 
How is it shown that national irritability is one of the causes of 
war ? 

What class of considerations often promote war ? 

What is mentioned as still more powerful ? 

What is said of the ambition of great men as a cause of war ? 

What is perhaps the most operative cause of the popularity of war ? 

What is the true view of this cause ? 

How is this view illustrated and enforced 1 

What does the author avow as his conviction 1 



CONSEQUENCES OF V^AR. 

What is said of the calamities of war ? of the pecuniary evils 

resulting from it ? 

Quote the opinion of Erasmus. 

What is the comparative evil inflicted by war upon the commu- 
nity and upon the military profession ] 
Illustrate this. 

What does military subjection require ? 

Can it be right so to subject ourselves and our consciences ? 

What alone makes such a condition tolerable ? 

What is said of the elfects of war upon the community ? 

What other evils must be deprecated by the disciple of Christ ? 

What is said respecting war and Christianity ? 



LAWFULNESS OF W^AR. 

What is remarked of the arguments which are adduced in sup- 
port of the lawfulness of war ? 

What is the testimony of Erasmus ? of Bishop Watson ? 

of Southey ? of Dr. Knox ? 

What says the moral lav^^ on this subject ? 

Would any sentiment in favor of war have been consistent vnth. 
these passages ? 

Is it only from general principles that the Christian law on this 
subject is to be deduced ? 
Quote the Savior's precepts. 

Can these and similar precepts be supposed to permit violence? 



4i 



QUESTIONS. 



261 



Is only the act forbidden ? 

Wh,at was the usual practice of the Savior in this particular ? 
What appears to have been the most emphatical of his benedic- 
tions ? 

Do the discourses of the £q>ostles coincide in spirit with those 

of their Master 1 
What class of virtues do they especially inculcate 1 
Can we suppose the apostles anticipated that it would ever be 

attempted to reconcile the practice of war with the principles of 

Christianity 1 

What two considerations should be borne in mind in examining 
the arguments by which war is defended ? 

Do these remarks apply to the defenders of peace 1 

What scriptural narrative furnishes one argument in favor of the 
lawfulness of war ? 

How is this met ? 

What would be the result of rcELsoning from anaiogy in this 
case ? 

What other case is cited ? 
How is this answered ? 

What appears to have been the primary object of Christianity ? 

What, then, becomes of the argument drawn from silence on par- 
ticular points ? 

What has sometimes been urged 1 

How is this shown to be fallacious ? 

What is said respecting the payment of tribute ? 

What is said of John the Baptist's precepts ? 

Are we to consider his mission as identical with that of Christ, 
or only preparatory to it ? 

What may be strikingly inferred from the citations of Milton on 
this subject ? 

Describe those citations. 

What subject is mentioned as peculiarly important in view of the 
present question ? 

Are we to expect that the precepts of Christianity are to be sub- 
jected to any alteration in order to their accomplishment of this 
period of universal peace 1 

Do they not, then, tend to peace now ? 

What is certain with respect to the early followers of Christ ? 

Recount some examples in proof of this. 

Are these supposed to have been solitary instances ? 

When did Christians become soldiers ? 

Was this dereliction suddenly general ? 

At what period did Christians begin to engage in war without 
hesitation ? 

What is the argument most relied on by the advocates of 
war ? 

Can this be sustained on the principle of the paramount author- 
ity of the gospel on all questions of morals whatsoever ? 

Is it admitted that some kinds of resistance are lawful, in the 
case of nations as well as of indiviauals ? 



262 



QUESTIONS. 



Can this be made to include violent resistance 1 
What is the ^rsi duty ? ^ 
What appears to be the only truth elicited by the argument on 
this subject ? 

Can the difficulty of obedience be properly urged in opposition to 
the duty? 

Does the author suppose the difficulty of forbearance would be as 
great in practice as in theory 1 



OF THE PROBABLE EFFECTS OF ADHERING TO THE MORAL 
LAW IN RESPECT TO WAR. 

What may we reasonably hope if we conform ourselves consci- 
entiously to the will of God ? 

Are we, then, to be disappointed if our interests in the present 
life are sometimes sacrificed to our eternal interest 1 

What is the testimony of experience ? 

Quote the instances adduced from American history 3 from 

the history of ihe Irish rebellion. 
What is the deduction ? 

Has a national example of a refusal to bear arms ever been pre- 
sented to the world ? 
With what result ? 

What has been the ordinary practice of those who have colonized 
distant countries 1 

What was the course of the founders of Pennsylvania ? 
How long did their peace subsist in the midst of war ? 
When was this peace broken ? 

What grounds have we for confiding in the protection of God ? 
What, then, is the difficulty 1 
What evidence is there of this ? 

Who are the supporters of whom Christianity stands in need ? 
Recount the positions established by the reasonings of this 
chapter. 

What is the first ? the second ? &c. 

What is the reader invited to do in order to come to a right view 
of this subject 1 

What must be considered reasonable ? 

What would be the probable consequence of pursuing uniformly 
the pacific morality of the gospel ? 

♦ 

CONCLUSION. 
(Page 222.) 

What does the author state to have been a source of encour- 
agement ? 

May we observe indications of advancement ? 



QUESTIONS. 



263 



What is remarked of the lamentations over the degeneracy of the 
day ? 

WTiat proofs are adduced of improvement ? 

What inference is drawn from the fact that many new subjects 
of inquir}' are constantly arising ? 

Give a general outline of the author's concluding apology for 
his own deficiencies^ and of the avowal wit'- which he takes hig 
leave of the reader. 



THE END. 



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